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Introduction
Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Rajul Pandya-Lorch
The International Food Policy Research Institute has always held fast to the goalof generating policy information that will enable the world to feed its peoplesustainably, but in the early 1990s a world free of hunger and poverty looked
a long way off. At that time we found that global poverty and food insecurity had
fallen from their levels 20 years earlier but remained severe and persistent problems.
Moreover, we were troubled to see considerable disagreement on the magnitude and
nature of the world’s food, agricultural, and environmental problems and no long-
term vision or consensus about the steps required to feed the world, alleviate poverty,
and protect the natural resource base. So in 1993, in collaboration with partners
around the world, we launched an initiative called A 2020 Vision for Food,
Agriculture, and the Environment, to develop a shared vision and consensus, to gen-
erate information, and to encourage debate and action on these topics. The 2020
Vision initiative undertakes these activities in pursuit of the ultimate goal of achiev-
ing a world where every person has access to sufficient food to sustain a healthy and
productive life; where malnutrition is absent; and where food originates from effi-
cient, effective, and low-cost food systems that are compatible with sustainable use
of natural resources.
Today we find that some parts of the world have made great strides toward a
situation of sustainable food security, others are inching toward it, and still others
are moving away. This book brings together briefs and articles generated by the 2020
Vision initiative that remain highly relevant to the ongoing dialog and debate and,
given the nature of the topics addressed, are likely to remain so for some time to
come.
The initiative’s policy briefs present state-of-the-art information on key topics
related to food security, poverty alleviation, and sustainable resource management.
Written by leading experts at IFPRI and around the world, these briefs draw upon
a solid body of research. The initiative also publishes a periodic newsletter, 2020
News & Views; each issue carries a lead article on an emerging or “hot” topic relat-
ed to sustainable food security and based on interviews with policymakers, policy
analysts, and experts. But these briefs and newsletters tend to have a short “shelf”
life. Libraries usually do not catalog them, and they can easily get lost in the piles
of papers on most people’s desks. We have compiled them in a book as a way of mak-
ing them readily available for use in policy debates and actions.
x INTRODUCTION
Together these pieces offer a fairly comprehensive picture of the policy issues
the world must address if it is to overcome poverty, hunger, and environmental
degradation. Achieving a world of sustainable food security involves policy actions
in many related areas. Thus, readers will find in these pages discussions of nutrition
and health problems, demographic changes, natural resources, microcredit, gender
issues, globalization, and new technologies. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are
the sites of the world’s most severe food security problems, and this book presents
recent knowledge on these two specific regions.
The concluding chapter attempts to identify the most important policy actions
required to achieve the 2020 Vision, based primarily on the knowledge presented
in the rest of the book. At the international level, policies and institutions that guide
globalization and technological progress to benefit the poor and malnourished will
be of critical importance. At the national and community levels, policy action must
be tailored to the particular circumstances and the intended beneficiaries should be
empowered to participate in policy design and implementation. Policies to strengthen
the human resource through education, primary health care, and better nutrition
should be given high priority, along with policies and institutions to facilitate access
by low-income people to productive resources, fair and well-functioning markets,
and appropriate knowledge and technology. Good governance and an appropriate
macroeconomic framework are also crucial.
Most of the briefs and articles included in this book have been left in their orig-
inal form. Where deemed useful, the empirical evidence has been updated. Some
of the people interviewed have moved on to other positions or occupations.
However, all interviewees are identified by the position held at the time of the inter-
views. The rare instances when briefs were cut back or combined are noted in the
source listing at the end of the book.
We wish to thank the contributors whose work has been included in this vol-
ume. We would also like to thank Heidi Fritschel for her editorial assistance.
The Unfinished Agenda and
Prospects for the Future
P A R T  1
C h a p t e r  1
Famine and Poverty 
in the 21st Century
Reported by Ellen Wilson
The bottom line is that it is up to 
governments to take action to prevent 
hunger and future famine.
When Tesfaye Getachew and his wife, Senait Gebre-Selassie, experienced asevere drought on the heels of two years of dry weather in Ethiopia, theyhad to sell off the last of their belongings to buy food. But this wasn’t
enough to see them through more than a month or two because their assets were
so meager. When what little food they had ran out, Tesfaye was forced to beg. As
conditions worsened for everyone in the village because of the drought, neighbors
no longer helped each other, but fought each other for the handfuls of roots still
left in the fields. Twenty-five of the 100 families living in the village were wiped out
by cholera, which signaled the peak of the famine.
Famine. As we watch the gaunt faces on television, we wonder why does
famine happen. Should we blame the drought? Should we blame the war? Who or
what should we blame, and what can be done about it?
As researchers and policymakers work to answer these questions, they have
found that poverty, for the most part, is to blame. But poverty is complex, and its
solutions lie in its causes, which vary from locale to locale. Only after these causes
are examined can solutions be developed.
“Poverty is one of the most important unfinished tasks of this century,” said
Senator Sartaj Aziz, former finance minister of Pakistan and a member of the inter-
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national advisory committee for IFPRI’s 2020 Vision initiative. “It is atrocious that
there are still over 1 billion people living in poverty, half of them in conditions of
extreme poverty, and an estimated 700 million people who lack enough food to eat.”
Unfortunately, the most prevalent behavior exhibited by governments and the
donor community toward poverty has been reactive—after poverty has led to
famine.
“The proportion of money from the international donor community that has
been made available to fight poverty has not been very significant,” said Aziz. “In
the late 1970s and early 1980s the problem of poverty received some attention, and
many successful experiments were launched to find meaningful ways to reach the
poor. However, the interest of the donor community in poverty was not sustained.
In the next decade, there needs to be a much more determined effort to put these
promising solutions into action on a much broader scale.”
Once poverty reaches a state of famine, it is clear that there have been serious
human lapses, in addition to whatever natural disasters might have occurred.
“Famine is ultimately the responsibility of governments both in its cause and
in its resolution,” said Patrick Webb, research fellow at IFPRI, who has written, with
Joachim von Braun, several IFPRI reports on famine prevention and an IFPRI
report on hunger for the World Bank’s recent conference on hunger. “Famine is the
final manifestation of government’s failure to serve and protect its citizens. Famine
also represents a breakdown in the community’s ability to protect itself and its weak-
er members. Famine happens when governments and households fail to make the
right moves and the right choices at the right moment.”
There has been much debate about what the right “moves” are for governments
and households in preventing poverty and, ultimately, hunger, food insecurity, and
famine. According to Aziz, governments should first carry out a systematic survey
to find out the causes of poverty in a particular location and then decide on how
best to address these causes.
“Everything can work in the right context,” said Webb. “No strategy is inher-
ently better than another. Understanding when and where to use each tool is what
matters.”
According to Webb, governments and the international aid community must
build up the capacity of the poor to buy food and to cope with small and large
catastrophes.
The range of options includes diversifying the income base through nonfarm
jobs so that families don’t have to rely solely on rainfed agriculture; investing in agri-
cultural research and transferring technology, such as drought-resistant and high-
yielding crops, to farmers; allowing markets to function freely so that the buying
and selling of food is not affected by artificial restrictions and political turmoil; pro-
viding some of the poor with food subsidies such as food stamps; making credit
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available to the poor for building up assets and purchasing needed farm supplies;
investing in road building and other infrastructure because markets cannot work if
there are no roads on which food can be delivered; and promoting sustainable use
of the natural resource base.
According to Aziz, aid efforts also need to focus on social issues that contribute
to poverty, including inadequate health care and sanitation, lack of literacy, and dis-
crimination against segments of the population on the basis of race or ethnicity.
“However, many of these solutions have not received international acceptance
mainly because of the cost-benefit requirement of aid dollars,” said Aziz. “How can
you put a financial return on an investment in education or vocational training?”
Researchers also call on governments and the donor community to be rigor-
ous in seeking out early warning signs of impending hunger or famine. According
to Tom Zopf, director of Food Aid Management, a Washington, D.C.-based organ-
ization that seeks to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of food aid, “People
have certain coping mechanisms that they use to survive through the low periods,
such as using their savings, selling off assets like the family possessions or livestock,
and sending family members off to the cities in search of work. These actions only
make families more vulnerable to hunger, and governments must be able to track
and act upon them before families and whole communities end up in refugee
camps.”
Researchers also point out the value in asking the community itself what needs
to be done. “People need to have more control over their own resources and over
the development process, be it agriculture, health, or family planning,” said Zopf.
“In the development community, we have many solutions, but unless the people
affected tell us what the right ones are, we’ll be nowhere.”
In the past, according to Zopf, food aid, for the most part, did nothing to pre-
vent the next famine or hunger in the coming years. Recently, there have been efforts
to obtain long-term development benefits from emergency-relief activities, such as
food-for-work programs where roads or other infrastructure are constructed or the
provision of nutritional or vocational counseling in relief camps. “You need to do
what you can where you can and try to get as much development mileage out of
emergency aid as possible,” said Zopf. “But this takes ingenuity and creativity.”
Given the twin pressures of the burgeoning population and a limited natural
resource base, poverty is also inextricably linked to the environment. Growing fam-
ily size and deepening poverty force families to cultivate marginal lands and reduce
fallow periods, which only make the next years more difficult. Although, accord-
ing to Aziz, conservation of the environment is crucial, it cannot fall on the shoul-
ders of the poor. “For example, if you ask poor farmers and pastoralists living in
conditions of extreme poverty to stop cutting down trees for their fuel, then you
must provide them with subsidized kerosene and stoves.”
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When military conflicts and political turmoil spur the onslaught of famine,
what can be done? Not much except delivering emergency food aid and relief to the
affected areas as soon as possible, according to researchers. “However, a past record
of political instability should not be an excuse for not doing anything in a country
when there is a window of opportunity,” said Webb. “The international donor com-
munity should step in and reward peace and political stability with long-term devel-
opment aid wherever and whenever it occurs.”
Hunger is most acute now in Sub-Saharan Africa, but in terms of actual num-
bers, more people are hungry in Asia—in India, China, and Bangladesh. Some won-
der why famine and malnutrition ever occur at all given the world’s great food
surpluses. According to Webb, the surpluses are in the wrong places. “When you’re
talking about surpluses, you’re talking about Europe and North America. Though
some is redistributed to the developing world through food aid, this is really a drop
in the ocean compared with the need.”
The bottom line is that it is up to governments to take action to prevent
hunger and future famine. Amartya Sen, a leading researcher on hunger issues, has
found that democracies tend to do better at preventing famines, probably because
governments in democracies are charged with being responsible to the needs of the
people who elected them.
“From a cynical point of view, it actually costs more to respond to emergen-
cies, which are a constant drain on international aid dollars, than to invest proper-
ly in preventing them,” said Webb. And prevention will be an essential task in the
coming years as the world sees the population increase by 2.5 billion people by the
year 2020.
C h a p t e r  2
Global Food Security 
A Review of the Challenges
Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Rajul Pandya-Lorch, and Mark W. Rosegrant
The policy choices and investment decisions made will
profoundly influence the number and location of
food-insecure people in the future.
The extent and depth of food insecurity in the developing world at the turn ofa new century and millennium remains unconscionable. About 800 millionpeople—one-sixth of the developing world’s population—do not have access
to sufficient food to lead healthy, productive lives. Around 280 million of these food-
insecure people live in South Asia; 240 million in East Asia; 180 million in Sub-
Saharan Africa; and the rest in Latin America, Middle East, and North Africa.
Although progress is being made in tackling food insecurity, it is slow. And in Sub-
Saharan Africa the number of food-insecure people has actually doubled since
1969–71. According to recent projections from the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Summit goal of halv-
ing the number of food-insecure people from 800 million in 1995 to 400 million
by 2015 will not be achieved until 2030 (Figure 2.1).
Results from IFPRI’s revised and updated global food model, the International
Model for Policy Analysis of Commodities and Trade (IMPACT), suggest that
there will be similarly slow progress in reducing child malnutrition. Under the most
likely or baseline scenario, 132 million children under the age of six years—one out
of every four children—will be malnourished in 2020. This figure represents a
decline of only 20 percent from 166 million in 1997 (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.1 Food Insecurity in the Developing World, 1969/71–2030
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “Agriculture:
Towards 2015/30,” Technical Interim Report (Rome: 2000).
Figure 2.2 Child Malnutrition in the Developing World, 1970–2020
Source: 1970–95 data from Lisa Smith and Lawrence Haddad, Overcoming Child
Malnutrition in Developing Countries: Past Achievements and Future Choices, 2020 Vision
Discussion Paper 30 (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute,
2000); 1997–2025 projections from IFPRI IMPACT simulations, October 2000.
food-insecure people
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Micronutrient deficiencies remain widespread. About 2 billion people suffer
from iron-deficient anemia, more than 2 billion people are at risk of iodine-
deficiency disorders, and 250 million children are affected by severe vitamin A defi-
ciency. Relatively little attention has been paid to other important but neglected
micronutrients such as zinc, riboflavin, and calcium, and the global extent and con-
sequences of their deficiencies remain unknown. The consequences of micronutrient
malnutrition include higher mortality and morbidity, lower cognitive ability and
work production, impaired reproduction, and forgone economic growth.
Food insecurity is closely associated with poverty. About 1.2 billion people in
the developing world are absolutely poor, with only a dollar a day or less per per-
son to meet food, shelter, and other basic needs. According to the World Bank, the
number of poor people could remain unchanged over the next decade if growth
remains slow and inequality increases from current levels (Scenario A in Figure 2.3).
However, if countries adopt policies and interventions that foster inclusion and if
all benefit equally from growth, the number of poor people could decline by 40 per-
cent to 680 million by 2008 (Scenario B).
The majority of the world’s poor live in rural areas. They depend on agricul-
ture, either directly or indirectly, for their incomes and food security.
Figure 2.3 Poverty in the Developing World, 1987–2008
Source: World Bank, Poverty Trends and Voices of the Poor (Washington, D.C.: 1999).
Note: Scenario A: slow growth and rising inequality; Scenario B: Inclusive growth.
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During the next two decades, the world’s population is projected to increase
by 24 percent and to reach 7.5 billion in 2020. Virtually all of the population
increase will take place in developing countries, and much of it in the urban areas
(Figure 2.4). The rapid urbanization of the developing world and associated changes
in lifestyles will have profound effects on food preferences and hence on demand.
Prospects for economic growth appear favorable in the developing world, with
incomes projected to grow at an average of 4.7 percent annually during the next two
decades (Figure 2.5). All major regions are expected to experience income increas-
es, but Sub-Saharan Africa’s average per capita income is so low that even by 2020
it is projected to remain less than a dollar a day, condemning many people in the
region to persistent food insecurity.
IMPACT projects that a growing and urbanizing population with rising
incomes will increase global demand for cereals by 35 percent between 1997 and
2020 to 2,497 million tons and for meat by 57 percent to 327 million tons. Almost
all of the increase in demand will take place in developing countries. By 2020, devel-
oping countries as a group are forecast to demand twice as much cereals and meat
as developed countries (Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.4 World Population, 1950–2020
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision (New York: 1999).
Note: Medium-variant projections for 2000–2020.
Figure 2.6 Total Demand for Cereals and Meat Products, 1997–2020
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, October 2000.
Figure 2.5 Projected Annual Income Growth Rates, 1997–2020
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, October 2000.
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How will farmers meet such large increases in cereal demand? Primarily through
increases in productivity. Ecologically and economically sound opportunities for
expanding cultivated area are limited in most developing countries and virtually
nonexistent in many Asian countries. To bring about the necessary production
increases, farmers will have to improve their crop yields (Figure 2.7).
Yet farmers in both developed and developing countries are experiencing slower
growth in cereal yields, and this trend is projected to continue in coming decades
(Figure 2.8). Contributing factors include insufficient investment in agricultural
research and modern technology, inadequate extension services linking researchers
and farmers, insufficient or improper use of inputs, poorly functioning markets, lack
of appropriate infrastructure, and lack of timely access to credit.
As a result of the expected slowdown in crop yield increases, reduced pop-
ulation growth, and strong growth in demand for meat in developing countries,
Figure 2.7 Sources of Growth in Cereal Production, 1997–2020
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, October 2000.
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food prices are projected to remain steady or fall slightly between 1997 and 2020
(Figure 2.9).
Although cereal production in the developing world is projected to increase by
45 percent between 1997 and 2020, it will not keep pace with the increase in
demand. As a result, net cereal imports by developing countries are forecast to almost
double over this period, with the largest absolute increase expected in East Asia and
the largest relative increase in South Asia (Figure 2.10).
As noted earlier, the number of malnourished children is projected to decline
from 166 million in 1997 to 132 million by 2020 in the most likely scenario.
However, IMPACT projects that under certain conditions this number could drop
even further to 94 million. These conditions include increases in projected income
growth in developing countries; increases in crop yield growth in both developed
and developing countries; increases in cultivated area and irrigated area in developing
countries; improvements in health and education; and lower-than-expected popu-
lation growth. Conversely, the number of malnourished children could climb to 175
million in 2020 under other conditions, such as declines in projected income
growth in developing countries; declines in crop yield growth in both developed and
developing countries; declines in cultivated area growth; zero growth in irrigation;
reductions in health and education indicators; increases in agricultural protection
Figure 2.8 Annual Growth in Cereal Yields, 1982–2020
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, October 2000.
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Figure 2.10 Net Cereal Imports of Major Developing Regions, 1997 and 2020
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, October 2000.
Figure 2.9 International Food Prices in Real Terms, 1997 and 2020
Source: IFPRI IMPACT simulations, October 2000.
Note: Beef price is per 100 kilograms.
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in developing countries; and higher-than-expected population growth. Hence, the
policy choices and investment decisions made will profoundly influence the num-
ber and location of food-insecure people in the future.
Increasing food production and productivity is essential to achieving food
security, and policies that promote this goal include the following:
• developing efficient and effective markets for agricultural inputs and outputs
and assuring access to land and other productive resources by the poor;
• developing and maintaining appropriate infrastructure—including transporta-
tion, storage, and marketing infrastructure—particularly in rural areas;
• facilitating timely, reasonably priced access to required plant nutrients from
both organic and inorganic sources and supporting an integrated nutrient
management approach that seeks to both increase agricultural production and
safeguard the environment for future generations;
• removing institutional barriers to the creation and expansion of small-scale
rural credit and savings institutions and making them available to small farm-
ers, traders, transporters, and processing enterprises;
• expanding public-sector research, using the most appropriate methods, includ-
ing agroecological methods, conventional research methods, and genetic engi-
neering for the benefit of the poor and food insecure; and
• pursuing macroeconomic, trade, and sectoral policies that benefit low-income
people’s food security.
Making more food available is a necessary but not sufficient condition for food
security. Ensuring that people have access to that food is also vital. Policies to reduce
child malnutrition and improve food security by improving access to food include
the following:
• investing in improving women’s education and status—an IFPRI study found
that improvements in women’s education and status together accounted for 55
percent of the total reduction in child malnutrition in the developing world
between 1970 and 1995 (Figure 2.11);
• fighting hidden hunger or micronutrient deficiencies by fortifying foods and
offering vitamin supplements, encouraging diversified diets or healthier eating
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habits, and breeding nutrients into staple crops through conventional plant
breeding or biotechnology;
• tackling urban food insecurity by improving urban livelihoods and employ-
ment among the poor, supporting environmentally sound urban agriculture,
promoting healthy physical environments and adequate caring and feeding
practices, and designing more participatory and urban programs and strategies;
and
• effectively addressing health risks and diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria, and obesity that compromise food and nutrition security.
Finally, improving policies and increasing investments for food and agriculture
are particularly important in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is the only region where the
number of malnourished children has consistently increased since 1970, and it is
the only region where it is projected to continue to increase through 2020. By then,
30 percent of the developing world’s malnourished children would be residing in
Sub-Saharan Africa, up from 10 percent in 1970 (Figure 2.12).
Figure 2.11 Estimated Contribution of Major Determinants to Reductions in
Child Malnutrition, 1970–95
Source: Lisa Smith and Lawrence Heddad, Overcoming Child Malnutrition in Developing
Countries: Past Achievements and Future Choices, 2020 Vision Discussion Paper 30
(Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2000).
Note: Malnourished children refers to underweight children.
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Globalization—whose key features include international trade liberalization,
the opening up of economies in both developed and developing countries, and a
freer flow of capital, labor, information, and technology—is a major emerging
phenomenon. It has considerable potential to significantly influence food security
for better or worse, but its implications and consequences are not well known or
understood. It is highly unlikely that the forces of globalization can be turned back.
It is imperative that we identify the domestic policy changes required in develop-
ing and developed countries to minimize negative and maximize positive effects of
globalization on poor people in developing countries. In a globalizing world, new
and different groups of people may be vulnerable to food insecurity, but at the same
time new and different instruments and opportunities for facilitating food security
may become available. The challenge is to proactively guide globalization so as to
benefit poor, food-insecure people.
Figure 2.12 Child Malnutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1970, 1997, and 2020
Source: Lisa Smith and Lawrence Heddad, Overcoming Child Malnutrition in Developing
Countries: Past Achievements and Future Choices, 2020 Vision Discussion Paper 30
(Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2000); IFPRI IMPACT sim-
ulations, October 2000.
Nutrition and Health:
The Ultimate Goals
P A R T  2
C h a p t e r  3
Overcoming Child Malnutrition
in Developing Countries
Past Achievements and Future Choices
Lisa C. Smith and Lawrence Haddad
Education of women is a powerful
weapon against malnutrition.
In 1995, 167 million children under five years old—almost one-third of devel-oping-country children—were malnourished. Malnutrition causes a great dealof human suffering, and it is a violation of a child’s human rights. It is associated
with more than half of all deaths of children worldwide. People who survive a mal-
nourished childhood are less physically and intellectually productive and suffer
from more chronic illness and disability. The costs to society are enormous.
Eradicating malnutrition remains a tremendous public policy challenge. Which
types of interventions will have the greatest impact in reducing child malnutrition?
The study on which this brief is based uses national data for 63 countries over
1970–96 to explore this question.
Determinants of Child Nutritional Status
In order to reduce malnutrition, one must understand its causes. The immediate
determinants of a child’s nutritional status are the child’s dietary intake and health.
These, in turn, are influenced by three household-level underlying determinants:
food security, adequate care for mothers and children, and a proper health envi-
ronment. Finally, the underlying determinants are influenced by the basic determi-
nants: the potential resources available to a country or community, and a host of
22 LISA C. SMITH AND LAWRENCE HADDAD
political, cultural, and social factors that affect their utilization. The study focuses
on the underlying determinants, using four variables to represent them: national
food availability (for food security), women’s education and women’s status relative
to men’s (for both quality of care and food security), and access to safe water (for
the quality of the health environment). It also explores two basic determinants, using
per capita national income to capture the availability of resources in a country and
democracy as an indicator of the political context that influences malnutrition.
Reductions in Child Malnutrition during 1970–95
Between 1970 and 1995, the number of malnourished children declined by 37 mil-
lion, from 204 million to 167 million, while the prevalence of malnutrition (as meas-
ured by weight below the norm) in the developing world as a whole fell from 46.5
percent to 31 percent, about 15 percentage points in all (see Table 3.1). Progress in
reducing malnutrition has varied greatly from one region to another. The prevalence
of malnutrition has declined the fastest in South Asia (by 23 percentage points) and
slowest in Sub-Saharan Africa (4 percentage points). The number of malnourished
children has declined most sharply in East Asia (from 78 to 38 million). The situ-
ation is particularly troubling in Sub-Saharan Africa where the number of mal-
nourished children has increased by 70 percent. Since 1970, the prevalence has
decreased in 35 developing countries, held steady in 15, and increased in 12, with
most of the countries with increases in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 3.1 Malnourished Children in Developing Countries, by Region, 1970, 
1995, and 2020
2020 
Region 1970 1995 (under the status quo)
Percent underweight
South Asia 72.3 49.3 37.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 35.0 31.1 28.8
East Asia 39.5 22.9 12.8
Near East and North Africa 20.7 14.6 5.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 21.0 9.5 1.9
All developing countries 46.5 31.0 18.4
Number underweight (millions)
South Asia 92.2 86.0 66.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 18.5 31.4 48.7
East Asia 77.6 38.2 21.4
Near East and North Africa 5.9 6.3 3.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 9.5 5.2 1.1
All developing countries 203.8 167.1 140.3
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All four of the underlying-determinant factors the study considers are found
to have made substantial contributions to the reductions in the developing-country
prevalence of child malnutrition over 1970–95. Improvements in women’s educa-
tion have contributed by far the most, being responsible for 43 percent of the total
reduction. Improvements in per capita food availability contributed about 26 per-
cent and improvements in health environments 19 percent. The lowest contribu-
tion (12 percent) came from improvements in women’s status. While this factor has
a potentially strong impact, its potential has not been realized because women’s status
has improved little over 1970–95.
Together, women’s education and relative status have contributed to more
than half of the 1970–95 reduction in the prevalence of malnutrition in develop-
ing countries. Education of women is a powerful weapon against malnutrition:
increased knowledge and skills enable women to earn higher incomes, and thus
enhance household food security, and education improves the quality of day-to-day
care women give to their children. Women’s status relative to men’s influences chil-
dren’s nutritional status through its effects on the mental and physical condition of
the women themselves and through women’s autonomy and ability to influence how
household resources are allocated. In short, low status restricts women’s capacity to
act in their own and their children’s best interests.
Per capita national income and democracy—the basic-determinant factors—
influence the nutritional status of women only indirectly through public and pri-
vate investments in the underlying factors. Increases in per capita national income
have accounted for roughly 50 percent of the total reduction in child malnutrition.
Democracy is a potentially powerful influence because it gives people a voice in how
government resources are allocated, but democracy has not improved over the peri-
od for the developing countries as a whole. Thus no overall contribution could be
measured.
Projections of Child Malnutrition to 2020
The future prevalence of child malnutrition obviously depends on the degree of
effort exerted to reduce it. This study presents three scenarios based on the projected
evolution of the underlying determinants of child malnutrition during 1995–2020.
In the status quo, or “do-nothing-different” scenario, per capita food availability rises
about 9 percent, and safe water access, female secondary school enrollment, and the
female-to-male life expectancy ratio improve at the same rates as they did during
1985–95. The prevalence of underweight children falls from 31 percent in 1995 to
18 percent in 2020 (Table 3.1). About 140 million children, roughly one-fifth of
developing-country children, would remain malnourished under this scenario.
Under the pessimistic scenario, in which the rate of improvement in the nonfood
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underlying determinants is assumed to decline by 25 percent and per capita food
availability to be stagnant, the predicted percentage of malnourished children under
five in developing countries is 22 percent. If this scenario were to prevail, only a slight
decline in the number of malnourished children would be achieved by 2020: a
reduction of 12 million. In the optimistic scenario, in which the rate of improve-
ment in the nonfood underlying determinants is assumed to increase by 25 percent
and per capita food availability by 16 percent, the prevalence of child malnutrition
in the year 2020 would be cut in half, falling to 15 percent (leaving 128 million chil-
dren malnourished).
The projections to 2020 for the developing countries as a whole mask wide vari-
ation across the regions. Under all scenarios, South Asia will continue to be the
region with the highest prevalence and numbers of malnourished children, although
both will fall rapidly. Little progress in reducing the prevalence of child malnutri-
tion will be made in Sub-Saharan Africa. Given slow rates of decrease in prevalence
and large expected increases in the total number of African children under five, the
number of malnourished children will increase under all scenarios, rising as high as
55 million under the pessimistic scenario. The prevalence and number of mal-
nourished children are expected to decline the fastest in East Asia. Malnutrition will
fall to very low levels in the Near East and North Africa, and will almost be elim-
inated in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Priorities for the Future
Even under the most optimistic of scenarios, as many as 128 million children
would still be malnourished. What combinations of actions will lead to the great-
est reductions in child malnutrition by 2020? Given resource constraints and knowl-
edge of the costs of alternative interventions, how should policymakers prioritize
investments to reduce child malnutrition most quickly in coming decades?
In Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, improvements in per capita food avail-
ability and women’s education offer the best hope for future reductions in child mal-
nutrition. In South Asia, promotion of improved status for women should also be
prioritized. In East Asia, the Near East and North Africa, and Latin America and
the Caribbean, women’s education should be given top priority, followed by women’s
status relative to men’s. Additional secondary priorities are food availability for East
Asia and health environment improvements for Latin America and the Caribbean.
To maintain the necessary resource base and political will for these investments,
improvements in national income growth and democratic development must be
accelerated as well.
The study finds that significant progress can be made toward reducing child
malnutrition through accelerated action in sectors that have not been the traditional
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focus of nutrition interventions. Efforts to improve women’s education, raise food
supplies (or reduce population growth or both), bolster women’s status, and create
healthful environments should be an integral part of strategies for reducing child
malnutrition in the future. These initiatives should be seen as complementary to
more direct nutrition interventions, such as feeding programs and nutrition
education.
Any comprehensive strategy for resolving the problem of child malnutrition
must include actions to address both its underlying and basic causes. This is the key
message of the study underlying this brief. If the economic resources of the devel-
oping countries, as indicated by national incomes, cannot be raised, then increased
investment in health environments, women’s education and relative status, and food
availability will not be forthcoming. Similarly, if a democratic government is not in
place, people will not be able to bring pressure on governments to have their needs
met. But just having sufficient income and a democratic government are not
enough. Increased national income must actually be spent on improvements in the
underlying determinants, which requires knowledge of their roles in reducing child
malnutrition and political commitment to do so.
C h a p t e r  4
Health and Nutrition 
Emerging and Reemerging Issues
in Developing Countries
Rafael Flores
The benefits of good health and nutrition on
economic growth cannot be overstated.
Ahealthy and nutritionally well-fed population is indispensable for economicgrowth and development. Health and nutritional status affect the capacityto learn, which in turn determines productivity and economic growth.
Evidence from developing countries shows that adult productivity depends to a con-
siderable extent on the contribution health and nutrition during early childhood
make to educational attainment. Studies also show that a healthy adult with a
nutritionally adequate diet has a higher level of economic productivity in both own-
farm production and the labor market than one who eats and keeps less well.
There are many examples of the impact of ill health, which is often tied to the
vulnerabilities caused by poor nutrition, on economic outcomes. For example, in
Tanzania the average cost of treatment of a single HIV/AIDS infection, including
the loss of productivity, is estimated to be between 8.5 and 18 percent of per capita
income. Countries with severe malaria outbreaks have an average annual economic
growth rate that is 1.3 percent lower than those that do not. Tuberculosis (TB)
patients are absent from work three to four months out of the year, forfeiting 20 to
35 percent of annual household income.
Causation, Risks, and Effects
While the interaction of inadequate dietary intake and disease leads to malnutri-
tion, disability, and death, it is also clear that insufficient access to food, inappro-
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priate caring practices, a poor environment, inadequate health services, low women’s
status, and poverty play a major role in catalyzing the whole process. Each of these
factors can be a cause, a risk, and/or an outcome; the pathways toward and away
from good health and nutrition go in multiple directions.
Take the impact of poverty on HIV/AIDS and TB. Poverty increases the expo-
sure to, as well as the impact of, HIV/AIDS. It diminishes the perceived value of
avoiding HIV/AIDS (“we will die soon anyway”), increases the relative costs of pre-
venting and treating the illness, and worsens the impact of weakened immunity
because it commingles with a more hostile bacterial and viral environment. Under
these circumstances, TB reemerges rather easily, augmenting the negative impact of
poverty. Poverty and TB in tandem increase the already deleterious impact of
HIV/AIDS on family, friends, community, and state.
Looking at the causal process in reverse, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis increase
poverty in the short to medium run by stripping assets—human, social, financial,
physical, natural, informational, and political. Asset rundown leaves individuals,
families, and communities more exposed to future health and nutrition shocks. In
the meantime, public health resources are increasingly diverted away from preven-
tion and rural primary care to the treatment of HIV/AIDS-infected individuals.
The Global Burden of Disease
The 1996 World Health Organization study of the global burden of disease pre-
dicts that deaths from communicable diseases, maternal and perinatal conditions,
and nutritional deficiencies (Group I) are expected to decline by more than half,
from 34 percent of all deaths due to disease in 1990 to 15 percent in 2020. The
projected decrease reflects the overall improvements in Group I conditions brought
about by increased income, greater literacy, and progress in the development of
antimicrobials and vaccines. The major exception to this trend is HIV/AIDS, for
which global mortality is rising rapidly, from 300,000 deaths in 1990 to 2.7 mil-
lion in 1999.
While Group I conditions as a whole are expected to decline, deaths from non-
communicable diseases (Group II) are expected to rise from 55 percent of all deaths
due to disease in 1990 to 73 percent in 2020. In the developing world Group II
deaths are expected to climb from 47 percent of all deaths due to disease to almost
70 percent.
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
Today, approximately 36 million individuals are living with HIV/AIDS. Sub-
Saharan Africa is the region most affected by this disease. Most, if not all, of the 25
million people in Sub-Saharan Africa infected with HIV/AIDS will have died by
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the year 2020, in addition to the 13.7 million Africans already claimed by the epi-
demic. HIV/AIDS is also spreading dramatically in Asia, which will overtake Sub-
Saharan Africa in absolute numbers before 2010. HIV/AIDS has contributed
dramatically to exorbitant health care costs, labor shortages, a declining asset base,
breakdown of social bonds, loss of livestock, and reliance on crops that are easier to
produce but less nutritious and economically valuable. All of these effects contribute
to food and nutrition insecurity.
TB is the leading infectious killer of young and middle-aged adults in the world.
It causes 26 percent of avoidable deaths in the developing world. TB and HIV/AIDS
often conjoin to destroy lives. TB kills 30 percent of AIDS victims in Africa and
Asia, and HIV accelerates the progression to active TB by up to one hundredfold.
The burden of TB is expected to increase, with 80 million deaths over the next three
decades. TB’s negative impact on the social fabric of families and their nutrition secu-
rity is enormous.
Malaria is a major health problem in parts of Asia, Latin America, the Middle
East, and the Pacific. However, Africa faces the greatest burden of the disease. Each
year 300 to 500 million people become ill with malaria and 1.5 to 2.7 million people
die. Ninety percent of this mortality is in Africa, in children under the age of 5.
Pregnant women are also severely affected, and so are their developing fetuses.
Malaria is on the increase due to insecticide resistance, antimalarial drug resistance,
and environmental changes. Because malaria often strikes during harvest time, it can
threaten food security and agricultural production.
Intrauterine Growth Retardation, Cardiovascular and 
Endocrine Diseases, and Obesity
IUGR refers to fetal growth that has been constrained in the uterus. It results in new-
borns that have not attained their full growth potential and are already malnourished
at birth. Recent estimates suggest that about 11 percent of newborns, or 12.6 mil-
lion infants, suffer from low birth weight at term (the IUGR proxy). Low birth weight
at term is especially common in South Central Asia, where 21 percent of newborns
are affected. Low birth weight at term is also common in Middle and West Africa.
The “Barker hypothesis,” which remains controversial, is founded on the con-
cept that maternal dietary imbalances at critical periods of fetal development affect
fetal structure and metabolism in ways that predispose the individual to later cardio-
vascular and endocrine diseases. This hypothesis may have major implications for pub-
lic health, especially in developing countries. This is because in the developing world
a high proportion of births occur in the birth-weight range with the highest risk of
developing adult disease. In addition, the prevalence of risk factors, such as obesity,
that might lead to high blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, non-insulin-depend-
ent diabetes, and some cancers is increasing rapidly in some developing countries.
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Obesity remains rare in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. But in the more
developed countries of Latin America, the Middle East/North Africa, and Central
Eastern Europe/Commonwealth of Independent States, obesity in women and
children is as common as it is in the United States. Some countries with high levels
of obesity still report significant rates of childhood stunting and nutritional de-
ficiencies. The existence of a dual nutrition agenda of obesity and undernutrition
presents a difficult challenge because resources are limited.
Aging, Health, and Nutrition
The percentage of the world’s population over 60 years old in 1980 was 8.5 per-
cent. It now stands at 11 percent, or 613 million people. By 2020 there will be 1
billion elderly, with 71 percent living in developing countries. The elderly will be
susceptible to the health problems traditionally associated with low-income societies,
including infections and accidents, and their diet and nutritional status will inter-
act with these conditions. Infections that traditionally produced mortality in early
life, such as malaria, TB, respiratory infections, or diarrhea, may reemerge in the
lives of the elderly in developing countries.
Neglected Micronutrients
Poorer populations usually consume few animal products, so their intakes of vita-
min A, iron, zinc, riboflavin, vitamin B-12, vitamin B-6, and calcium are inade-
quate. Poor diets may also contain few fruits and a limited variety of vegetables and,
therefore, low amounts of beta-carotene, folic acid, and vitamin C. Failure to
address the problem of these neglected micronutrients means that a high propor-
tion of the world’s population—especially infants, children, women of reproduc-
tive age, and the elderly—will continue to suffer the illnesses and debilities associated
with this form of malnutrition.
Conclusion
A positive relationship exists between health and nutrition and economic pro-
ductivity. The benefits of good health and nutrition on economic growth cannot
be overstated. But to harness these benefits, the interactions of risk, causation, and
consequences among poverty, food insecurity, health, and nutrition need to be
understood.
C h a p t e r  5
Fighting Hidden Hunger
Reported by Heidi Fritschel
No single solution is likely to solve 
the micronutrients problem.
In the early 1980s, researchers from the Johns Hopkins University School ofHygiene and Public Health studying vitamin A consumption and blindness inIndonesia noticed that children with mild night blindness and dry eyes—symp-
toms of vitamin A deficiency—appeared to be at a higher risk of dying in the next
three to four months. To follow up, they studied 30,000 children in 450 villages on
the island of Sumatra, giving children in half of the villages a large dose of vitamin
A every six months and children in the other villages nothing. The findings were so
dramatic that nutritionists could scarcely believe them.
“We found that two cents’ worth of vitamin A twice a year brought down
mortality rates by more than 30 percent. It generated a lot of skepticism, but
other studies replicated it, and they confirmed the findings,” says Keith West,
an associate professor at Johns Hopkins. A lack of vitamin A, it was clear, could
be lethal.
This discovery contributed to a fundamental shift in the focus of nutrition
projects in developing countries. With respect to diet, instead of being concerned
only with whether people were getting enough energy, development practitioners
began to also concern themselves about whether people were getting enough
micronutrients—the vitamins and minerals that help the body function. In the last
decade or so, progress has been made—iodine and vitamin A deficiencies are on the
decline—but there is a long way to go. Researchers in a number of fields are work-
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ing on improving old ways of combating poor nutrition and on developing new
methods of delivering nutrients to the people who need them. Their successes
could lead to healthier, more productive lives for billions of people.
The Price of Poverty
In industrial countries micronutrients are everywhere. Dozens of foods, like milk,
flour, and breakfast cereal, are fortified, and multivitamin supplements are readily
available. And most people can afford to eat a varied diet that includes naturally
occurring sources of micronutrients.
In developing countries, however, the problem of micronutrient deficiencies
is huge. Although data are scarce, available estimates are cause for alarm. More than
half of pregnant women and school-age children suffer from iron deficiency ane-
mia, as do more than 40 percent of nonpregnant women and preschool children.
Some 100–250 million preschool children alone are affected by severe vitamin A
deficiency. And 740 million people are affected by goiter, a symptom of iodine
deficiency.
The costs of these deficiencies in terms of lives lost, forgone economic growth,
and poor quality of life are staggering. According to Rebecca Stoltzfus, associate pro-
fessor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health, iron
deficiency anemia in children impedes mental and physical development, damages
the cardiovascular system, and can lead to death. In women of reproductive age, it
can cause preterm births and contribute to maternal mortality during delivery.
Susan Horton, professor of public health and economics at the University of
Toronto, has found that anemia causes 65,000 maternal deaths a year in low-
income countries in Asia. She estimates that iodine deficiency causes losses of adult
productivity equal to 3.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in Pakistan, and
a group of economists at the Administrative Staff College of India estimates that in
India iron deficiency causes losses equal to 1.25 percent of GDP.
Iron and vitamin A deficiencies are often linked to poverty. “Poor people fre-
quently cannot get access to a sufficient quantity and variety of high-quality foods
that are rich in nutrients,” says Rafael Flores, an IFPRI research fellow.
Loading Nutrients into Foods
The biggest global micronutrient success story is probably the fortification of salt
with iodine. Iodine deficiency leads to mental impairment, even at mild levels. “If
you did nothing about iodine deficiency, many schoolchildren would be perform-
ing at a level close to mental retardation,” says Werner Schultink, senior adviser on
micronutriuents at UNICEF. Fortunately, adding iodine to salt is a cheap process,
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and 70 percent of the world’s population now consumes iodized salt, according to
Schultink.
The appeal of fortification is that it does not require people to change their eat-
ing behavior. It does require, however, getting nutrients into the foods they already
eat. Most Latin American countries have mandatory fortification of flour, says
Venkatesh Mannar, executive director of the Micronutrient Initiative, which organ-
izes and supports micronutrient programs worldwide. “The advantage of wheat flour
is that you can add several nutrients, including vitamin D, B vitamins, folic acid,
and iron. But the choice of vehicle for fortification is very limited in many
countries.” A food to be fortified must be available to and consumed by the entire
population, and it must be “fortifiable.”
The greatest micronutrient deficiencies tend to be in South Asia, where rice is
a staple. “One problem is you can’t cheaply fortify rice,” says Horton. “You could
coat the grain, but people wash rice. Or you can break down the grain, fortify it,
and reconstitute it, but this is 10 times more expensive than fortifying wheat flour,
and people tend to pick out the broken grains.”
“The other big issue, equally important,” Horton explains, “is that because rice
is processed in so many places, often by small processing plants, it is very difficult
to use as a fortification vehicle.” Because of these difficulties, some Asian countries
are beginning to fortify other local staples, like soy sauce in China, fish sauce in Viet
Nam, and noodles in Thailand.
The Micronutrient Initiative is leading a project to fortify salt with iron as well
as iodine. “It’s quite a challenge getting both iron and iodine in salt because they
compete with each other,” says Mannar. “Our solution was to encapsulate each iron
and iodine molecule.” The new double-fortified salt is about to be tested in a few
countries.
Vitamin Pills for All?
A range of efforts are underway to fortify foods, but why can’t aid agencies simply
circumvent the difficulties of fortification and distribute micronutrient supple-
ments to the people who need them? In some cases, that is what they are doing.
Supplementation seems to work best for vitamin A, which can be stored in the body
for six months. This means that supplements can be given just twice a year.
“Supplementation used to be considered a short-term solution until dietary
solutions kick in, but it now seems to be a longer-term prospect,” says Schultink.
This is because varied diets that include a range of nonstaple foods depend on long-
term income increases for the poor. Moreover, recent research has shown that
vegetable sources of beta-carotene, which is converted to vitamin A in the body, are
not as well absorbed by the body as previously thought.
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At certain stages of life, supplementation may be the only way to get people all
the nutrients they really need, even people who eat a varied and nutritious diet. This
is particularly true during pregnancy, when both the mother and the fetus have an
enormous demand for a range of nutrients. “We still need to provide iron supple-
ments during pregnancy,” says Stuart Gillespie, research fellow at IFPRI. “It’s a
fallacy to think we can phase them out. But by targeting supplements to people who
need them the most, we can reduce the number of people getting supplements and
reduce costs.”
Even if you can get the pills to the people who need them, individuals will not
always take them. “If you give pregnant women iron and make sure they take it every
day, their iron status will be much better,” says Mannar. “But in the real world, there
are issues of compliance. Communication is a huge part of it.”
New Ways of Eating
Nutritionists agree that part of the solution to micronutrient deficiencies is con-
vincing people to make their diets more nutritious. So far, however, most attempts
to change people’s eating behavior have been unsuccessful. “It’s often difficult to
make dietary changes using local foods if you’re poor. You can’t afford a nutritious
diet,” says Stoltzfus.
One project designed to increase vitamin A consumption among the poor in
northeast Thailand showed positive results. The project promoted vitamin A-rich
foods as something used by loving and caring mothers, focusing on a locally grown
vegetable—ivy gourd—rich in vitamin A that people could cultivate themselves. “It’s
not that we were interested in promoting only one green vegetable,” says Suttilak
Smitisiri of the Institute of Nutrition, Mahidol University, Thailand. “We promoted
the ivy gourd as representing other green vegetables. And we chose green vegetables
not because they are the best sources of vitamin A but because they are the most-
available sources for northeast Thailand.”
Most projects seeking to change diets, however, end with people returning to
their old ways. “Dietary approaches have worked in only limited settings,” says
Mannar of the Micronutrient Initiative. “They require lots of inputs and education.
When they are scaled up, they rarely work, so they tend not to be sustainable.”
Putting the Nutrients in Staple Crops
One new strategy for supplying micronutrients to the poor in developing countries
involves making the staple foods they eat more nutritious by using conventional
plant breeding and biotechnology. This is potentially a low-cost, sustainable strat-
egy: it would not require people to change their eating habits and would not impose
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the recurring costs that accompany fortification and supplements. The greatest
potential for improving nutrition status on a wide scale probably involves rice, which
is a staple for billions of people in Asia.
Howarth Bouis, an IFPRI senior research fellow, leads a collaborative initiative
among international agricultural research and nutrition centers to breed for nutri-
tionally improved staple food crops. Because different varieties of a crop can have
different levels of micronutrients, plant scientists can breed for this trait, he explains.
“Iron is in every rice endosperm, with lots of variation in levels. Plant breeders can
take a high-iron rice and cross it with a high-yielding plant,” says Bouis.
In fact, as part of this initiative the International Rice Research Institute in the
Philippines has identified an iron-and zinc-dense rice variety that is also high yield-
ing and disease resistant. One potential obstacle to this approach is that plant
sources of iron usually contain compounds that impede iron absorption by humans.
“In a pilot feeding trial at a Philippine convent, the iron status of the sisters improved
after eating this high-iron rice for four months,” according to Glenn Gregorio,
IRRI’s coordinator of the research. A larger-scale trial with a control group is
planned to see if results can be confirmed.
For vitamin A, a conventional plant breeding approach is out of the question,
because there is no known rice variety that contains beta-carotene in the endosperm
(the milled rice grain). So researchers at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
used genetic engineering to transfer beta-carotene from another species into rice.
In January 2000 they announced that they had created a so-called golden rice, which
contains beta-carotene, by inserting two genes from the daffodil and one gene from
a bacterium into the genetic material of a rice plant.
“The benefit of having the beta-carotene in the crop is that the delivery sys-
tem is already there,” says Gary Toenniessen of the Rockfeller Foundation, which
helped fund the research. “The current generation of improved varieties is being
grown in rural areas not being reached by supplements, for instance.”
Although golden rice contains only small amounts of beta-carotene, it is an
exciting first step in the effort to make staple crops more nutritious. Getting this
variety to farmers will still require putting the beta-carotene into rice varieties pre-
ferred by farmers and consumers, nutritional and biosafety studies, and field trials.
Commercial adoption of golden rice is several years away.
“We hope that our example will encourage other scientists and granting agen-
cies to follow the golden rice case with other traits and other crop plants important
for food security in developing countries,” says Ingo Potrykus, who led the Swiss
research team.
“Nutrient-dense staple crops could play a major role in reducing malnutrition,
but up to this point substantial funds have not been invested in the strategy,” says
Bouis.
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No Single Solution
Iron, iodine, and vitamin A are not the only micronutrients that need attention in
developing countries—they are just the ones that nutritionists know the most
about. But evidence is growing that other micronutrient deficiencies may be as seri-
ous. Marie Ruel, a research fellow at IFPRI, says, “We have only recently started to
pay attention to zinc deficiency, which has symptoms just as serious as those of iron
and vitamin A deficiencies.”
No single solution is likely to solve the micronutrients problem. “The consensus
among nutritionists now,” says Flores, “is that we need to use a combination of
approaches: fortification, supplementation, and food-based approaches, including
plant breeding. If we wait for a food-based approach alone to work, we will not solve
the problem. The magnitude of the problem is so big that we can’t wait.”
In the end reducing poverty may have the greatest impact on people’s nutrition
by giving them access to a variety of foods and making it possible for developing
countries to afford fortification and supplementation efforts. In the meantime
researchers are pursuing new avenues to broaden the options for combating this per-
sistent problem.
C h a p t e r  6
AIDS Mushrooms into 
a Development Crisis
Reported by Sara E. Wilson
The gravest long-term impact of the HIV/AIDS 
crisis is that on children.
Each day more than 10,000 people in Sub-Saharan Africa are handed what isalmost surely a death sentence, and all of them will likely be dead by 2010.These people are infected with HIV/AIDS. It is now clear that the deaths of
so many adults in their most productive years will have a devastating impact not
only on individual families, but also on communities and entire countries.
“The realization that we need to focus on AIDS as a development rather than
just a health problem has only really come in the last year or two,” says Stuart
Gillespie, a research fellow at IFPRI. Although health-oriented strategies to com-
bat HIV/AIDS have been under way since the 1980s, attempts to address the
socioeconomic repercussions of illness and death on such a massive scale have only
just begun.
And the repercussions are enormous. In countries with the highest rates of
infection, gains in economic growth, life expectancy, and educational attainment
are all being reversed. The sheer number of deaths in Africa is already causing prob-
lems for efficiency of businesses and government services. Environmental problems
caused by inability to combat agricultural pests and to maintain irrigation systems
could occur. The disease is contributing to rapid changes in cultural values, and those
changes may alter social bonds. “The epidemic will change these societies, there’s
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no doubt about that,” says Tony Barnett, professor of development studies at the
University of East Anglia, in the United Kingdom. “But those changes are
unpredictable.”
Indeed, researchers are still learning what the full range of effects may be.
“The research is fragmentary so far,” admits Hans Binswanger, the World Bank’s
sector director for rural development in Africa, “but the signs of what is to come
are obvious.”
The Scope of the Epidemic
Of the 36 million people worldwide currently infected with HIV/AIDS, 95 per-
cent live in the developing world and 70 percent live in Sub-Saharan Africa, where
infection rates in some countries are as high as 35 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa has
already lost nearly 14 million to AIDS, and another 23 million will die there by
2020. According to the Worldwatch Institute, life expectancy in Botswana is expect-
ed to fall from 66 years to 33 years by 2010.
Infection rates in Asia and Latin America are currently much lower than those
in Africa, but many countries there are expected to face rising infection rates and
millions of AIDS deaths during the first two decades of the 21st century. It is esti-
mated that India has the highest absolute number of infected citizens. “Even though
India is ‘only’ at a 1 percent infection rate, things can move very fast from there. I
believe India, China, and the Philippines, in particular, are at a huge risk,” says
Binswanger.
Greatest Risk for the Poor
HIV/AIDS takes an especially heavy toll on the poor in the developing world.
Poverty and HIV/AIDS can create a vicious circle: conditions imposed by poverty
increase the risk of infection, and the effects of the disease in turn exacerbate pov-
erty. The intensification of poverty caused by the disease is not limited to the
person dying of AIDS, because survivors are left to live on diminished assets and
income.
Poverty increases the risk of infection in a number of ways. The poor in many
countries are likely to be uneducated and illiterate, which can make it difficult to
reach them with information about preventing infection. People living in poverty
sometimes leave their villages to find work in cities. Separated from their spouses
and unsupervised by local norms, they may engage in risky sexual behavior.
Untreated sexually transmitted diseases are a recognized factor in the transmission
of HIV, increasing the risk of HIV infection for women by 300 to 400 percent.
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Finally, poverty can make it difficult for people to concern themselves with
long-term risks. Gabriel Rugalema, a research fellow in the Group on Technology
and Agrarian Development at Wageningen Agricultural University in the Nether-
lands, says, “Sex workers I’ve spoken to in Dar es Salaam, for instance, say they have
to focus on feeding and educating their children in the here and now.”
Cultural stigmas and lack of access to medical care combine to keep most
people from being tested. Once they are infected, the disease spreads as people infect
their spouses through sexual intercourse and mothers infect their children at birth
or through breastfeeding. Because they do not know they are infected, individuals
do not prepare themselves and their families for the financial and emotional impact
of their impending illness and death.
Even when the poor know they are infected, their time is relatively limited
because of the prohibitive cost of life-prolonging drugs. According to nutritionist
Vivica Kraak, who led a team of Cornell University researchers in East Africa,
“Malnourished people are likely to see a faster progression from HIV infection to
full-blown AIDS and to die sooner of AIDS-related complications, especially when
they don’t have access to prophylactic and antiretroviral drugs.”
AIDS Leads to Hunger
Households caring for an AIDS patient turn to a number of different coping strate-
gies, most of which lead to less income and less food security. AIDS decreases
income and agricultural production by removing from the labor force not only the
sick person, but also other members of the household who must care for the patient.
According to a 1999 report from the Joint United Nations Programme on
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), families in Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Thailand who were
coping with HIV/AIDS experienced a fall in income of 40 to 60 percent. Loss of
income and agricultural labor in turn cause a decrease in the household’s access to
nutritious food. Rural families will often plant root crops because they require less
labor, but such crops also offer a lower nutritional value. To raise cash to pay for
health care or food, families sell food-producing assets, such as chickens or goats.
When cash is lacking, households simply eat less.
The death of a major adult member does not mark the end of a family’s food
security problems. “In my experience in Cambodia,” says Margrethe Juncker, a
physician and volunteer with the Catholic organization Maryknoll, “the husband
got sick first and the wife had to spend all their money to care for him. Then he
dies, the mother is now also infected and has no source of income, and the kids have
had to be taken out of school. It’s a downward spiral.” The survivors may not have
the ability or energy to farm the land they retain and may not have the income to
hire help, or they may lose land completely because of land tenure practices.
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Says Alan Whiteside, director of the Health Economics and HIV/AIDS Re-
search Division at the University of Natal, South Africa, “We need to look at ways
to safeguard household assets, both the physical assets like the plow and the cattle,
but also the human resources, the knowledge represented by adults. For example,
Dad may know not to plant cassava in a particular corner of the field because it
always floods there, but his children might not. When Dad is gone, so is that
knowledge.”
Food insecurity caused by AIDS can extend beyond individual households.
When a large enough number of people are ill or dead because of AIDS, food pro-
duction for an entire region or nation could be compromised. Vivica Kraak found
evidence of this during research in East Africa in 1999. “In Uganda farmers in
the region around Kampala have traditionally grown matooke [green banana] and
supplied it to other regions of the country. Because of the loss of labor caused by
AIDS-related illnesses and deaths, the production of matooke has fallen, and this
decrease in production has affected not only people growing matooke for their
own uses, but also the availability of the crop for people in other parts of the
country.”
Loss of labor and income can also cause survivors to abandon agricultural prac-
tices that raise yields and protect soil fertility, like fallowing and use of fertilizers.
Children Are Hardest Hit
Almost everyone agrees that the gravest long-term impact of the HIV/AIDS crisis
is that on children. Even before they face the emotional loss of parents, children may
have suffered from the choices their parents have had to make in response to
HIV/AIDS. These choices can cause children to suffer from lack of food and
parental attention, to be withdrawn from school because fees could not be paid or
because their labor was needed, or to be sent away from home to live with relatives.
“The most obvious way children are affected is through orphaning,” says
Whiteside. “But they’re really orphaned before the death of their parents. Orphaning
is a series of events, with the death of the parent the culminating one. We are end-
ing up with millions of children who are unloved, unsocialized, and uneducated.”
UNAIDS estimates that by 2010 there could be as many as 42 million orphans
in Sub-Saharan Africa. “Young children and adolescents are losing more than their
parents,” says Anita Alban, senior economist in the Policy, Strategy, and Research
Department of UNAIDS. “They are losing basic life skills such as caring for one
another. The norms of such children might change not only their future but the
community they will have to adapt to.” Because they are, by definition, years away
from adulthood, caring for these children will require the commitment of long-term
resources.
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Mitigation Efforts Are Changing
Since HIV/AIDS was viewed exclusively as a health issue until recently, most
support efforts have focused on providing medical care to the sick and dying. Now
attention is being turned to aiding those left behind when AIDS victims die. In gen-
eral, such mitigation efforts have been carried out by the affected communities
themselves. For example, a World Bank study in Tanzania found that 90 percent of
assistance to families that had lost a major adult member came from families or
communities. These kinds of support strategies include community-based child care;
volunteer labor to assist in increasing agricultural output and caring for HIV/AIDS
patients; and apprenticeship and training for orphaned adolescents.
Nongovernmental organizations often team with local communities to offer
mitigation assistance. Small programs, like the one run by Maryknoll in Cambodia,
often start with basic care of AIDS patients and move on to more extensive miti-
gation efforts. Juncker, for example, started an income-generating activity with
patients she cared for in Maryknoll’s Seedlings of Hope clinic. Income generated
by making patchwork quilts earns people in the program US$62 a month. “After six
months, I now have 11 people sewing the quilts and more families working at home
to cut donated fabric for the sewers,” she says. Juncker hopes to expand the pro-
gram by opening a creche so that widows with young children will have somewhere
to leave their children while sewing. Similar programs throughout the developing
world provide opportunities for HIV/AIDS-affected people and families to protect
themselves from the worst of the poverty-exacerbating impacts of the disease.
Yet, while these programs are important, they do not reach enough of those
who need help. Binswanger of the World Bank refers to them as “tiny boutiques,
which do good work but only reach 1 to 2 percent of the population.”
Development agencies are more likely to have the financial and organization-
al capital to reach more of those in need. For instance, the World Bank trains agri-
cultural extension workers to offer advice on what crops to grow when there are
fewer adults available to farm the land. The United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) works to improve orphan registration efforts and to promote the right
of HIV/AIDS children to stay in school. However, according to Daphne Topouzis,
a consultant specializing in HIV and agriculture and rural development, inter-
national agencies have focused their efforts on research. “It’s very hard to general-
ize,” she says, “but it is certain that they have done more on the research side than
on practical mitigation efforts.”
There are signs that this focus may be changing, among them the fact that in
September 2000 the World Bank approved a multicountry HIV/AIDS program for
Africa. Funds will go to projects developed by individual countries. According to
the World Bank, the program “will support efforts to scale up national prevention,
care, support, and treatment programs, and to prepare countries to cope with the
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unprecedented burdens they will face as the millions living with HIV today develop
AIDS over the next decade.”
Prevention Is the Ultimate Solution
No matter how widespread mitigation efforts are, the devastating impact of
HIV/AIDS will continue unabated until its incidence can be drastically reduced.
Since development of a vaccine appears to be at least a decade off, other methods
must be found to stem the tide of infection. Some argue that aggressive education
campaigns targeting those most at risk can accomplish this goal. That strategy has
had significant success in Thailand. In 1990 both Thailand and South Africa had
adult infection rates of less than 1 percent. In 1999 South Africa’s infection rate was
20 percent; Thailand’s was 2 percent.
Despite the case of Thailand, many researchers now argue that prevention
strategies will have to aim at the underlying issue of poverty to be truly successful.
Rugalema says, “Preventing AIDS through information and messages doesn’t really
make sense to me. People can’t eat information. Where the economy is very weak,
sending information is not going to solve the problem. You have to start with re-
habilitating the economy so people will have some hope for the future.” Gillespie
adds, “There has been too much on awareness raising and too little on the specific
conditions that have to change before behavior can change.”
In a way, then, successful mitigation strategies can themselves be prevention
techniques because of the two-way relationship between HIV/AIDS and poverty.
Desmond Cohen, former director of the HIV and Development Programme of the
United Nations Development Programme, points out, for example, that children
who are malnourished, lack education, and have missed out on normal processes
of socialization because of the impact of HIV/AIDS on their families and societies
are more likely, because of these very conditions, to become “the next cohort of the
HIV infected.” Improving the conditions under which these children live could pre-
vent them from becoming infected and, ultimately, end the epidemic.
Still, even if no new infections were to occur beginning tomorrow, Africa and
some areas in Asia and Latin America will be facing severe socioeconomic reper-
cussions for decades to come. Vigorous efforts are already under way by donor
agencies, NGOs, and communities themselves to understand and act on the ram-
ifications of HIV/AIDS. There are some hopeful signs that national governments
and the international community are beginning to understand that increased polit-
ical will and financial resources must be directed toward this epidemic. Only when
that commitment is made will communities, governments, and their partners in the
developing world be able to make a real impact on the disaster of HIV/AIDS.
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HIV/AIDS
A Critical Health and Development Issue
Tony Barnett and Gabriel Rugalema
By killing productive adults who are key family providers,
HIV/AIDS shatters the social networks that provide
households with community help and support.
Slightly more than 20 years ago, the first cases of AIDS (acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome) were identified. Since then, scientists not only haveidentified the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) that causes AIDS, but
also now understand many of the stages in transmission. Naturally, an infection that
is transmitted in a predominantly heterosexual manner and that destroys the health
and finally the lives of people of prime producing age exerts a considerable socio-
economic impact.
Neither a vaccine nor a cheap, assured, and effective treatment for HIV/AIDS
exists. The pandemic continues to grow and to affect millions of people worldwide,
particularly the poor in the southern hemisphere, where 95 percent of cases are
concentrated. With most illness and death occurring in the 15–50 age group, the
disease deprives countries, communities, and households of their strongest, most
productive people.
Today, approximately 36 million individuals are living with HIV/AIDS.
Assuming that each HIV/AIDS case directly influences the lives of four other indi-
viduals, a total of more than 150 million people are being affected by the disease.
Sub-Saharan Africa is the region most affected by HIV/AIDS, now that area’s lead-
ing cause of adult morbidity and mortality (see Table 7.1). Most, if not all, of the
25 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa who are living with HIV/AIDS will have
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died by the year 2020, in addition to the 13.7 million Africans already claimed by
the epidemic.
HIV/AIDS also is spreading dramatically in Asia. India leads the world in
absolute numbers of HIV infections, estimated at 3 to 5 million. China, too, has a
growing HIV/AIDS problem, with approximately 0.5 million AIDS cases and,
according to private estimates by Chinese specialists, up to 10 million HIV infec-
tions. Asia will overtake Sub-Saharan Africa in absolute numbers before 2010; by
2020 Asia will be the HIV/AIDS epicenter.
HIV/AIDS Morbidity and Mortality and 
Household Food Security
HIV/AIDS is a huge health problem with profound social and economic implica-
tions, including its effect on the ability of households to acquire enough nutritious
Table 7.1 HIV/AIDS by Region, December 2000
Adults and Adults and Percent of
Children Children Adult HIV-Positive
Epidemic Living with Newly Infected Prevalence Adults Who
Region Started HIV/AIDS with HIV Rate (%) Are Women
Sub-Saharan Africa Late 1970s– 25,300,000 3,800,000 8.8 55
early 1980s
North Africa and Late 1980s 400,000 80,000 0.2 40
Middle East
South and South- Late 1980s 5,800,000 780,000 0.56 35
east Asia
East Asia Late 1980s 640,000 130,000 0.07 13
and Pacific
Latin America Late 1970s– 1,400,000 150,000 0.5 25
early 1980s
Caribbean Late 1970s– 390,000 60,000 2.3 35
early 1980s
Eastern Europe Early 1990s 700,000 250,000 0.35 25
and Central Asia
Western Europe Late 1970s– 540,000 30,000 0.24 25
early 1980s
North America Late 1970s– 920,000 45,000 0.6 20
early 1980s
Australia and Late 1970s– 15,000 500 0.13 10
New Zealand early 1980s
Total 36,100,000 5,300,000 1.1 47
Source: www.unaids.org
Note: Adulthood is 15–49 years of age.
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food for members to lead active, healthy lives. HIV/AIDS has created or con-
tributed to exorbitant health care costs, labor shortages, a declining asset base,
breakdown of social bonds, downgraded crops, and loss of livestock. All of these
effects contribute to food insecurity.
Households are said to be food-secure when the following four elements are in
balance with each other: food availability, equal access to food, stability of food sup-
plies, and quality of food. For rural households, the equitable availability of stable
quantities of nutritious food depends on food production (using mainly family
labor, land, and other resources); food purchase (using household income); assets
that can be quickly turned into food or cash as necessary; and social claims on others
through custom and societal structures such as family and community networks.
HIV/AIDS morbidity and mortality affect food security by reducing house-
holds’ ability to produce and buy food, by depleting assets, and by reducing the
insurance value of social networks as the household calls in favors. Morbidity affects
agricultural productivity by affecting labor availability, forcing households to re-
allocate labor from agriculture to patient care. AIDS mortality permanently removes
adult labor from the household. This combination of adult morbidity and mortal-
ity and the associated reallocation and withdrawal of labor has led to a number of
adverse changes.
Downgraded Crops and Loss of Livestock
Households affected by HIV/AIDS often replace valuable and nutritious crops
that are labor-intensive with root crops, which are fast-maturing but less profitable.
Household members consume this mainly starchy food but cannot easily purchase
nutritious food because of lower farm income. Chronic food insecurity and high
levels of malnutrition among children, especially orphans, are the likely results of
these changing crop patterns. Livestock may be sold to generate cash for patient care
or as compensation for a labor shortage, may be taken away from survivors, or may
be slaughtered for consumption during funerals—or animals may die because of
poor management. When households lose livestock, they also lose fertilizing
manure, milk for the family, and “ambulatory” savings.
Loss of Farm Management Resources and Skills
Subsistence agriculture requires the interaction of human, financial, and physical
resources, and all adult household members contribute to this interaction in some
way. But HIV/AIDS breaks the chain of knowledge transfer and labor sharing
between generations. As a result, survivors—notably orphans and the elderly, who
cannot manage the family farm due to lack of knowledge, experience, and physical
strength—often remain or become malnourished.
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Inability to Earn Income
By killing young adults, the key earners of nonfarm income, HIV/AIDS dramati-
cally reduces households’ earning power and, therefore, their ability to buy food and
related goods and services. Illness and funerals force households to spend most of
their cash on care, treatment, and other expenses, with adverse consequences for
food availability. Labor shortages force households to forgo cash crops in favor of
fast-maturing food crops, curtailing the ability of afflicted households to generate
cash. Evidence from eastern and southern Africa shows that households affected by
HIV/AIDS not only are eating fewer meals and consuming poorer foods, but also
are investing less in the health of surviving members, losing even more labor to fre-
quent morbidity.
Loss of Assets
Food security hinges on household assets, which create a buffer between poor pro-
duction on the one hand and consumption and exchange needs on the other. In
times of need, assets such as livestock, land, trees, and even furniture can be readily
converted into cash to buy food. Households accumulate assets as an insurance strat-
egy, but HIV/AIDS forces households to dispose of their assets. They are left not
only impoverished, but also vulnerable in the long term.
Disruption of Social Networks
By killing productive adults who are key family providers, HIV/AIDS shatters the
social networks that provide households with community help and support.
Survivors are left with few relatives upon whom to depend, and strong evidence
shows that gender and age are critical determinants of social exclusion in the face
of HIV/ AIDS. Widows and their households face critical shortages of food and
income, primarily due to disinheritance, lack of sufficient assets, lack of labor sup-
ply, and exclusion from wider kinship networks. Orphans, widows, and the elder-
ly find it particularly difficult to depend on other relatives for survival.
Increasing Dependency
Households headed by survivors—notably widows, orphans, and the elderly—are
more highly dependent on outside sources of support, further compromising their
access to food. Moreover, the centuries-old external support structures that guar-
anteed the interhousehold transfer of food to cushion the needy are collapsing
because of HIV morbidity and mortality.
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Policy and Program Implications
Few poverty and distributional policies and programs—particularly in Africa, but
also in Asia and Latin America—are unaffected by HIV/AIDS. Households that lose
labor are less able to earn cash, with implications for income-generating projects.
Less purchasing power reduces the standards of long- and short-term dependent care
within those households. Any efforts at mitigating the rural impact of HIV/AIDS,
however, must be multisectoral and must take account of local circumstances.
Efforts should be made to identify the most vulnerable farming systems and
to ensure the food security of the most vulnerable households. Farming systems and
households that remain viable should be supported to prevent individuals from
resorting to activities that deplete natural resources (such as bush encroachment).
Research and extension programs should contain an HIV/AIDS education
component and should encourage rural people to consider how they would respond
to the impact of HIV/AIDS. In some communities, farmers’ panels could be estab-
lished so that those who have coped or are coping with the disease can talk with peo-
ple from hitherto lightly affected communities.
Development, dissemination, and scaling up of labor-economizing methods of
cultivation, food preparation, water supply, and livestock-raising should be encour-
aged. Agricultural education should be targeted to orphans and out-of-school youth,
and land tenure arrangements must safeguard the interests of widowed women and
orphaned children.
In general, policies and programs must go beyond HIV prevention and AIDS
care to the long-term issues of livelihood maintenance and food security.
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Obesity
An Emerging Health and Nutrition
Issue in Developing Countries
Reynaldo Martorell
Obesity is not a problem everywhere in the
developing world, but it appears to become 
a problem as income increases.
Obesity is a disease of complex, multiple causes leading to an imbalancebetween energy intake and output and to the accumulation of large amountsof body fat. It is measured most often as excessive weight for a given height,
using the body mass index (BMI)—weight in kilograms (kg) over height squared
(m2). The World Health Organization (WHO) defines overweight as a BMI between
25.0 and 29.9 kg/m2 and obesity as a BMI of 30.0 kg/m2 or greater.
A Growing Public Health Problem
The consequences of obesity for adults are well known. Obesity contributes to the
development of many diseases, including diabetes, hypertension, stroke, cardiovas-
cular disease, and some cancers. Obesity also increases mortality from all causes,
including cardiovascular disease and cancer.
Childhood obesity is a problem because it is an important predictor of adult
obesity. About one third of obese preschool children become obese adults, and one-
half of obese school-age children become obese adults. Most obese adults, however,
were not obese children.
Obesity also affects child health. The risk of hyperlipidemia, hypertension, and
abnormal glucose tolerance is somewhat higher among obese children. In the
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United States childhood obesity has important psychosocial consequences: obese
children frequently are targets of systematic discrimination and, by adolescence,
many suffer from low self-esteem.
According to WHO, obesity is increasing worldwide at an alarming rate, in
both developed and developing countries. WHO issued this conclusion despite the
limited availability of nationally representative data and scarce information about
trends. The note of alarm led a U.S. team from Emory University (Reynaldo
Martorell and Morgen Hughes) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) (Laura Kettel Khan and Lawrence Grummer-Strawn) to analyze data from
national nutrition surveys in the last 15 years to determine obesity levels and trends
in developing countries. Most of these surveys focus only on preschool children and
women of reproductive age and therefore provide limited information about obe-
sity patterns.
Obesity in Women
The study compared overweight and obesity rates in women from 38 developing
countries with rates in the United States (Figure 8.1). Levels of overweight and obe-
sity were extremely low in South Asia. In poor countries, such as those in Sub-
Saharan Africa, obesity levels were low, with the condition concentrated among
urban and educated women.
In more developed countries, including those in Latin America and the Central
Eastern Europe/Commonwealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS) region, obesity
levels were higher and more equally distributed in the general population. Obesity
ceased to be a distinguishing feature of high socioeconomic status in Brazil, and in
Mexico it is emerging as a marker of poverty, as it is in developed countries.
Obesity in Children
Data regarding obesity in children 12 to 60 months old were available from 50 coun-
tries. Obesity was defined as greater than two standard deviations above the mean,
using the international reference population recommended by WHO. The preva-
lence of obesity in the reference population is 2.3 percent. With the exception of
Pakistan, where 2.6 percent of children were obese, obesity was rare in South Asia
(including India) and in Thailand. The countries examined in Sub-Saharan Africa
had low levels of obesity, except Malawi, with 5.2 percent. Seven of 13 countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean, 1 of 2 countries in the CEE/CIS region, and all
4 Middle Eastern and North African countries exceeded 2.3 percent. In the United
States, 3.1 percent of children were obese.
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Obesity was more common in urban areas and was more prevalent in girls and
in children of mothers with higher education. At the country level, child obesity
was positively related to gross national product and negatively related to stunting.
Assessing Obesity Trends
In assessing trends in obesity, the research team was severely constrained by lack of
data. Only a few countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, had
repeat surveys: 6 for women and 17 for children. In the repeat surveys, obesity lev-
els in children in 7 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa did not appear to change over
time. By contrast, in Latin America, levels increased in most of the 9 countries with
data. In Egypt, obesity levels decreased slightly but remained among the highest in
developing countries.
Figure 8.1 Overweight and Obesity in Women in Developing Countries and the
United States
Source: L. Grummer-Strawn, M. Hughes, L. K. Khan, and R. Martorell, “Obesity in Women
from Developing Countries,” European Journal of Clinical Nutrition 54 (2000): 247–252.
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Other sources suggest that obesity, particularly among adults, is increasing in
Micronesia, the Middle East, and Latin America as it is in the United States and
Europe. Better data are needed, however, to confirm trends in developing countries.
The results of this study of obesity in women and children in developing coun-
tries need to be interpreted with caution because of insufficient data as well as
methodological concerns. The reference population used to assess obesity in chil-
dren is derived from measurements of U.S. children, who may have higher than
desired levels of fatness. No consensus on how best to measure obesity in children
exists, and the interpretation of weight-for-height indexes in populations with sig-
nificant levels of stunting has been questioned. There is consensus, however, that a
BMI over 30 in adults represents a serious clinical concern. Moreover, risk appears
at much lower levels of BMI, and just being overweight (BMI of 25 to 29.9)
increases health and mortality risks.
Some countries with high levels of obesity also report significant rates of child-
hood stunting and nutritional deficiencies. Maintaining a dual nutrition agenda—
preventing obesity and related chronic diseases while eliminating nutritional
deficiencies—presents a difficult challenge to countries with limited resources. In
addition, many countries are unprepared to address the changing epidemiology.
Because information about the occurrence of obesity and related chronic diseases
in the population is limited, these issues are not considered public health problems.
Many countries’ nutrition policies continue to focus on undernutrition, limiting
experience and expertise with chronic diseases.
Preventing Obesity and Related Diseases
Obesity is not a problem everywhere in the developing world, but it appears to
become a problem as income increases. Developing countries need to take a num-
ber of measures to prevent obesity and related chronic diseases. Information systems
should collect data about chronic diseases to support advocacy activities and to help
define policies and programs. These efforts must include schoolchildren, elderly
women, and men—not just women of reproductive age and young children.
Professionals must be trained to design, monitor, and evaluate programs aimed at
preventing chronic diseases.
Nutrition and healthy lifestyles should be addressed in the school curriculum,
and physical activity should be promoted in schools and in the general population.
In Singapore, for example, the “Trim and Fit Scheme”—a comprehensive 10-year
program that began in 1992—features teacher education and training, assessment
of students, a program to reduce sugar in children’s beverages, and more physical
activity for children during school hours. A recent evaluation of the Singapore pro-
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gram shows a marked improvement in fitness and some evidence of reduction in
obesity.
Urban planners can support increased physical activity by building recreational
facilities, such as parks and playgrounds. Public education must be as aggressive and
effective as commercial advertisements in promoting healthy diets and lifestyles.
Food and agricultural policies can stimulate consumption of healthy diets. Nutrition
labeling should be required for all industrially prepared foods to help consumers
select food. Industry’s role in developing healthier food products and in promoting
public health and nutrition should be recognized and encouraged. Agricultural
research can help shift the macro- or micro-nutrient composition of the food sup-
ply. In the U.S. livestock sector, for example, food processing modifications com-
bined with changes in breeding, feeding, and meat-trimming practices have
contributed to lower-fat meat.
In much of the developing world, preventing obesity and related chronic dis-
eases should be a priority of governments, as well as of international, bilateral, and
national organizations. At the same time, efforts to eliminate nutritional deficien-
cies must continue.
Demographic Issues:
Population Growth
and Urbanization
P A R T  3
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The Population Boom
What Do the Numbers Mean?
Reported by Ellen Wilson
The high population numbers predicted for the 
future should not lead the world to become
complacent about the ability of family
planning programs to have an impact.
Is the earth headed toward massive overpopulation by the year 2020 and beyond?Or is the world’s populace destined to decline because of the horrors of diseaseand war? Whatever the size of the population, will all mouths be fed in the com-
ing years?
The experts seem to agree that by the year 2020, the population will increase
from the current 6 billion people to about 7.6 billion people. But after that, the pre-
dictions vary wildly. The United Nations provides three possible projections of pop-
ulation after 2020, ranging from 5.6 billion to 17.5 billion people in the year 2100.
Though the far future may be uncertain, there is a current increase in popula-
tion of 75 million people per year in the developing world. Policymakers must
address this reality while paying attention to the realities behind the population
growth numbers of the more distant future.
However, according to researchers, policymakers should not just focus on the
sheer size of the population, but direct their attention to the implications of the
numbers, which will potentially vary more wildly than the numbers themselves. To
what geographic regions will the numbers be distributed? Will the regions have the
ability—or the “carrying capacity”—to sustain the population in terms of food and
income? Will population growth be counter-balanced by new technologies, for
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example, that increase food production to meet needs? Or will increases in food pro-
duction lead the population to grow even larger and exhaust the supply of food? What
will be the age distribution of the population? Will increased quality of life, social
services, and family planning programs help to substantially reduce fertility rates?
Population Movement Versus Population Growth
One of the most important forces behind population growth is the powerful impact
of policy incentives in reshuffling people around the globe. According to Steve Vosti,
an IFPRI research fellow, “There is an important distinction between population
growth and population movement. Policies must be examined to see if they are
inducing large numbers of people to migrate to areas where the ‘carrying capacity’
is lowest—to areas that are least able to sustain the large numbers of people.”
“If you have millions of people moving in a five-year period to agriculturally
marginal areas,” continued Vosti, “you can see that policies that affect population
movement might have a more immediate impact on the areas’ natural resource base
than policies that affect family fertility. Falling mortality rates also lead to popula-
tion increases that may far surpass policies to slow human fertility rates.”
Partially in response to policies that affect population movement, large num-
bers of people have settled over the past decades in coastal and river regions, accord-
ing to Thomas Merrick, senior advisor for population at the World Bank. “This
causes problems in terms of water resources, for example, in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Good governance and good management, planned far in advance,
are critical for coping with these pressures. Governments should not distort the
incentive system so that the real costs of land and water use are artificially reduced.”
But increases in population density don’t have to signal an imminent
Malthusian crunch. As the population grows, according to Peter Hazell of IFPRI,
the carrying capacities of currently productive lands can be increased through envi-
ronmentally sustainable agricultural technologies. Contrasting with Green
Revolution technology where the same improvements could be applied across the
board, many sustainable technologies are location-specific and require more com-
plex management schemes. However, such technologies as pest-resistant crops could
increase crop yields with little harm to the environment. In fact, some researchers
say agricultural technologies, if invested in now, could increase food production
enough to feed everyone—no matter which of the projections is realized.
Marginal Areas
But many of the world’s poor live in marginal areas, such as hillsides and forest mar-
gins, where the prospects for increasing productivity in food are limited. Experts say
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that more research is needed on how to increase the carrying capacity of this land,
but, in the meantime, actions can be taken, including establishing “market linkages.”
“In marginal areas, often people are trying to subsist on the food they grow in
their own backyard,” said Vosti. “But this is extremely demanding on their piece of
land, and often not sustainable over the long run. What is needed are ‘market link-
ages’—the ability to grow a cash crop or extract a product from their land and sell
it at market for money in order to purchase instead of grow food. Coffee, for exam-
ple, grows well in some marginal areas where food crops do not. But there has to
be a good market for coffee—a mechanism by which coffee can be exchanged for
food at reasonable rates throughout the year.”
Finally, Vosti notes the importance of considering the proportion of the pop-
ulation that is of working age versus the proportion that is not. “If a large portion
of the population is over the age of 60 and under the age of 10, you may have real
problems in terms of the ability of working people and governments to keep income
and food production up enough to sustain the ‘dependent’ components of the
population.”
Quality of Life and Population
Those who are just looking at the population numbers, not the moral issues, may
ask: Once people are well fed, whether on marginal or productive lands, won’t this
increase population growth and exacerbate the world’s state of overcrowding and
environmental devastation? Just as construction of new highways seems to breed
even more cars and traffic jams, will increases in the food supply lead to further
increases in population?
Not so, say researchers. “If food is available at affordable prices for poor peo-
ple—if there is sufficient ‘food availability’—this will be a critical factor in increas-
ing the general welfare of the family and, therefore, contributes to decreases in infant
and child mortality,” said Vosti. “When people are eating better and are better off,
they tend to invest more in each child, instead of investing in larger numbers of chil-
dren, and family fertility rates tend to fall.”
Also contributing to increased quality of life and, therefore, reduced fertility rates
are investments in social programs, such as in education, particularly for women.
“We have had favorable outcomes in our literacy rates, fertility rates, and infant
mortality because of decades of investment in people,” said Dr. Rebeca Grynspan
Mayufis, past vice president of Costa Rica and a member of the international advi-
sory committee for the 2020 Vision initiative. “Education has been at the center of
our concerns since the 19th century and the main factor that explains where we are
today. We have obligatory, free education for both girls and boys and have had a
recent expansion of secondary school education for both genders. Our literacy rate
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is now 95 percent, and this makes people more receptive to family planning mes-
sages.” In the 1960s, the country brought down its population growth rate by
more than 33 percent.
Family Planning
Another critical force in controlling and reducing population growth is family plan-
ning programs. According to Robert Engelman, director of the population and envi-
ronment program of Population Action International, the high population numbers
predicted for the future should not lead the world to become complacent about the
ability of family planning programs to have an impact.
“Population growth is not a mechanistic, easily predictable pattern,” said Engel-
man. “There is a combination of good and bad ‘wild cards’ that could change the
current pattern of population growth tremendously. Birth rates could go down faster
than expected or death rates could reverse their historic decline and go up. The
numbers provided to us by the demographers are not predictions, but projections
based on assumptions, and the low projections are equally as plausible as the high
projections.”
According to Engelman, one of the main goals of the International Conference
on Population and Development in Cairo and population organizations around the
world is to put in place policies that encourage worldwide achievement of “replace-
ment” level fertility—2.1 children per family. The average fertility rate is now 4 chil-
dren per family. He says this reduction could potentially be achieved by meeting all
of the world’s unmet demand for family planning services, closing the gender gap
in education, and improving women’s status in the family and workplace.
“The agriculture and population communities have a common cause,” said
Engelman. “It’s in the interest of the agricultural development community to sup-
port family planning and social programs because these programs will make their
job of feeding the world easier. By the same token, it’s in the interest of the popu-
lation community for people to be well fed, healthy, and able to make choices about
their own lives.”
However, according to Vosti, “Bringing down fertility rates will be a slow
process, and millions of new mouths will have to be fed in the meantime. Yet, these
new mouths are most likely to be born in areas least able to feed them, and, there-
fore, there are three alternatives for preventing hunger: sustainably increasing agri-
cultural productivity, destroying the natural environment, or providing massive food
aid. The only reasonable alternative is the first, and the time to begin was yesterday.”
C h a p t e r  1 0
Population Growth and Policy
Options in the Developing World
John Bongaarts and Judith Bruce
To be effective, population policies should address all
sources of continuing growth, except declining mortality.
The population of the developing world has doubled since 1965 and nowstands at 4.8 billion. This growth in human numbers has been a principalcause of a rising demand for food, water, and other life-sustaining resources
in the past and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. The United Nations
projects that the developing-country population will reach 6.5 billion by 2020 and
8.2 billion by 2050 (the projected world total is 7.7 billion for 2020 and 9.4 bil-
lion for 2050). Although populations throughout the developing world continue
to expand rapidly, the rate of growth is declining modestly. The average annual pop-
ulation growth rate was 2.4 percent per year in 1965, is estimated to be 1.7 percent
today, and is expected to be 1.2 percent by 2020 (see Table 10.1). The main cause
of this decline is a revolution in reproductive behavior that began in the 1960s.
Contraceptive use, once rare, is now widespread, and the average number of births
per woman has fallen by half—from the traditional six or more in the 1960s to near
three today. Fertility declines have been most rapid in Asia and Latin America.
Relatively little change has occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa, but significant declines
are under way in several countries in the region—Botswana, Kenya, South Africa,
and Zimbabwe, for example.
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Why Population Growth Continues
Many analysts find it difficult to understand why massive further growth will take
place despite declining fertility rates. First, the large decline since the 1960s still
leaves fertility about 50 percent above the two-child level needed to stabilize the pop-
ulation. With more than two surviving children per woman, every generation is
larger than the preceding one, and population continues to grow. The extent to
which high (but falling) fertility rates remain a driving force for population growth
varies by region. It is highest in Africa, with a current fertility rate of 5.3 births per
woman, and lowest in Asia and Latin America, where fertility has dropped to just
below 3 births per woman.
High fertility can, in turn, be attributed to two distinct underlying causes:
unwanted childbearing and a desired family size of more than two surviving chil-
dren. About one in five births is unwanted, and a larger proportion is mistimed.
An estimated 25 million abortions are performed each year in developing coun-
tries—many of them under unsafe conditions. Many couples have large numbers
of children because they fear that some children will die, and they want to be sure
that enough children survive to assist them in family enterprises and support them
in old age. In most developing countries, the completed family size desired by
women still exceeds two children; in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, desired fam-
ily size is typically more than five children.
Table 10.1 Population Size and Growth by Region, 1965, 1998, and 2020
Developing 
Population Africa Asia Latin America World World
Size (billions)
1965 0.32 1.90 0.25 2.38 3.34
1998 0.78 3.59 0.50 4.75 5.93
2020 1.32 4.59 0.66 6.45 7.67
Annual growth rate
(percent per year)
1965 2.6 2.3 2.7 2.4 2.0
1998 2.6 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.4
2020 2.1 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.0
Total fertility rate
(births per woman)
1965 6.7 5.7 5.8 6.0 4.9
1998 5.3 2.7 2.7 3.1 2.8
2020 3.5 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.4
Source: United Nations Secretariat, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population
Prospects: The 1996 Revision (New York, 1996).
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Second, declines in death rates—historically the main cause of population
growth—will almost certainly continue. Higher standards of living, better nutrition,
greater investments in sanitation and clean water supplies, expanded access to health
services, and wider application of public health measures such as immunization will
ensure longer and healthier lives in most countries. Only a few countries—mostly
in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the AIDS epidemic is most severe—are the exception.
Yet, the AIDS epidemic is not expected to eliminate population growth.
The third growth factor is what demographers call “population momentum.”
This refers to the tendency for a population to keep growing even if fertility were
immediately brought to the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman with con-
stant mortality and zero migration. Because the age structure of the population is
young, the largest generation of adolescents in history will soon enter the child-
bearing years. Even if each of these young women has only two children, they will
produce more than enough births to maintain population growth over the next few
decades.
Of the three factors expected to contribute substantially to continued growth,
population momentum is the most important. It will account for 76 percent of the
expected increase between 2000 and 2020 in the developing world as a whole and
for an even larger portion in Asia and Latin America. Further large increases in the
population of the developing world are therefore virtually certain.
Population Policy Options
To be effective, population policies should address all sources of continuing growth,
except declining mortality. Among the strategies to be considered are the following.
Expand High-Quality Family Planning and Reproductive Health Services
Unwanted pregnancies occur when women and men who want to avoid pregnan-
cy do not practice effective fertility regulation. Offering individuals and couples
appropriate services has been a priority of many governments in the developing
world. Despite considerable progress over the last several decades, however, the cov-
erage and quality of family planning services remain less than satisfactory in many
countries. In addition, some countries have imposed provider targets on family plan-
ning programs, limiting, for example, the number of intrauterine devices to be
inserted or the number of sterilizations to be performed, thus actively interfering
with trust between clients and providers. To ensure that family planning programs
appropriately assist individuals in reaching personal fertility goals, family planning
should be strictly voluntary and services should be linked with other reproductive
health services. The quality of these programs can be improved by extending serv-
ices to underserved areas; broadening the choice of methods available (including safe
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pregnancy termination where it is legal); improving information exchanges between
client and provider; promoting empathetic relationships between client and pro-
vider; assuring the technical competence of providers; including men in programs;
adding service elements to address related health problems, such as diagnosis and
treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and treatment following unsafe abortion;
and increasing public awareness of the value of and means available for fertility reg-
ulation, responsible and safe sex, and the location of services.
Create Favorable Conditions for Small Families
Several social and economic measures have substantial effects on desired family size.
1. Increase educational attainment, especially among girls. As economies become
less agrarian, the availability of mass education changes the value placed on
large families and encourages parents to invest in fewer but “higher-quality”
children, capable of entering the emerging labor markets. Higher levels of
education are also associated with the spread of nontraditional roles and val-
ues, including less gender-restricted behaviors. Educated parents rely less on
children for income and old-age support. Educated women want (and have)
fewer children with higher survival rates, have higher earnings, and are more
able to invest in their children’s nutrition and education.
2. Improve child health and survival. No developing country has had a sustained
fertility decline without first having experienced a substantial decline in child
mortality. A high child death rate discourages investments in children’s health
and education and encourages high fertility because parents believe that excess
births are required to ensure that at least the desired number of children will
survive to adulthood.
3. Invest in women and provide them with economic prospects and social identities
apart from motherhood. Improvements in the economic, social, and legal status
of girls and women are likely to increase their bargaining power, giving them a
stronger voice in family reproductive and productive decisions. As women’s
autonomy increases, the dominance of husbands and other male household
members is reduced, as well as the societal preference for men. As women’s
status improves, the value of children as insurance against adversity (for exam-
ple, in old age) and as securers of women’s social positions declines.
Delay Marriage and Childbearing by Addressing 
the Needs of Young Women
While a young population age structure (the cause of momentum) is not amenable
to modification, the age at which childbearing begins and its pace can be altered to
POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY OPTIONS 65
offset momentum. Women in general, and young women in particular, are under
pervasive pressure to fulfill societal expectations of appropriate feminine behaviors,
especially with respect to their sexuality and fertility. This is a disguised form of co-
ercion, as young women often have little choice about whether or not to have sex-
ual relations, when or whom to marry, and whether to defer childbearing. Educating
girls to the secondary level; including them in community development efforts,
sports, and other publicly visible activities; and encouraging them to generate
income begins to lead girls toward autonomy. Social power and economic author-
ity for women are necessary counterpressures to traditional imperatives to marry and
have children early.
Conclusion
Well-designed population policies are broad in scope, socially desirable, and ethi-
cally sound. They appeal to a variety of constituencies: those seeking to eliminate
discrimination against women and improve the lives of children, as well as those
seeking to reduce fertility and population growth. Mutually reinforcing invest-
ments in family planning, reproductive health, and a range of socioeconomic meas-
ures operate beneficially at both the macro and micro levels to slow population
growth, increase productivity, and improve individual health and welfare.
C h a p t e r  1 1
Achieving Urban Food and Nutrition
Security in the Developing World
James L. Garrett
Growth in urban poverty, food insecurity, and malnutrition
and a shift in their concentration from rural to urban 
areas will acompany urbanization.
The trend is inescapable: more and more people in the developing world areliving in the cities. By 2020, the number of people living in developing coun-tries will grow from 4.9 billion to 6.8 billion. Ninety percent of this increase
will be in rapidly expanding cities and towns. More than half the population of
Africa and Asia will live in urban areas by 2020. More than three-quarters of Latin
Americans already do.
Growth in urban poverty, food insecurity, and malnutrition and a shift in their
concentration from rural to urban areas will acompany urbanization. Although the
magnitude and speed of change vary by country, data covering more than half the
developing world’s population indicate that:
• The proportion and number of poor people living in urban areas grew during
the 1980s and 1990s in seven of eight survey countries, including India and
China. (Because data are not available, poverty also serves as a reasonable
indicator of food insecurity here.) By the early 1990s, the cities of these eight
countries alone were home to more than 140 million poor people, up from
about 120 million 5 to 10 years earlier.
• From the early to the mid-1990s, the urban share of malnourished children
also increased in 11 of 15 countries for which data are available. The total
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number of malnourished children in urban areas increased in 9 of the 15.
Almost 10 million malnourished children in these countries live in urban
areas, up from about 7 million in earlier years.
Urban Food Insecurity and Malnutrition:
Issues and Policies
A number of factors will affect the future shape of urban food insecurity and mal-
nutrition. Because urban dwellers must buy most of their food, urban food security
depends mostly on whether the household can afford to buy food, given prices and
incomes. High per-unit costs of food result from inefficient urban food-marketing
systems and the fact that the poor usually can buy only small quantities of food at
a time rather than in bulk. Macroeconomic policies are also important. Inflation,
depreciation in the exchange rate, and the removal of key consumer or producer sub-
sidies can all push prices up. Policies to improve urban food security must therefore
seek to improve market efficiency and maintain stable prices.
Logically, income security is also crucial to food security for urban dwellers. Yet
with little human or financial capital, the poor are forced to take casual, insecure
jobs. These jobs often experience seasonal ups and downs, just as in rural areas. For
example, demand for construction workers can decline drastically during the rainy
season. Garment workers may be laid off when the holiday rush dies down. With
their abundance of labor, but often little else, the poor find competition for jobs is
fierce.
To lift the poor from poverty, programs and policies should concentrate on cre-
ating jobs and on increasing the capacity of the poor to find and hold more-secure,
higher-paying jobs or to expand their own businesses and generate new jobs.
Governments, communities, and the private sector should cooperate to provide the
elements for private sector success, much of which depends on a capable, if not
extensive, government. At the same time, targeted income or food programs and
more general social security and unemployment programs will continue to be nec-
essary to provide for those who are left behind or who cannot work, including the
elderly and the sick. Programs may also need to address issues of land and housing
security, as secure tenure helps ensure that the poor do not lose their investments
in tangible assets or in social networks.
However, efforts to improve urban livelihoods must go beyond a focus on urban
jobs. Urban and rural lives are intertwined through goods, services, and people. In
many cities, a majority of urban dwellers depend indirectly on agriculture for their
livelihoods, through employment in food transport, retailing, and processing.
Survival strategies may involve maintaining links with a home community in rural
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areas, through a plot of land or continued connections with family. Policies for
improving urban livelihoods, then, must take into account the complexity of
urban–rural links and recognize that rural conditions affect urban livelihoods as well.
Urban food security may also have a more direct link with agriculture. Even in
large, congested cities, the urban poor may have a home garden or raise small ani-
mals as part of a coping strategy. This urban production, often done by women, can
complement household incomes and improve the quality of urban diets. Urban
planners and local governments should consider how to incorporate environmen-
tally sound urban agriculture in their plans.
Of course, food security is not enough for good nutrition. A healthy house-
hold environment and good care and feeding practices are essential as well. The
threats to good nutrition for both adults and children in urban areas differ from
those in rural areas. The most substantial threats to health of the poor in the cities
come from flimsy and overcrowded housing amid filthy conditions—uncollected
garbage, unsafe water, overflowing sewers—and from the inability of the poor to
get good health care. Even when health facilities are available, the poor often have
no access to these services because of an inability to pay. According to UNICEF and
the World Health Organization, for example, globally less than 20 percent of the
urban poor have access to safe water, compared with 80 percent of the rich. Poverty
and inequality are clearly major determinants of health and nutrition outcomes in
the city.
Potentially harmful changes in diets also accompany urbanization. Because
urban dwellers often face time constraints and have greater exposure to advertising
and easier access to supermarkets and fast-food vendors, they often consume more
processed and prepared foods. The typical urban diet results in higher levels of some
micronutrients and animal proteins than the rural one, but it also means higher
intakes of saturated and total fat and sugar and lower intakes of fiber. Combined
with a sedentary lifestyle, this diet increases the risk of chronic diseases, including
obesity. The public health sector faces a significant challenge in trying to overcome
the malnutrition and poor health caused by poverty at the same time it responds to
diseases associated with wealth and industrialization.
Challenges to child nutrition come from this unhealthy physical environment
and from inadequate caring and feeding practices. Urban women end breastfeed-
ing two to three months earlier than rural women, perhaps depriving their children
of needed nutrients and reducing immunity. Women in urban areas also often
work outside the home, which may mean they have less time and more difficulty
in caring for their children. Policies to promote child nutrition in urban areas
should focus not only on increasing incomes, especially women’s, but also on en-
couraging good feeding and caring practices, including provision of easily accessi-
ble quality child care for those mothers who work. Good caring practices are
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possible even for the poor—as they frequently depend more on knowledge rather
than income levels—and have been shown to counter the effects of low income on
nutritional status.
The greatest difference between solutions to food and nutrition insecurity in
rural and urban areas is probably that in rural areas development can often be
addressed through broad-brush interventions affecting agriculture, which drives the
rural economy. While agricultural growth may also help to reduce urban food in-
security, the income sources in urban areas are more diverse, as are underlying
causes and actors in the urban environment. Effective policies and programs will
require a holistically conceived response that coordinates actions across actors and
levels—from the household (to raise incomes, for example), to the community (to
install a water system), to far beyond (to promote labor-intensive growth by the
government).
In any case, the most effective, relevant policies will emerge from a system of
governance that firmly connects the needs of the poor to a politically responsive local
government that has the technical and institutional capacity to act. Programs should
work to strengthen the poor’s ability to organize, make demands, and affect local
authorities and to strengthen the municipality’s understanding of its responsibility
to respond.
Urban Food Insecurity and Malnutrition: Why Worry Now?
Some argue that concern about urban poverty is misplaced—that rural areas con-
tinue to hold most of the poor, food insecure, and malnourished and that they will
for many years to come. Many analysts and governments seem complacent because
their countries are not industrialized or highly urban. As we look to 2020, is such
complacency justified? Clearly not.
First, the experiences of the industrialized world clearly show that developing
countries are simply not going to “urbanize” themselves out of poverty. Governments
and development agencies must take seriously the shift in poverty, food insecurity,
and malnutrition from rural to urban areas. Second, in highly urbanized regions
such as Latin America, the geographic center of poverty has already shifted: in these
countries more poor people already live in the cities than in the countryside. Finally,
even in countries that are still highly rural and where rural poverty predominates,
millions of poor people live in cities. These people deserve not to be forgotten.
The perception that urban poverty exists only in industrialized countries is not
matched by reality. In Mozambique, for example, with a poverty rate of 69 percent,
2 million poor people live in urban areas, more than the number of urban poor in
highly urbanized Colombia and more than half the number of urban poor in much
more populous Indonesia.
ACHIEVING URBAN FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY 71
Even in highly rural countries, then, urban poverty, food insecurity, and mal-
nutrition are problems of today, not tomorrow. For the sake of the millions of hun-
gry and undernourished people living in cities today, as well as for the sake of those
millions who may be forced to live there tomorrow, governments, development
agencies, and communities must act now. They must work forcefully, confidently,
and reasonably to promote policies, including those that promote rural develop-
ment, to confront the rising specter of urban poverty, hunger, and malnutrition and
so achieve the 2020 vision of sustainable food and nutrition security for all.
C h a p t e r  1 2
Urbanization and Agriculture
to the Year 2020
Reported by Ellen Wilson
Though malnutrition in the cities is often not 
as severe as in rural areas, there are pockets 
of urban malnutrition that can rival the 
poorest areas of the countryside.
At present, the global population is half rural and half urban, but the world’scities are swelling. By 2025, two-thirds of the world’s people will live inurban areas, and 80 percent of these urban residents will live in developing
countries. As urbanization increases, policymakers in developing countries will be
challenged to design ways to feed their cities ideally by relying mostly on their coun-
tries’ own agriculture sectors. They must also work to prevent undernutrition, cope
with changing diets among urban residents, and seek to quell the trend toward
obesity.
“The developing world is now experiencing urbanization in the way developed
countries did in the past, with urban populations doubling and tripling in one or
two decades,” says Wally N’Dow, secretary-general of Habitat II. “The difference
is that urban dwellers in the developing world earn as little as $200 per person in
annual income, compared with more than $20,000 in the United States. That
means that cities must manage their money aggressively because there is less to invest
in services and infrastructure.”
“Urbanization means good news and bad news,” said Jorge Wilheim, deputy
secretary-general of Habitat II. “Urbanization contributes to national economic and
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social development. However, when the speed of urbanization is great, it is almost
impossible for governments to follow the growth with water, energy, and other basic
services.”
The result is often poverty, unemployment, inadequate shelter, poor or non-
existent sanitation, contaminated or depleted water supplies, air pollution, and
other forms of environmental degradation. Substandard housing, unsafe water, and
poor sanitation in densely populated cities are responsible for 10 million deaths
worldwide every year, according to the United Nations. The UN reports that 600
million urban dwellers now live in life- and health-threatening housing situations
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Reducing Pressure on the Cities
Much of the current and future urbanization in developing countries, particularly
in Africa and Asia, is occurring as a result of rural-urban migration and the trans-
formation of rural areas to urban centers. According to IFPRI, one way to reduce
the pressure on cities is for developing-country governments to invest in the rural
areas, particularly in the agriculture sector—the base of the economy in most devel-
oping countries. This would make people less inclined to leave their agrarian
lifestyles in search of better jobs in the cities. An investment in agriculture rever-
berates across the whole economy, generating more income and employment.
According to IFPRI, each additional dollar of agricultural production spurs more
than two dollars in spending in other sectors of the economy.
“If you increase agricultural productivity, then farmers make more money and
have more to spend on other goods and services such as food, clothing, housing,
education, and health care,” said James Garrett, a researcher with IFPRI. “If the rural
areas are not supported and the well-being of rural people improved, the cities will
implode. People will continue to move to the cities, but the cities won’t be able to
support them in terms of either jobs or services.”
Generally, urban areas offer people more jobs and health and social services than
are available in the rural areas. As people move to cities, birth rates also tend to go
down, mainly because fertility tends to fall as women’s level of education rises, and
cities offer greater educational opportunities. “Urban areas offer a higher life
expectancy and lower absolute poverty and can provide essential services more
cheaply and on a larger scale than rural areas,” says Mathias Hundsalz, coordinator
of the Global Report on Human Settlements by the United Nations Centre for
Human Settlements (Habitat).
But experts agree that policies should not favor cities over the countryside.
“People vote with their feet,” said Richard Stren, director of the Center for Urban
and Community Studies at the University of Toronto. “They perceive that their lives
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will be better off in the cities, and this is often the case. But, even though people
are able to live better in urban areas, development should not favor urban areas over
rural areas or vice versa. We don’t want to discourage development in one sector at
the cost of development in the other. We must invest in the whole economy so that
people will have the freedom to live where they want and so that there continues
to be a dynamic interaction between the rural and urban areas.”
The Rural-Urban Connection
But urban policies are greatly needed to help manage urbanization. “The trend has
been for urbanization to be concentrated in one city, and hence we’ve seen the
growth of the megacities of the South such as São Paulo, Mexico City, and Cairo,”
said Wilheim of Habitat II. “We are encouraging countries to set up urban policies
to stimulate a network of medium-sized cities. This would help provide people in
the rural areas with employment and other benefits.”
According to Stren from Toronto, this trend is already taking place. “The
megacities have stopped growing rapidly in the South with the exception of cities
in China. Since the 1980s, small and middle-sized cities have begun to grow more
rapidly. This has implications for agricultural production because these cities are
more connected to the agricultural hinterlands and, with good communication sys-
tems, can interact with the rural agricultural sector.”
Better channels of communication between farmers and the cities, and new
methods for transporting food cheaply from rural areas to cities will be crucial for
stimulating economic growth in the rural sectors and low food prices throughout
a country. “There must be ways for farmers to obtain information on what types
of food products the urban areas are going to demand so that they can respond
accordingly,” said Garrett. “Communications and transportation systems should be
improved so that farmers know what prices to charge and can get their goods to
market.”
In many countries, the current costs of “food marketing”—the process by
which crops leave farmers fields and are transported to food processing plants or to
urban markets to be sold—are extremely high. Of these food marketing costs, high
transportation costs, caused by factors such as poor roads, high gas prices, and high
automotive maintenance bills, can be major inflators of food prices for urban and
rural residents. These factors can spur malnutrition by preventing the poor from
being able to buy the food they need. Countries need to improve food marketing
systems so that these costs remain low.
However, for farmers to take advantage of markets in urban areas, they must
have education and other assistance. “You can have great roads, but if you are a poor,
small farmer with no access to credit or the right seeds or you are not healthy enough
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to farm your land, these things don’t matter,” said Garrett. “Governments need to
invest in rural people so that they can gain access to agricultural markets.”
Meeting the Demands of Urban Appetites
As people move to the cities, they have less time and are exposed to a wider range
of food items than in the rural areas they came from. These factors and others spur
significant changes in diets in urban areas. Urban populations tend to eat more meat
and processed foods and less rice and other grain and root dishes. This trend has
already taken place in the rapidly urbanizing areas of Asia, such as Japan, Taiwan,
and the Republic of Korea, and in Latin America. Some of the demand for meat
will be fulfilled by rural areas outside of cities. Imports will also help take care of
the increased demand for meat. According to IFPRI, developing-country imports
of meat are expected to increase 20-fold from 2000 to 2020.
But no matter how developing countries’ increasing appetite for meat is satis-
fied, urbanization and the accompanying more sedentary lifestyle, as well as diets
that include more animal fat, sugar, and processed food, will lead to more obesity.
Obesity is closely associated with chronic diseases, such as heart problems, diabetes,
and hypertension. Significant increases in obesity have occurred in all regions of the
developing world since 1957.
“As they eat more fat than they need or too many processed foods with com-
paratively low nutritional value, the urban poor begin to experience the worst of
both the developed and developing worlds—both obesity and undernutrition some-
times in the same household,” said Garrett. “Processed foods are often inexpensive,
but can rob families of essential vitamins and minerals that can be found in more
expensive fresh fruits, vegetables, and grains. While families may be increasing their
calorie intake, they are not getting other nutrients they need.”
Malnutrition in the Cities
Though malnutrition in the cities is often not as severe as in rural areas, there are
pockets of urban malnutrition that can rival the poorest areas of the countryside.
“For kids in the rural areas, milk comes from a cow,” said Wilheim from Habitat
II. “For kids in the cities, milk comes from the refrigerator. The milk must be pur-
chased. Food and nutrition in the urban sector are almost totally dependent on the
income of the family.”
But sometimes money for food is in short supply, for example, if the family loses
a job or if the husband does not give spending money to the wife for food. One
way to help ward off hunger among low-income households of the future may be
through “urban agriculture”—the farming of small plots of land available in urban
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environments or on the perimeter of the city. Urban agriculture might be able to
supplement the family’s diet, according to Dan Maxwell, a Rockefeller fellow at
IFPRI.
However, urban agriculture must be managed carefully to address important
food safety and environmental concerns. Urban residents must not irrigate edible
crops with raw sewage or farm intensively with fertilizers and pesticides in highly
populated areas. “Urban agriculture can have a beneficial impact on food security
for low-income urban residents, but there are also potential risks, particularly where
water is scarce and municipal governments are weak or ill informed,” said Maxwell.
As urbanization increases, policymakers have multiple challenges with which
to contend. Habitat II will seek to deal with many of these policy issues. However,
it will also seek to improve overall human solidarity as more and more people in
the world live closer together in the smaller quarters of urban cities.
“There is an urban war in the cities now with divisions between races and eth-
nic groups,” said Wilheim. “We want to reconquer human solidarity. People must
learn to be convivial, to live together. We want to prevent cities from becoming
Sarajevos. Human diversity is as important as biodiversity.”
Diet Trends: Increasing
Demand for Livestock and Fish
P A R T  4
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Are We Ready for a Meat Revolution?
Reported by Heidi Fritschel and Uday Mohan
“Most people in India, including government officials, don’t
believe a huge increase in meat consumption will happen,
but I think they’re in for a big surprise.”
—Peter Hazell
It happens in developing countries the world over—when poor families in Africa,Asia, and Latin America get access to a little more money, they spend a sizableshare of it on meat to supplement their meager diet of staple grains. On a
worldwide scale, this tendency produces dramatic results. For all developing coun-
tries combined, per capita consumption of beef, mutton, goat, pork, poultry, eggs,
and milk rose by an average of about 50 percent per person between 1973 and
1996.
“As populations and urbanization increase and economic reforms lead to high-
er gross domestic product levels, the demand for livestock products will only grow
stronger,” says Simeon Ehui, coordinator of the Livestock Policy Analysis Project
in the Ethiopia office of the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). “We
are in the midst of an animal food product revolution,” says Christopher Delgado,
an IFPRI research fellow and coauthor of a 2020 Vision discussion paper on trends
in livestock supply and demand.
Work conducted at IFPRI shows that in 2020, each person in the developing
world is likely to demand about 29 kilograms of meat and 63 kilograms of milk a
year, up from 21 kilograms and 41 kilograms, respectively, in 1993. Can the world
produce the livestock necessary to meet this future demand? Even if it can, what will
be the consequences for health and the environment and for small-scale farmers?
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Income Is Not the Only Factor
“The poor consume cereals first to keep from going hungry, because cereals are
cheap,” says Howarth Bouis, an IFPRI research fellow. “The very poor don’t have
any money left over. But as people’s income goes up, that’s what they buy: meat and
dairy products.” In China and other countries of East Asia, which have seen large
jumps in income since the early 1980s, meat consumption has grown by more than
5 percent a year.
Another important contributor to rising demand for meat products is urban-
ization. As people move to cities, studies show they start to eat more meat, milk,
and other livestock products. “We’re not sure of the cause,” says Bouis. “It may be
reduced activity patterns and, thus, lower cereal consumption—farming is more
strenuous than most urban occupations. It may be that in cities people have more
choices about what to eat and are exposed to new foods and recipes.”
This trend will probably mean large increases in meat consumption in coming
decades. In the future, the rural population in developing countries is expected to
remain about constant while the urban population will increase rapidly.
Urbanization is already changing diets in India, according to Vijay Vyas, pro-
fessor emeritus of the Institute of Development Studies in Jaipur, India, but not nec-
essarily leading to much higher consumption of meat. “The importance of cereals
in the food basket is declining, even among the poorest of the poor,” says Vyas. “But
the increase in meat consumption is not happening at the same speed in India as
in China and other Southeast Asian countries. We are seeing a large increase in con-
sumption of milk and eggs, as well as other noncereal foods like vegetables and
fruits.” Vyas attributes the shift partly to urbanization and partly to increased avail-
ability of these products and the religious sanctions against eating beef. “India has
surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest producer of milk,” says
Vyas.
But Peter Hazell, an IFPRI researcher and coauthor of a study on food balances
in India, believes India is poised for an explosion in demand for meat, as well as more
milk and eggs. “Most people in India, including government officials, don’t believe
a huge increase in meat consumption will happen, but I think they’re in for a big
surprise. Our study showed that in the last 10 years prices for livestock products went
up and income growth for rural people in India was slow. So you wouldn’t think
that consumption of meat products would rise much. In fact, however, consump-
tion shot up. Imagine what will happen if real incomes do grow more rapidly as a
result of India’s ongoing policy reforms.”
The reasons, says Hazell, are many. Television is everywhere. Restaurants and
street foods are more prevalent. Transportation is better, so rural people travel to
town more often. The middle class is growing larger, and others see how they live.
And advertising works.
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The Meat Factor
By developed-country standards, people in the developing world still eat very small
amounts of meat and livestock products. In the early 1990s, on average, each per-
son in the developed world ate nearly four times as much meat and consumed nearly
five times as much milk as each person in the developing world. And many poor
people in developing countries still do not get enough calories or protein.
There are sound nutritional reasons for poor and malnourished people to wish
to add more meat to their diet. Food staples like rice and maize offer calories but
are not dense in micronutrients or protein. Christopher Delgado says, “You can get
complete protein from vegetables, but you need to eat a wide variety of them. Eating
meat is an easy way to get usable protein into your diet.”
Meat can also aid in the absorption of other nutrients. “Meat contains iron,
but it also helps the body absorb iron from other foods. This trait is known as the
meat factor,” says Catherine Geissler of the Department of Nutrition and Dietetics
at King’s College London. “Only small amounts of meat are required to do this.
Vegetarians can get an adequate diet, but a mixed omnivore diet is an easier way to
get all your nutrients.”
In Bangladesh, says Bouis, people get only about 2 to 3 percent of their calo-
ries from meat, and their diet contains insufficient amounts of bioavailable iron.
“More than half of adult women and 40 to 45 percent of preschool children are ane-
mic,” Bouis explains. “This iron deficiency retards mental development, particu-
larly for infants, and reduces work capacity for adults. More meat, fish, and dairy
consumption would be the best thing for nutrition in Bangladesh.”
“Our research shows that a fivefold increase in meat, fish, and dairy con-
sumption would lower the prevalence of anemia by 50 percent,” says Bouis. “But
with their income level, such an increase is totally infeasible, so finding ways to
reduce prices of animal products is really important.”
The Nutrition Transition
While some developing countries are struggling with how to add more meat to their
diets, others are already facing the problem of too much meat consumption. “A
nutrition transition is occurring in some developing countries,” says Geissler. “The
diseases of affluence are beginning to take over from the diseases of poverty. China
is seeing a shift from undernutrition to such problems as heart disease partly caused
by a rich, high-fat diet.”
“China is trying to increase the consumption of traditional protein-rich prod-
ucts like soy through education, but it’s not working too well. The general demand
is for meat and other animal products,” says Geissler. “Now that trade in food is
freer, the government has less control. Farmers are freer to produce what they want.”
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To complicate matters, countries like China have a mixture of poor and better-
off communities, containing both undernourished and “overnourished” people. “So
targeted policies are needed,” says Geissler.
“Meating” Demand
Increases in demand have been met largely by substantial growth in livestock pro-
duction in developing countries. Meat production grew 5.4 percent annually
between the early 1980s and early 1990s, a rate almost five times the developed-
country average of 1.1 percent. Although per capita meat production in develop-
ing countries is still only a little more than a fourth of the developed-country
average, the developing world supplies almost half the world’s meat. Asia is the fastest
growing supplier, accounting for more than 80 percent of the net increase in meat
output of developing countries.
“Globally, livestock will become the most important economic subsector with-
in agriculture,” predicts Henning Steinfeld, senior officer in the Animal Production
and Health Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations.
Increases in the supply of livestock products in developing countries—with
pork and poultry production growing particularly fast, at 6.1 and 7.8 percent per
year, respectively—are coming predominantly from industrial production. Steinfeld
says there are several reasons why the traditional, small-scale producer cannot
respond to the surge in demand: “Traditional livestock production uses feed
resources, such as grazing, that simply cannot expand at a fast enough rate. There
is also the difficulty that livestock products are easily perishable, and rural produc-
ers often don’t have adequate market access. Economies of scale in production and
processing favor large-scale livestock production, which is now found in the vicin-
ity of virtually every large developing-country city. And policies do tend to favor the
large producers with capital subsidies.”
Nonetheless, Steinfeld sees livestock offering “a great development opportunity
that could be missed.” He worries that donors and development agencies have
turned away from livestock mainly because of environmental and social concerns.
“But these problems have little to do with livestock activities themselves,” says
Steinfeld, “and much more to do with the broader policy framework that has not dealt
effectively with health, environment, and poverty issues as they relate to livestock.”
How Will the Smallholder Fare?
The rewards of a dynamic livestock sector could especially benefit the poor, many
of whom derive a larger share of their income from livestock than do the well-off.
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About half a billion pastoralists depend on livestock for their livelihood, and at
least 200 million smallholder farm families in the developing world derive most
of their income from livestock. In some African countries, livestock contributes
roughly 80 percent of cash income in crop-livestock farming systems. “As live-
stock production increases,” says Ehui, “smallholders will increasingly walk away
from poverty.”
Joyce Turk, senior livestock adviser at the U.S. Agency for International
Development, enumerates the ways livestock can help the poor: “In addition to
improved human nutrition, of course, livestock generates economic growth through
cash stability in the form of collateral and savings that aren’t easily dissolved by infla-
tion, reduces the need to purchase inorganic soil amendments, and provides prod-
ucts that can be sold at market.” Delgado agrees but warns, “If research and policy
do not find market-oriented ways for the smallholder to compete with large-scale
commercial farming, the smallholder may well be shut out from an unprecedented
growth opportunity.”
Some analysts fear that booming livestock production could divert cereals
away from food and toward feed markets, pushing prices for staple cereals out of
the reach of the poor. But such concerns are misplaced, says Delgado. “World cere-
al prices are experiencing a long-term trend downward, because a substantial reserve
capacity for production exists. IFPRI’s projections to 2020 show that increasing live-
stock consumption will prevent inflation-adjusted cereal prices from falling below
their already low levels, or raise them marginally, but nowhere near the high levels
of the 1980s.”
Dairy production has been one means the poor have used to improve their lives
through the livestock sector. “Women especially tend smaller livestock, and this gives
them increased control over products and the income from their sale, all of which
promotes gender equity,” says Jim De Vries, head of international programs at
Heifer Project International, a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization (NGO)
that supplies poor families with livestock to help them become self-reliant. “We have
seen that one of the primary benefits of our work with goat husbandry, for exam-
ple, is that the increased income particularly benefits the nutrition and education
of girls,” adds De Vries.
Market-oriented dairy production is also an avenue for smallholder women
farmers to increase income and food security. In some cases, however, women do
not gain as much as men despite providing as much or more livestock labor. “Only
in areas where women traditionally dominate in agriculture do they control most
of the income from dairying,” explains Steve Staal, an economist at ILRI. “And even
where men and women control income fairly equally, women’s participation in
dairying can be constrained because of lack of access to adequate investment
resources,” he adds.
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Effects of Production on Health and the Environment
In addition to its benefits, livestock production presents enormous environmental
challenges. Cees de Haan, livestock adviser at the World Bank, says, “The large
increase in demand for livestock products expected in the developing world over the
next decades will put tremendous pressure on natural resources. Livestock produc-
tion can help the rural poor to escape the poverty trap, but policymakers and
researchers will have to meet the challenge of putting in place the policies and tech-
nologies to make livestock production more sustainable.”
About 37 percent of the world’s meat supply comes from industrialized live-
stock production. In recent years, industrial production, which concentrates large
numbers of animals in confinement, has grown twice as fast as production in farm-
ing systems that mix crops and livestock, and six times as fast as production in graz-
ing systems. Increased industrial production has brought its own environmental
problems as well as animal diseases. “In East Asia,” says Steinfeld, “increased ani-
mal density near urban centers now results in unparalleled waste loads, with the
capacity of plants to use nutrients from manure sometimes exceeded by 1,000 kilo-
grams of nitrogen per hectare, which poses risks to flora and fauna and ultimately
to humans.” Manure also produces greenhouse gases—16 percent of annual
methane emissions and 7 percent of the more aggressive nitrous oxide—that cause
global climate change.
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), an NGO based in the
United States, reports that “factory” farming in 29 U.S. states is poisoning drink-
ing water supplies and contributing to hazardous air pollution. Robbin Marks, sen-
ior resource specialist at NRDC, points to the large corporate farms that dominate
livestock production as “the culprits that create pollution problems when their
enormous manure storage sites contaminate bodies of water and release toxic fumes
into the air.” Tightening regulations, involving communities in decisions about set-
ting up factory farms, and banning manure runoff and open-air cesspools are some
of the solutions Marks proposes. The U.S. Department of Agriculture and the
Environmental Protection Agency are now drafting a strategy to limit these
problems.
Livestock can improve environmental quality when used in traditional farm-
ing systems. De Vries says that “ownership of livestock is a great motivation for farm-
ers to plant forage bearing trees and shrubs, grass contours, and pasture, all of
which help to control erosion and conserve water.”
But without proper training and incentives for smallholders, livestock can
damage the environment, especially through overgrazing on open rangeland. “There
are too many people raising too many animals in the low-rainfall areas in West Asia
and North Africa,” says Hazell. “The encroachment of cropping further erodes the
soil in these lands, some of which are already drought-prone.” He believes livestock
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production should rely less on grazing systems and more on intensive production
in higher-potential areas. Hazell agrees, however, that problems arise with this
method as well, including waste disposal and transfer of disease from animals to
humans: “In Hong Kong the lethal flu virus that jumped from poultry to humans
didn’t learn to spread from human to human, otherwise we could have seen mil-
lions of people die in a worldwide epidemic. We were lucky that time.”
Another problem is the conversion of forest to ranches in the Amazon, Central
America, and elsewhere. “The truth is,” Hazell says, “cattle are more profitable than
forest.” He sees deforestation and degradation increasing if the world’s demand for
livestock products goes up substantially and if countries fail to intensify and indus-
trialize their production in a sustainable way.
Milking the Benefits of Livestock Production
With rising incomes and freer markets in developing countries, it will be difficult,
if not impossible, for governments to control their people’s demand for meat prod-
ucts. The key for policy, therefore, is to ensure that meat, milk, and eggs are avail-
able to the poor, who are likely to derive the greatest health benefits, and that
livestock production is organized to bring the greatest benefits to the poor and to
minimize damage to the environment. “The worst thing that well-motivated agen-
cies can do is prevent investments in small-scale, sustainable, market-oriented live-
stock production,” says Delgado. “Such investments won’t stop the animal food
product revolution, but they will help ensure that it contributes as much as possi-
ble to poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability.”
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Livestock to 2020
The Next Food Revolution
Christopher Delgado, Mark Rosegrant, Henning Steinfeld,
Simeon Ehui, and Claude Courbois
Lack of policy action will not stop the Livestock Revolution,
but it will ensure that the form it takes is less favorable 
for growth, poverty alleviation, and sustainability 
in developing countries.
Arevolution is taking place in global agriculture that has profound implicationsfor human health, livelihoods, and the environment. Population growth,urbanization, and income growth in developing countries are fueling a mas-
sive increase in demand for food of animal origin. These changes in the diets of bil-
lions of people could significantly improve the well-being of many rural poor.
Governments and industry must prepare for this continuing revolution with long-
run policies and investments that will satisfy consumer demand, improve nutrition,
direct income growth opportunities to those who need them most, and alleviate
environmental and public health stress.
Transformation of Consumption and Production
Unlike the supply-led Green Revolution, the “Livestock Revolution” is driven by
demand. From the early 1970s to the mid-1990s, the volume of meat consumed
in developing countries grew almost three times as much as it did in the developed
countries. Developing-world consumption grew at an even faster rate in the second
half of this period, with Asia in the lead (Table 14.1).
Beginning from a small base, developing countries have begun to catch up with
developed-world consumption levels, but they have a fairly long way to go, prima-
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rily because of low income levels. People in developed countries obtain an average
of 27 percent of their calories and 56 percent of their protein from animal food prod-
ucts. The averages for developing countries are 11 and 26 percent, respectively. The
difference in consumption levels gives an indication of the dramatic changes in store
for global food production as the Livestock Revolution unfolds.
Production of animal food products grew most rapidly where consumption did.
Total meat production in developing countries grew by 5.4 percent per year between
the early 1980s and mid-1990s, more than five times the developed-world rate. Per
capita production kept up with population in most developing regions, except in
Sub-Saharan Africa (for meat) and West Asia/North Africa (for milk).
Whether these consumption trends will continue in the future is a question
explored through IFPRI’s global food model, which includes data for 37 countries
and country groups and 18 commodities. Known as IMPACT (International Model
for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Consumption), the model’s baseline scenario proj-
ects that consumption of meat and milk in developing countries will grow 2.8 and
3.3 percent per year between the early 1990s and 2020. The corresponding
developed-world growth rates are 0.6 and 0.2 percent per year. By 2020 develop-
ing countries will consume 100 million metric tons more meat and 223 million met-
Table 14.1 Actual and Projected Meat Consumption by Region
Annual growth of total meat Total meat consumption 
consumption (percent) (million metric tons)
Region 1982–94 1993–2020 1983 1993 2020
China 8.6 3.0 16 38 85
Other East Asia 5.8 2.4 1 3 8
India 3.6 2.9 3 4 8
Other South Asia 4.8 3.2 1 2 5
Southeast Asia 5.6 3.0 4 7 16
Latin America 3.3 2.3 15 21 39
West Asia/North Africa 2.4 2.8 5 6 15
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.2 3.5 4 5 12
Developing world 5.4 2.8 50 88 188
Developed world 1.0 0.6 88 97 115
World 2.9 1.8 139 184 303
Source: FAO annual data. Total meat consumption for 1983 and 1993 are three-year moving averages.
2020 projections come from IFPRI’s global model, IMPACT.
Notes: Meat includes beef, pork, mutton, goat, and poultry. Suspected overestimation of meat pro-
duction in China in the early 1990s suggests that actual 1993 consumption was 30 million metric tons
(a 6.3 percent annual growth rate since 1983). If so, the level of world meat consumption for 1993 is
overestimated here by at most 4.3 percent and by even less than that for 2020 because IMPACT in-
corporates pessimistic assumptions that are compatible with the conservative view for 1993.
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ric tons more milk than they did in 1993, dwarfing developed-country increases of
18 million metric tons for both meat and milk.
Growth rates for meat production through 2020 again follow those for meat
consumption quite closely in most regions. Meat production will grow about four
times as fast in developing countries as it will in developed countries. By 2020 devel-
oping countries will produce 60 percent of the world’s meat and 52 percent of the
world’s milk. China will lead meat production and India milk production.
Implications for World Food Prices
The increase in livestock production will require annual feed consumption of cere-
als to rise by 292 million metric tons between 1993 and 2020. While some are con-
cerned that such large increases will raise cereal prices substantially over time, the
inflation-adjusted prices of livestock and feed commodities in fact are expected to
fall by 2020, though not as rapidly as they have in the past 20 years. In a “worst-
case” scenario, which by common accord is much too pessimistic, feedgrain require-
ments per unit of meat are assumed to rise 1 percent per year through 2020 due to
increased industrialization of production and lack of a countervailing increase in live-
stock feeding efficiency. Even so, IMPACT shows that real maize prices in 2020
would be at most one-fifth above their present levels and remain substantially below
their levels in the early 1980s.
Even with increases in livestock productivity far below historical trends, enough
meat, milk, and feed will be available in 2020 without prices rising above 1992–94
levels. The key issue, then, is not availability, but what direct effect rapidly escalat-
ing livestock production and consumption will have on the poor, the environment,
and human health.
Livestock and the Poor
Far from being a drain on the food available to the poor, increased consumption of
animal products can help increase the food purchasing power of the poor.
Considerable evidence exists that the rural poor and landless, especially women, get
a higher share of their income from livestock than better-off rural people (with the
main exceptions found in areas with large-scale ranching, such as parts of Latin
America). Furthermore, livestock provide the poor with fertilizer and draft power,
along with the opportunity to exploit common grazing areas, build collateral and
savings, and diversify income. The Livestock Revolution could well become a key
means of alleviating poverty in the next 20 years. But rapid industrialization of pro-
duction abetted by widespread current subsidies for large-scale credit and land use
could harm this major mechanism of income and asset generation for the poor.
92 CHRISTOPHER DELGADO ET AL.
Policymakers need to make sure that policy distortions do not drive the poor out
of the one growing market in which they are presently competitive.
Livestock products also benefit the poor by alleviating the protein and micronu-
trient deficiencies prevalent in developing countries. Increased consumption of
even small additional amounts of meat and milk can provide the same level of nutri-
ents, protein, and calories to the poor that a large and diverse amount of vegetables
and cereals could provide.
Environmental Sustainability and Public Health
At the low levels of calories consumed by the poor, lack of access to animal prod-
ucts, not overconsumption, should be the concern of policymakers. The greater
health risks from livestock products in developing countries come from animal-
borne diseases, such as avian flu and salmonella, microbial contamination from
unsafe handling of foods, and a build-up of pesticides and antibiotics in the food
chain through production practices.
The effects of the Livestock Revolution on the environment are also potentially
worrisome. Livestock typically contribute to environmental sustainability in mixed
farming systems that strike a proper balance between crop and livestock intensifi-
cation. In these systems livestock provide the manure and draft power to sustain
intensive crop production. But the larger concentrations of animals in periurban
areas needed to meet growing urban meat and milk demand have led to the degra-
dation of grazing areas and pollution problems. Policies have also encouraged over-
stocking or deforestation by shielding producers and consumers from the true costs
of environmental degradation. In high-intensity systems, the large quantities of
greenhouse gases and excess levels of nutrients produced by livestock pose dangers
to the environment. This pollution needs to be, but rarely is, reflected in financial
costs to the producer and consumer.
Conclusions for Policy
Some want to halt the Livestock Revolution. But the ongoing nutritional transfor-
mation in developing countries driven by income, population, and urban growth
leaves little room for policy to alter the widespread increase in demand for animal
food products. Policy can, however, help make the form of the revolution as bene-
ficial as possible to the overall well-being of the poor. To do this, policymakers will
have to focus on four key issues:
Small-scale producers have to be linked vertically with processors and marketers of
perishable products. The poor find it difficult to gain access to productive assets such
as credit and refrigeration facilities and to information such as knowledge about
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microbial infection prevention. The integration of small-scale livestock producers
and larger-scale processors would combine the environmental and poverty-
alleviation benefits of small-scale livestock production with the economies of scale
and human health benefits that can be had from larger-scale processing.
Policy can help facilitate the incorporation of smallholders into commercial pro-
duction by remedying distortions that promote artificial economies of scale, such as sub-
sidies to large-scale credit and grazing. Success in this effort will require political
commitment as well as public and private partnership to develop the technologies
and practices necessary to minimize risks from animal disease that are inevitable
when animals from large numbers of small-scale producers are mixed in a single fin-
ishing or processing facility. Much greater attention should be given to livestock pro-
ductivity and health issues, including in postharvest processing and marketing.
Regulatory mechanisms for dealing with the health and environmental problems
arising from livestock production need to be developed. Technologies that address envi-
ronmental and public health dangers will not work unless regulatory enforcement
backs them up. Such institutional developments will likely occur when the politi-
cal demands for better regulation become strong.
Above all, small-scale producers need to be included in the response to this dynam-
ic opportunity. Lack of policy action will not stop the Livestock Revolution, but it
will ensure that the form it takes is less favorable for growth, poverty alleviation, and
sustainability in developing countries.
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Overfished Oceans, Booming Fisheries
What Does This Mean for World Food Security?
Reported by Ellen Wilson
“We’ve reached the point where we have
the technology to catch the last fish.”
—Gerry Leape 
The adage “Give a man a fish, and feed him for a day; teach a man to fish, andhe can feed himself for a lifetime” no longer holds true in today’s world.Families that rely on fishing for their sustenance and livelihood are facing
poverty and food insecurity as bounty from the oceans is depleted the world over.
Aquatic resources, including fish caught from the oceans and fish grown on salt-
water and freshwater farms, were valued at US$70 billion in 1991. The fishing
industry—in everything from dug-out canoes to giant trawlers using the advanced
technology of the 1990s—is struggling to meet the world’s appetite for fish. The
result has been overexploitation of natural fish stocks and severe degradation of
marine and coastal environments—resources once thought to be unlimited gifts of
nature.
“The fishing industry’s aggressive and expanding search for fish from the sea
reached a turning point in 1990,” said Meryl Williams, director general of the
Philippines-based International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management
(ICLARM). “After many years of increasing production, the global marine and
inland catch from natural stocks declined from the 1989 peak of about 89 million
tons to 85 million tons in 1993. Despite a rebound to 91 million tons in 1994 and
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1995, all indications are that the global catch will not resume the fairly steady pro-
duction increase that marked the period from the 1940s to the 1980s.”
The depletion of the world’s natural fish stocks will have no small effect on the
world food supply now and in the coming years. About 1 billion people—a fifth
of the global population—rely on fish as their primary source of protein. Fish are
also an important source of income, particularly for artisanal fisherfolk—people who
live along coastal areas of developing countries. These people are at risk not only
because their waters are overfished, but also because competition for access to
coastal resources is increasing, mainly as a result of the recent phenomenal growth
in shrimp and lobster exports to developed countries. This fisheries boom has mar-
ginalized many artisanal fisherfolk. With the global population growing fast, the
world will need to further expand aquaculture to make up for the lost food and
income supply for the poor.
Overfishing
Natural fish stocks are depleted worldwide because of unbridled access and super-
advanced fish harvesting technology. Better enforcement of international agreements
is needed to sustainably manage natural fish stocks and allow the oceans to recover.
“We’ve reached the point where we have the technology to catch the last fish,” said
Gerry Leape, legislative director for ocean issues at Greenpeace. “We can no longer
continue to develop our fishing fleets. But the world still subsidizes commercial fleets
to the tune of a billion dollars a week. To put that in perspective, the world spends
US$124 billion to catch US$70 billion worth of fish.”
Industry is pumping so much money into increasingly more sophisticated
equipment, such as trawlers with drift nets that span 40 kilometers, computer-
ized searching mechanisms, and larger fishing vessels and fleets, because the fish
are getting harder to find. In 1950, no marine fish stocks were known to be over-
fished. In 1994, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
estimated that almost 70 percent of those stocks of marine fish for which assess-
ments were available were fully exploited, overfished, or otherwise in urgent need
of management.
“All of the oldest fishing grounds of the Northern Hemisphere are overfished,”
said Chris Delgado, research fellow at the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI). “Europe and North America’s traditional high-quality halibut,
sole, and flounder fisheries are under severe pressure; previously abundant stocks
from the North Sea between Denmark and Britain are at their lowest point ever;
and, more recently, there has been the collapse of and subsequent ban on the fish-
ing of Canada’s cod. It remains to be seen how long it will take for these stocks to
regenerate.”
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Overfishing is also taking place in Asia, in some African countries, in parts of
Latin America, and in many small island countries, according to a report by the
Denmark-based Institute for Fisheries Management and Coastal Community
Development. Overfishing by local fishers in these areas is often aggravated by fish-
ing fleets from industrialized countries.
Restrictions on Fishing
As fish have become increasingly scarce, countries have established 200-mile fishing
limits off their coasts, which, to some degree, restrict access to fish on the continental
shelf in much of the world. They have also created licensing and quota restrictions,
such as “effort quotas,” “individual transferable quotas” (ITQs), and limited entry
into fisheries. Developed countries back up these limits with military force.
However, few developing countries have been able to implement comprehensive and
effective management measures for their waters.
“There is an international agreement and many laws,” said Max Agüero, gen-
eral director of the Chile-based research organization the Inter-American Centre
for Sustainable Ecosystems Development (ICSED). “But industrial fleets do not
fully respect the regulations, and developing countries do not have the resources
to enforce them, such as through good fleets to monitor the waters within their
own boundaries. We need more means to police the oceans if we want to imple-
ment the regulations, and, as an international community, we must find ways to
self-regulate.”
Some areas are still in dispute, such as those between China and the Philippines,
the United States and Canada, and Canada and Spain. And these limits do not take
into account fish that migrate from one country’s jurisdiction to another, such as
tuna and salmon.
Another major problem is the high rate of discarded fish, estimated by FAO’s
report The State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture 1996 to be in the neigh-
borhood of 27 million tons per year, or about 32 percent of the total reported annu-
al production of marine capture fisheries. Trawling and other technologies sweep
the ocean floor, but most of the catch is thrown out and wasted.
Policy groups call for increased enforcement of treaties to restrict fishing
around the world, and some strides have been made in recent years. “For many
years, the law of the sea under the United Nations was a pious wish that wasn’t
being implemented,” said Delgado. “Now, after years of foot-dragging, it is
being better implemented under the Agreement on Straddling Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, and this has signified a major change in the way the world
does business.”
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The Fisheries Boom
As the industrialized world’s fish stocks have been depleted, the fish trade has
increasingly turned to developing countries for fish. The United States, for exam-
ple, has gone from the world’s second largest exporter of fish to a net importer in a
10-year period, according to an IFPRI report. Among developing countries, fish
exports have become the major foreign exchange success story of the last decade.
From 1985 to 1994, foreign exchange earnings from fish exports from developing
countries, mainly from Asia, have gone up from US$9 billion in 1983 to US$17
billion in 1993 after adjusting for inflation. This is an 87 percent increase in real
terms over 10 years. Increased trade in fish has driven up fish prices. This has been
good news for many debtor nations. Increased earnings from fish have come at a
time when receipts from traditional exports of tropical agricultural products from
developing countries were declining as a result of sharp price decreases for those
items on the world market.
“The numbers are astounding,” said Delgado. “The traditional money earn-
ers in many developing-country economies—sugar, coffee, tea, and cocoa—are
together earning less now on a global scale than large-scale fisheries exports,
which tend to be concentrated in countries like Indonesia, India, Mexico, and
Thailand.”
But there is a dark side to the new fish boom in developing countries. Most
of the new fish on the market are coming from industrial fisheries in developing
countries. These are often capital-intensive enterprises, mainly financed by and
earning profits for large investors, favored by national governments because of
their contributions to markets, exports, and the national economy. Although
they provide employment, industrial fisheries are not producing food for the poor.
They produce high-value fish for industrialized countries and low-value fish for
fish meal that is fed to livestock. Yet they are overtaking the waters of small-scale,
artisanal fisherfolk, particularly in Asia, where there are many poor, coastal
communities.
“Generating income is one thing,” said Agüero. “Who gets the income is
another, and it is not the small-scale fishers. With new trends toward a global econ-
omy and more foreign investment, outsiders take advantage of the income fish
resources can generate. Increasingly, resources from these enterprises are going into
very few hands, and the community at large is not benefiting.
“There needs to be an emphasis on producing more low-cost fish like tilapias
and carps on fish farms, rather than emphasizing the high-value fish that gener-
ally appeal to high-income population,” continued Agüero. “While the produc-
tion of high-value fish has increased the income and foreign exchange of many
developing countries, it does not address the food problem.”
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Artisanal Fisherfolk
The significance of small-scale artisanal fisherfolk cannot be overemphasized, as they
account for the major part of the fish landed for direct human consumption in devel-
oping countries, according to an IFPRI report. “The contribution of small-scale fish-
eries to income and employment, often in areas where there is no alternative
employment, is also considerable, with at least 100 million people wholly or partly
economically dependent on it.”
According to the 1996 FAO report on fish, “it is important to ensure that tra-
ditional fisherfolk also benefit directly from higher fish values and are fully involved
in decisions affecting their livelihoods.”
One way for artisanal fisherfolk to participate in the fisheries boom is through
fish cooperatives or comanagement of fisheries, whereby authority for fisheries man-
agement can be shared between various levels of government and the local fishing
community. According to a report by ICLARM, some countries such as Malawi and
Viet Nam have adopted comanagement as an official policy. In others, such as in
Bangladesh and the Philippines, it is being pursued selectively as an interim meas-
ure through local and community initiatives or with the assistance of nongovern-
mental organizations.
Nonetheless, in the years ahead, there will be a shortfall in inexpensive protein
for people who once relied on fish. According to Williams from ICLARM, better
research is needed on the freshwater farming of affordable food fish in developing
countries. Increasing the supply of substitute products through improved aquacul-
ture can help solve the conflicting problems of overfishing and the world’s increased
demand for fish. This technical solution must be complemented by social and pol-
icy measures to help make aquaculture environmentally sustainable and to improve
fisheries management.
“Fish is unlikely to ever return to being the poor man’s protein,” she said.
“However, we must maximize use of aquatic resources. Efficiency improvements,
such as reducing postharvest losses, hold great potential.”
Williams also raised the issue of using aquatic resources as livestock and aqua-
culture feed, crop fertilizer, and food and nonfood additives. The critical question
to ask of lower-priced uses is whether a greater contribution could be made by using
the resources more directly for human food.
Looking to the future, economists project that under optimistic conditions,
overfishing—and the resulting loss of fish for human consumption—could be off-
set by the adoption of wise fish management strategies and the increased use of low-
value fish to the year 2010.
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“Over the next 25 years, the challenge will be to maintain present or near-
present levels of natural harvests while sustainably increasing aquaculture produc-
tion,” said Williams.
“The next few transition decades pose a host of uncertainties for users of fish-
eries, consumers, and management institutions. It is also a time of opportunities,
when even small actions could have important effects.”
Food Production and
the Environment
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The Earth’s Environmental Woes
Is Agriculture Part of the Problem
Or Part of the Solution?
Reported by Ellen Wilson
One of the major causes of the environmental stress in 
the developing world is poverty, and one of the major
causes of poverty is environmental stress.
Every year, nearly 17 million hectares of tropical rain forests are destroyed,thousands of irreplaceable plant varieties are lost, and millions of hectares ofland turn into deserts.
Will increased agricultural production, with its associated use of fertilizers, pes-
ticides, irrigation, and farm machinery only exacerbate these severe global envi-
ronmental problems? In short, does the goal of meeting the world’s future food needs
conflict with the goal of protecting the environment?
According to researchers, one of the major causes of the environmental stress
in the developing world is poverty, and one of the major causes of poverty is envi-
ronmental stress.
“The relationship between poverty and environmental degradation is close and
complicated,” said Per Pinstrup-Andersen, director general of IFPRI. “The rural
poor depend on agriculture, and hence on natural resources, for 40 to 85 percent
of their income. Environmental degradation sets in when the poor lose the capac-
ity to sustainably support themselves from their natural resource base. Population
pressures and a lack of adequate agricultural technologies, among other factors, are
major forces driving the poor to make desperate choices.”
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The negative relationship among poverty, population, and environmental
degradation can end only, according to researchers, with the help of more produc-
tive agriculture in the areas that have already been cultivated by the poor. This will
slow encroachment on rain forests, hillsides, and desert margins.
Yet at the same time, changes need to be made where agriculture is more
advanced, such as on former Green Revolution lands. More environmentally sound
management of fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation is needed to reduce the nega-
tive environmental impact of agricultural intensification.
Increasing agricultural productivity in both the fragile and the more produc-
tive areas of the developing world is essential for meeting future global food needs.
According to researchers, this is one of the most important ways of better manag-
ing the world’s natural resources.
Putting Nutrients Back into Soils
According to the 1994 UNICEF State of the World’s Children report, “Land cleared
by burning forests loses stability and fertility within a very few years; steep hillsides
quickly become eroded without investments in soil conservation; marginal agri-
cultural lands gradually become infertile when those who farm them can afford nei-
ther fertilizer nor fallow periods. . . .”
It used to be that farmers could allow land in fragile areas to recover between crop
rotations, but this practice is fast becoming a luxury as a result of population pressures.
Much of the population pressure is coming from migrations of people from wars, social
strife, natural disasters, and environmental degradation. According to an IFPRI report,
500 million people live on severely degraded hillsides, 200 million live in tropical rain
forests, and 850 million live in dry areas threatened by desertification.
As the population density increases, farmers must produce even more food than
before. To do this, there is no other way except to put nutrients back into soils. The
methods for doing this, however, are still being debated by agriculturalists and
environmentalists. There are inorganic and organic methods—use of synthetic fer-
tilizers and use of organic materials such as compost and nitrogen-fixing legumes
that add nutrients to the soils.
According to Carlos Baanante, director of the Research and Development
Division at the International Fertilizer Development Center, “Organic fertilizers,
such as composted livestock manure and plant residues, help to maintain the soil’s
organic matter and supply nutrients. But the nutrients supplied may not be suffi-
cient. The best management is the use of both organic and inorganic sources of
nutrients.”
But some members of the environmental community disagree. “The assump-
tion that we should keep adding nitrogen fertilizer to soils indefinitely is weak,” said
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Jonathon Landeck, director of international programs at the Rodale Institute. “The
ideal agriculture is that which does not incorporate any synthetic chemicals. For
those who say that organic fertilizers are not viable in the long run, I have to point
out that synthetic fertilizer use will likewise reach yield plateaus. Additionally, use
of organics could mean fewer energy inputs, making them cheaper than synthetic
chemicals. But we don’t know this because we have not been investing equally in
research on agriculture that is clean of synthetic chemicals.”
According to researchers, other needs in fragile areas are diverse cropping sys-
tems instead of intensive monocultures of annual crops; better integration of live-
stock and green manures into farming systems; and generation of nonfarm sources
of income. Other needed reforms include changes in land tenure rights. “In many
instances,” said Pinstrup-Andersen, “poor people do not own the land they farm.
They, therefore, have few or no incentives to conserve soils, harbor groundwater,
or preserve trees.”
People versus Trees
Fragile areas not only supply food, fuel, water, and income to the poor, they are also
home to some of the world’s most important caches of biodiversity. The Nature
Conservancy, through its assistance to developing-world organizations to purchase and
preserve ecologically valued land, often wrestles with the dilemma of “people versus
trees.”
According to Alan Randall, director of major program development at the
Conservancy, “Our philosophy is to make these reserves an instrument of economic
development and employment for the people who live around them rather than an
instrument for taking land away. The bottom line is that a forest reserve or park can-
not exist if it is surrounded by poverty.”
The Conservancy is working with the Bertoni Foundation, a conservation
group, to protect the Mbaracayu Forest Nature Reserve—146,000 acres in Paraguay.
The land was purchased in advance of a company that planned to raze the trees and
convert the land to industrial-scale soybean and cotton farming. Instead of oppos-
ing the poor farmers who sought land claims on the reserve, the Bertoni Foundation
is assisting community members to file land claims in the buffer areas outside the
reserve, and to adopt sustainable agricultural practices.
The Foundation and the Conservancy are also helping the community to
develop alternative sources of income that do not degrade the land, such as poul-
try production and beekeeping. They are also encouraging sustainable harvesting
of nontimber forest products, such as tea leaves, from the reserve. Indirect by-
products of the reserve have been government-sponsored improvements to the
rural roads and electrification of the local village.
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Agricultural Ills
Some perceive agriculture as an environmental enemy. In some of the highly pro-
ductive Green Revolution areas, dramatic increases in food production have been
associated with environmental degradation: waterlogging and salinization of soils
from irrigation; contamination of surface and groundwater; loss of beneficial insects;
buildup of chemical resistances in insects and weeds; poisoning of farm workers from
pesticides; and loss of traditional plant varieties from the planting of monocultures.
According to researchers, these ills do not necessarily have to come hand in hand
with agricultural development.
“Agricultural ‘inputs’—irrigation, fertilizers, and pesticides—have been heav-
ily subsidized by governments, making them far too cheap, and leading many to
overuse them,” said Peter Hazell of IFPRI. “Between 10 and 24 percent of all irri-
gated land, for example, suffers from salinization caused by overirrigation. In India,
about 7 million hectares of land have been abandoned because of salts.”
What is needed, according to Hazell, is better design and management of irri-
gation systems, fewer subsidies on fertilizers and pesticides, development of eco-
nomic incentives to reduce excessive use of water and chemical inputs, regionally
diversified crop breeding programs, and farmer education on safe application, stor-
age, and disposal of pesticides.
“Irrigation and chemical inputs, if applied properly, at the right time, and
sparingly, do not have to degrade the environment,” said Hazell. “And using chem-
icals that are specifically designed for the problems at hand will decrease the nega-
tive environmental consequences as well.”
Studies have found that pesticides are only needed in very small amounts, and
work is progressing on ways to replace them completely. Says Hazell, “There is a
shift toward biological control—using natural predators to control pests instead of
pesticides. We are also breeding into plants natural resistances to pests and diseases.
“Agriculturalists and environmentalists are becoming better informed,” con-
tinued Hazell. “Few agriculturalists think that Green Revolution technology should
be applied to fragile areas. On the other hand, in highly productive areas, more envi-
ronmentalists agree that we have to continue to use modern inputs, but do so in a
more environmentally responsible way. As we look to the future, biotechnology will
provide more and more substitutes for chemicals. Who knows, maybe one day we
can breed a nitrogen-fixing gene into wheat and rice.”
But according to Natural Resources Defense Council senior attorney Jacob
Scherr, policymakers should also look beyond technology to political and social
issues affecting environmental protection, poverty, and the food supply. “For exam-
ple, take Africa,” said Scherr. “If you consider its natural resource base, the conti-
nent should be able to meet its own food needs. However, Africa is experiencing a
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food shortfall, which is expected to become worse. The solution will not come from
a Green Revolution ‘magic bullet.’ The issue of adequate food supply in Africa is
extraordinarily complex. It involves markets, distribution, governmental policies—
all of which are vulnerable to disruption by political unrest. It is going to take much
more than improved seeds to avoid chronic hunger and food shortages.”
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Agricultural Growth Is the Key to
Poverty Alleviation in Low-Income
Developing Countries
Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Rajul Pandya-Lorch
Very few countries have experienced rapid 
economic growth without agricultural growth 
either preceding or accompanying it.
The extent and depth of poverty in the developing world is a disgrace. Over 1.1billion people—30 percent of the population—live in absolute poverty, withonly a dollar a day or less per person to meet food, shelter, and other needs.
Not surprisingly, hunger, malnutrition, and associated diseases are widespread:
more than 700 million people do not have access to sufficient food to lead healthy,
productive lives; millions more live on the edge of hunger; and more than 180 mil-
lion preschool children are significantly underweight. Every second person in South
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa is absolutely poor. Unless concerted action is taken
now, poverty is not expected to diminish much in the near future. South Asia will
continue to be home to half the developing world’s poor, and Sub-Saharan Africa,
where the number of poor is projected to increase 40 percent between 1990 and
2000, will emerge as an increasingly important locus of poverty.
Poverty is a rural phenomenon in most of the developing world, especially the
low-income developing countries. The rural poor make up more than 75 percent
of the poor in many Sub-Saharan African and Asian countries. Latin America’s high
urbanization rates have led to a higher prevalence of urban poverty, but even in that
region the majority of the poor are rural.
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Agriculture Is Key to Poverty Alleviation
Most of the world’s poor are rural-based and, even when they are not engaged in
their own agricultural activities, they rely on nonfarm employment and income that
depend in one way or another on agriculture. Moreover, agricultural growth is a cat-
alyst for broad-based economic growth and development in most low-income
countries: agriculture’s linkages to the nonfarm economy generate considerable
employment, income, and growth in the rest of the economy. Very few countries
have experienced rapid economic growth without agricultural growth either pre-
ceding or accompanying it. Economic growth is strongly linked to poverty reduc-
tion. Diversification out of agriculture will occur in the long term, but in the short
term many countries lack alternatives.
Agricultural growth and development must be vigorously pursued in low-
income developing countries for at least four reasons: (1) to alleviate poverty
through employment creation and income generation in rural areas; (2) to meet
growing food needs driven by rapid population growth and urbanization; (3) to
stimulate overall economic growth, given that agriculture is the most viable lead
sector for growth and development in many low-income developing countries;
and (4) to conserve natural resources. Poverty is the most serious threat to the
environment in developing countries: lacking means to appropriately intensify
agriculture, the poor are often forced to overuse or misuse the natural resource
base to meet basic needs.
National and international investments in agriculture have declined since the
mid-1980s. In many countries, agriculture has been taxed explicitly and implicitly.
The downward trend in support for developing-country agriculture must be reversed,
not only to assure future food supplies and to protect natural resources, but also to
promote general economic growth and poverty alleviation.
Accelerated public investments are needed to facilitate agricultural and rural
growth through
• Yield-increasing crop varieties, including improved crop varieties and hybrids
that are more drought-tolerant and pest-resistant, and improved livestock;
• Yield-increasing and environmentally-friendly production technology such as
small-scale irrigation and irrigation management systems and techniques such
as integrated pest management;
• Reliable, timely, and reasonably priced access to appropriate inputs such as
tools, fertilizer, and, when needed, pesticides, and the credit often needed to
purchase them;
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• Strong extension services and technical assistance to communicate timely infor-
mation and developments in technology and sustainable resource management
to farmers and to relay farmer concerns to researchers;
• Improved rural infrastructure and effective markets; and
• Primary education, health care, and good nutrition for all.
These investments need to be supported by an enabling policy environment. This
includes trade, macro, and sectoral policies that do not discriminate against agri-
culture, and policies that provide appropriate incentives for the sustainable man-
agement of natural resources.
Investments in Research and Technology Are Crucial
Agricultural research and technological improvements are crucial to increase agri-
cultural productivity and returns to farmers and farm labor, thereby reducing
poverty and meeting future food needs at reasonable prices without irreversible
degradation of the natural resource base. Accelerated investment in agricultural
research is particularly urgent for low-income developing countries, partly because
these countries will not achieve reasonable economic growth and poverty allevi-
ation without productivity increases in agriculture, and partly because
comparatively little research is currently undertaken in these countries. Many poor
countries, which depend the most on productivity increases in agriculture, gross-
ly underinvest in agricultural research (Figure 17.1). Per capita agricultural
research expenditures in low-income countries are one-tenth those in high-income
countries, even though agriculture accounts for much larger shares of average
incomes. Expenditures in public-sector agricultural research in low-income coun-
tries are still less than 0.5 percent of the agricultural gross domestic product, com-
pared with about 2.0 percent in high-income countries, a share that has doubled
since the early 1960s.
Sub-Saharan Africa, which desperately needs productivity increases in agri-
culture, has only 42 agricultural researchers per million economically active per-
sons in agriculture compared with 2,458 in industrialized countries. Figure 17.2
shows that the annual growth of African agricultural research expenditures has
declined since the 1960s. Sub-Saharan Africa is also missing out on biotechno-
logical research, which is concentrated in industrial countries and a few large
developing countries such as Brazil. By failing to capitalize on the new opportuni-
ties biotechnology offers, Sub-Saharan Africa may lose export markets to competi-
tors and synthetic substitutes.
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A large share of the poor reside in areas with high risks of environmental degra-
dation. The low priority given to research to develop appropriate technology for
these areas in the past is a major reason for the current rapid degradation of natu-
ral resources and high levels of poverty. In addition to assuring sufficient research
investment in the high-potential areas, much more research must be directed to the
development of appropriate technology for marginal areas. Outmigration is not a
feasible solution for these areas in the foreseeable future simply because of the large
numbers of poor people who reside there and the lack of opportunities elsewhere.
While the private sector is expected to play an increasing role in research and
technology development for developing-country agriculture, much of the research
needed to reduce poverty is of a public goods nature—the benefits are not easily cap-
tured by individual farmers or firms but extend to society as a whole—and will not
be undertaken by the private sector. Fortunately, extremely high social rates of
returns of past and current agricultural research justify public investment. The
major share of such investments should occur in the developing countries’ own
research institutions. However, to be fully effective, those institutions must be sup-
ported by international research. The centers under the auspices of the Consultative
Figure 17.1 Agricultural Research Expenditures, 1981–85
Source: P. Pardey, J. Roseboom, and J. R. Anderson, eds., Agricultural Research Policy:
International quantitative perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) play an essential role in
undertaking research of a public goods nature with large international benefits. Such
research is of critical importance to developing countries and must be accelerated
if poverty is to be significantly reduced.
Research and technology alone will not drive agricultural growth. The inter-
action between technology and policy is critical. The full and beneficial effects of
agricultural research and technological change will materialize only if government
policies are appropriate. Distortions in input and output markets, asset ownership,
and other institutional and market distortions adverse to the poor must be mini-
mized or removed. Access by the poor to productive resources such as land and cap-
ital needs to be enhanced. Human resources must be improved through expanded
investments in education, health care, nutrition, and sanitary environments. Rural
infrastructure and institutions must be strengthened. The policy environment must
be conducive to and supportive of poverty alleviation and sustainable management
of natural resources.
Agriculture must be in the forefront of the national and international agenda
to eradicate poverty in low-income developing countries. Failure to significantly
Figure 17.2 Annual Growth Rate of Expenditures in African national
Agricultural Research Systems
Source: P. Pardey, J. Roseboom, and N. Beintema, Agricultural Research in Africa: Three
Decades of Development. Briefing Paper No. 19 (The Hague, Netherlands: International
Service for National Agriculture Research, 1995).
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expand agricultural research in and for developing countries and failure to invest in
agricultural development will make poverty eradication an elusive goal. Lack of fore-
sight today comes with a high price tag for the future. As usual, the weak and pow-
erless will pay the largest share of the price. We must all share the blame for inaction
or inappropriate action.
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Reducing Poverty and
Protecting the Environment
The Overlooked Potential of Less-Favored Lands
John Pender, Peter Hazell, and James L. Garrett
Strategies to get agriculture moving in less-favored
areas will typically have to be different from 
the Green Revolution model.
Poverty, low agricultural productivity, and natural resource degradation aresevere interrelated problems in less-favored areas of the tropics. Less-favoredareas include lands that have low agricultural potential because of limited and
uncertain rainfall, poor soils, steep slopes, or other biophysical constraints, as well
as areas that may have high agricultural potential but have limited access to infra-
structure and markets, low population density, or other socioeconomic constraints.
In other words, less-favored lands may be less favored either by nature or by man.
According to a recent study by the Technical Advisory Committee of the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, nearly two-thirds of
the rural population of developing countries—almost 1.8 billion people—lives
in less-favored areas, including marginal agricultural areas, forest and woodland
areas, and arid areas. These areas include most of the semiarid and arid tropics of
Africa and South Asia, mountain areas in South America and Asia, much of the
highlands of East and Central Africa, hillside areas in Central America and
Southeast Asia, and large portions of the humid tropics of Africa and Latin
America. The available evidence suggests that most of the rural poor in develop-
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ing countries live in these less-favored areas. Low agricultural productivity and
land degradation are severe in these areas. Cereal yields of less than one metric
ton per hectare are common, and deforestation, overgrazing, soil erosion, and soil
nutrient depletion are widespread.
The conventional wisdom in policy circles has said that strategies for
development in developing countries should emphasize public investments in
favored areas. Many experts have believed that returns to investment would be
greatest in favored areas and that increased food production and rapid econom-
ic growth in these areas would ensure food security and allow people to migrate
out of less-favored areas, reducing poverty and pressure on the resources in such
areas.
In the past, many governments and donors have adopted this strategy and
provided high-potential areas with better roads, communications, schools, health
facilities, and agricultural technologies. Credit programs as well as pricing poli-
cies for production and for agricultural services and inputs have also tended to
favor these areas, or at least the crops produced there. Yet, despite considerable
outmigration, population and agricultural production in less-favored areas
continue to grow, often in association with worsening poverty and resource
degradation. At the same time, after years of intensive use of irrigation and
chemical inputs, erosion and salinization are affecting many high-potential areas,
and growth in yields has stagnated, leading to diminishing returns to new invest-
ment. In some instances, as capital-intensive technologies displace workers, the
development of high-potential areas has actually encouraged migration to less-
favored areas. Thus, the sustainability of this strategy is even now in doubt.
Success is especially uncertain for predominantly agrarian countries, like many in
Africa, with only limited high-potential land and nonfarm opportunities.
Although less-favored areas often have an absolute disadvantage in produc-
ing many types of crops compared with favored areas (that is, productivity is
lower than in favored areas), they invariably have a comparative advantage in
some type of agricultural production or in nonfarm activities (that is, produc-
tion is profitable given alternative uses of the land and labor of people in these
areas). The diversity of situations in less-favored areas can allow them to exploit
their different comparative advantages, provided that necessary investments in
infrastructure and institutions are made. Increasing evidence suggests that invest-
ments in less-favored areas can yield relatively high rates of economic return and
significantly reduce poverty in some countries. Anecdotal evidence also suggests
the possibility of reducing resource and environmental degradation alongside
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economic growth and poverty reduction. However, the evidence on such strate-
gies is still very limited.
Government and donor agencies could, of course, try to increase incomes in
less-favored areas by promoting nonagricultural or postharvest activities, instead of
agriculture. But in most rural areas, the generation of significant nonfarm income
depends critically on having a dynamic agriculture sector. If regional agriculture stag-
nates, the local economy has no engine to drive nonfarm activities.
In Africa, for example, less-favored areas are often isolated from the rest of the
economy. Low incomes limit demand. With investment, agriculture starts to grow;
incomes and expenditures of local people increase. Opportunities to diversify pro-
duction of agricultural and nonagricultural goods and services, including micro-
enterprises and agroprocessing, open up. 
Although there are large gaps in knowledge about the underlying causes of the
problems facing less-favored areas and the appropriate strategies to address them,
several key lessons emerge from recent assessments:
• Less-favored areas offer opportunities for socially profitable investments.
Recent research shows high returns to various kinds of public investment in
lower-potential areas of China and India (in many instances higher than
returns to investments in favored areas), in terms of both economic growth
and poverty reduction. Investments in agricultural research and development,
education, roads, and irrigation had greater incremental impact in less-favored
areas in these countries, in part because the opportunities for investment in
these areas had been neglected.
• The success of alternative investments in less-favored areas depends upon
differences in comparative advantage across these diverse areas. Given the
variety of situations in less-favored areas, no one-size-fits-all strategy is likely 
to succeed everywhere. Three factors are particularly important for deter-
mining comparative advantage: agricultural potential, access to markets and
infrastructure, and population density. In less-favored areas having high
agricultural potential but poor market access—as in much of humid West
Africa, parts of the East African highlands, and the Southeast Asian uplands—
high-value nonperishable perennial crops such as coffee, cocoa, or oil palm
often have a comparative advantage. Areas with low crop production poten-
tial are likely to have comparative advantage in extensive livestock production,
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particularly if they are far from markets and not densely populated, as in 
much of semiarid West Africa and the Altiplano of the southern Andes. In
remote areas where population densities are greater, mixed-crop livestock
production is more important, even where crop production potential is low, 
as in parts of the East African highlands. Areas with low crop production
potential but good access to markets—as in periurban areas of semiarid India
and other low-potential areas—are likely to have a greater comparative ad-
vantage in forestry, intensive livestock production, or nonfarm activities.
Development strategies will be more successful if they recognize and build
upon such comparative advantages.
• Strategies for developing and disseminating technologies must take into
account the special characteristics and demands of less-favored areas. A 
high degree of diversity in biophysical and socioeconomic conditions is 
one of the main challenges. Other challenges may include susceptibility 
to droughts, pests, diseases, temperature extremes, and other risks; the 
fragility of land and other resources; remoteness from markets and services;
and the subsistence orientation of farmers in these areas. A technological 
strategy should there-fore be participatory and demand driven, stimulating 
and building upon farmer innovation and adapting to local circumstances.
Technologies that help reduce risks (by increasing tolerance to drought, pests,
or frost, for example) and conserve and improve resources may be more effec-
tive than those that simply promote high yields in response to high levels of
inputs.
• Sustainable and profitable technologies are needed to conserve and effi-
ciently use scarce water, control erosion, restore soil fertility, and increase the
supply of useful biomass. Such technologies are often labor or land intensive
(such as terrace building) and may be unattractive to farmers where labor 
costs are high or where land is scarce. Labor- or land-saving technologies 
such as improved fallows during a short rainy season or agroforestry on farm
boundaries may have more potential. In areas with limited rainfall, scarcity 
of biomass and high demands for alternative uses of biomass (for fodder 
and fuel, for example) limit the potential of many organic approaches to 
land management. In such circumstances, technologies and policies for con-
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serving water and profitably increasing the production of useful biomass (such
as promotion of woodlots) should have high priority.
• Strategies for less-favored areas will be most effective if they are linked to the
development pathways that have comparative advantage in particular circum-
stances. Small-scale irrigation development is likely to yield the highest returns
in areas with good market access and otherwise suitable soil conditions, since
this can enable high-value crop production as well as intensified food crop
production. Road development is likely to have the highest returns in densely
populated areas with good agricultural potential but limited market access, by
enabling marketing of high-value commodities and inputs for these. Improved
management institutions for common property resources such as community
grazing lands or woodlots are critical in many less-favored areas, particularly
low-potential areas with limited opportunity to increase crop productivity.
Investments in education and training are also important, particularly in low-
potential areas with limited market access, where emigration is likely to be an
important element of people’s livelihood strategies for the foreseeable future.
• Secure property rights and effective institutions must be ensured. When
farmers do not have assured long-term access to land, do not bear the full
cost of resource degradation, or are not sure they will receive the benefits of
their investments, they are more likely to pursue unsustainable farming prac-
tices and fail to invest in improving and conserving resources. Governments
should ensure that farmers have secure property rights, and should remove
restrictions that inhibit the most efficient and environmentally sustainable
use of private, public, and common property. Many community-based land
tenure systems provide farmers with adequate security. When appropriate,
governments should strengthen these indigenous systems and facilitate their
adaptation to changing circumstances, instead of replacing them. This is par-
ticularly true of local organizations that manage common properties such as
rangelands, woodlands, and wetlands. When adequately empowered, they
are often best able to take account of resource interdependencies and estab-
lish regulations that recognize the rights of many users over the same land.
Such regulations are especially important in watersheds or drought-prone
areas that require the ability to move animals over wide areas as an integral
part of risk management.
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• Effective risk management is needed. Risks of crop disaster due to bad
weather or pests can discourage investments by farmers in land improve-
ments and their adoption of higher-yielding technologies. Agricultural
research can help reduce risk, for example, by improving drought resistance
in crops or developing better ways to conserve soil moisture. Additionally,
governments may need to assist farmers in coping with catastrophes and
work to provide effective safety net programs and credit and insurance mar-
kets. However, care should be taken in designing such interventions, for they
can easily backfire. Subsidized drought insurance, for example, increases the
profitability of more risky farming practices, some of which may be environ-
mentally unsuitable for drought-prone areas. Subsidized fodder programs in
drought years for rangeland users can also encourage overstocking, which
over time degrades the range.
• Policymakers must provide the right policy environment. Market reforms,
including price and trade liberalization, are also necessary to ensure that
prices provide the right production signals to farmers and that production
and input markets are competitive and work well. Governments should
make sure that farmers have access to good roads, telecommunications, and a
strong credit and savings system. Without them, farmers cannot be sure that
they will be able to sell their crops or get the inputs, like credit and fertilizer,
that they need.
Governments and donors should look more closely at the benefits of investing
in the agriculture of less-favored areas. Even without including social and environ-
mental benefits, the line can already be redrawn on what is economically justified.
This line may well shift even further in favor of less-favored lands as agricultural
research opens up new development possibilities. These investments become even
more compelling when the social benefits from reducing poverty, food insecurity,
and environmental degradation are considered.
Addressing the complex challenges of less-favored areas will not be easy or
inexpensive. It will typically require significant policy and institutional changes,
investments in agricultural research, rural infrastructure, human capital, and the
active involvement of local communities. Success will depend on the development
of stronger linkages between agricultural researchers, local governments, farmers,
community leaders, nongovernmental organizations, national policymakers, and
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donors. On their own, none of these agents of change are likely to succeed. But
by working together, they can take advantage of significant opportunities now and
in the future to reduce poverty and protect the environment in the areas that until
now have been less favored.
C h a p t e r  1 9
The Potential of Agroecology
to Combat Hunger in the
Developing World
Miguel A. Altieri, Peter Rosset, and Lori Ann Thrupp
With increasing evidence and awareness of the
advantages of agroecology, why hasn’t it spread 
more rapidly and how can it be multiplied 
and adopted more widely?
Proponents of a second Green Revolution generally argue that developingcountries should opt for an agroindustrial model that relies on standardizedtechnologies and ever-increasing fertilizer and pesticide use to provide addi-
tional food supplies for growing populations and economies. In contrast, a growing
number of farmers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and analysts propose
that instead of this capital- and input-intensive approach, developing countries
should favor an agroecological model, which emphasizes biodiversity, recycling of
nutrients, synergy among crops, animals, soils, and other biological components,
and regeneration and conservation of resources.
It is argued here that agroecology—a science that provides ecological principles
for the design and management of sustainable and resource-conserving agricultural
systems—offers several advantages over the conventional agronomic or agroindus-
trial approach. First, agroecology relies on indigenous farming knowledge and
selected modern technologies to manage diversity, incorporate biological principles
and resources into farming systems, and intensify agricultural production. Second,
it offers the only practical way to restore agricultural lands that have been degraded
by conventional agronomic practices. Third, it provides for an environmentally
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sound and affordable way for smallholders to intensify production in marginal
areas. Finally, it has the potential to reverse the anti-peasant bias of strategies that
emphasize purchased inputs as opposed to the assets that small farmers already
possess, such as their low opportunity costs of labor.
Case Studies
Thousands of examples exist of rural producers, in partnership with NGOs and
other organizations, promoting resource-conserving yet highly productive farming
systems. Critics of such alternative production systems point to lower crop yields
than in high-input conventional systems. But all too often it is precisely the empha-
sis on yield of a single crop that blinds analysts to broader measures of sustainabil-
ity and the greater productivity per unit area obtained in integrated agroecological
systems that feature many crop varieties together with animals and trees. Below are
some examples of the agroecological approach from Latin America.
Stabilizing the Hillsides of Central America
Perhaps the major agricultural challenge in Latin America has been to design crop-
ping systems for hillside areas that are productive and reduce erosion. World
Neighbors took on this challenge in Honduras in the mid-1980s. The program
introduced soil conservation practices, such as drainage and contour ditches, grass
barriers, and rock walls, and organic fertilization methods, such as the use of chicken
manure and intercropping with legumes. Grain yields tripled, and in some cases
quadrupled, from 400 kilograms per hectare to 1,200–1,600 kilograms. The yield
increase has ensured that the 1,200 families participating in the program have
ample grain supplies.
In the same region, a local NGO helped some 300 farmers experiment with
terracing, covering crops to smother weeds, and other new conservation techniques.
More than half of the farmers tripled their corn and bean yields. Many have gone
beyond staple production to grow vegetables for local markets.
Several NGOs in Central America have promoted the use of legumes as green
manure, an inexpensive source of organic fertilizer. Farmers in northern Honduras
are using velvet beans with excellent results. Corn yields are more than double the
national average, erosion and weeds are under control, and land preparation costs
are lower. Taking advantage of well-established farmer-to-farmer networks in
Nicaragua, more than 1,000 peasants recovered degraded land in the San Juan water-
shed in just one year using this simple technology. These farmers have decreased use
of chemical fertilizers from 1,900 to 400 kilograms per hectare while increasing
yields from 700 to 2,000 kilograms per hectare. Their production costs are about
22 percent lower than those for farmers using chemical fertilizers and monocultures.
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Agroecology in the Andean Region
NGOs in Peru have studied pre-Columbian technologies in search of solutions to
contemporary problems of high-altitude farming. A fascinating example is the
revival of an ingenious system of raised fields surrounded by ditches filled with water
that evolved in the Peruvian Andes about 3,000 years ago. These waru-warus were
able to produce bumper crops despite floods, droughts, and the killing frosts com-
mon at altitudes of nearly 4,000 meters.
In 1984 several NGOs and state agencies assisted local farmers in Puno to
reconstruct the ancient systems. The combination of raised beds and canals mod-
erates soil temperature, thereby extending the growing season and leading to higher
productivity on the waru-warus than on chemically fertilized normal pampa soils.
In the district of Huatta, the waru-warus have produced annual potato yields of
8–14 metric tons per hectare, contrasting favorably with the average regional pota-
to yields of 1–4 metric tons per hectare.
Beginning in 1983 an NGO and some peasant communities in Cajamarca
planted more than 550,000 trees and reconstructed about 850 hectares of terraces
and 173 hectares of drainage and infiltration canals over the course of 10 years.
About half the population in the area—1,247 families—now has land under con-
servation measures. For these people, potato yields have increased from 5 to 8 tons
per hectare and oca (wood sorrel) yields have jumped from 3 to 8 tons per hectare.
Enhanced crop production, fattening of cattle, and raising of alpaca for wool have
increased family income from an average US$108 per year in 1983 to more than
US$500 today.
Various NGOs and government agencies in the Colca valley of southern Peru
have sponsored terrace reconstruction by offering peasants low-interest loans or seeds
and other inputs to restore abandoned terraces. First-year yields of potatoes, maize,
and barley showed a 43–65 percent increase compared with yields from sloping
fields. A native legume was used as a rotational or associated crop on the terraces to
fix nitrogen, minimizing fertilizer needs and increasing production. Studies in
Bolivia, where native legumes have been used as rotational crops, show that though
yields are greater in chemically fertilized and machinery-prepared potato fields, ener-
gy costs are higher and net economic benefits lower than with the agroecological
system (see Table 19.1). Surveys indicate that farmers prefer this alternative system
because it optimizes the use of scarce resources, labor, and available capital and is
accessible to even poor producers.
Integrated Production Systems
A number of NGOs have promoted diversified farms in which each component of
the farming system biologically reinforces the other components—wastes from one
component, for instance, become inputs to another. Since 1980 an NGO has
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helped peasants in south-central Chile reach year-round food self-sufficiency
while rebuilding the productive capacity of the land. Small, model farm systems,
consisting of polycultures and rotating sequences of forage and food crops, for-
est and fruit trees, and animals, have been set up. Components are chosen accord-
ing to their nutritional contributions to subsequent rotations, their adaptability
to local agroclimatic conditions, the local peasant consumption patterns, and mar-
ket opportunities.
Soil fertility on these farms has improved, and no serious pest or disease prob-
lems have appeared. Fruit trees and forage crops achieve higher than average yields,
and milk and egg production far exceeds that on conventional high-input farms. A
nutritional analysis of the system shows that for a typical family it produces a 250
percent surplus of protein, 80 and 550 percent surpluses of vitamin A and C,
respectively, and a 330 percent surplus of calcium. If all of the farm output were
sold at wholesale prices, the family could generate a monthly net income 1.5 times
greater than the monthly legal minimum wage in Chile, while dedicating only a few
hours per week to the farm. The time freed up is used by farmers for other on- or
off-farm income-generating activities.
Recently a Cuban NGO helped establish a number of integrated farming sys-
tems in cooperatives in the province of Havana. Several polycultures, such as cas-
sava-beans-maize, cassava-tomato-maize, and sweet potato-maize were tested in
the cooperatives. The productivity of these polycultures were 1.45 to 2.82 times
greater than the productivity of the monocultures. The use of green manure
ensured a production of squash equivalent to that obtainable by applying 175 kilo-
grams of urea per hectare. In addition, such legumes improved the physical and
chemical characteristics of the soil and effectively broke the cycle of insect-pest
infestations.
Table 19.1 Performance of Traditional, Modern, and Agroecological Potato-
based Production Systems in Bolivia
Traditional Modern Agroecological 
Performance indicator low-input high-input system
Potato yields (metric tons/hectare) 9.2 17.6 11.4
Chemical fertilizer (nitrogen + 0.0 80 + 120 0.0
P2O5, kilograms/hectare)
Lupine biomass (metric tons/hectare) 0.0 0.0 1.5
Energy efficiency (output/input) 15.7 4.8 30.5
Net income per invested Boliviano 6.2 9.4 9.9
Source: S. Rist, “Ecología, economía y tecnologías campesinas,” Ruralter 10 (1992): 205–227.
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Conclusions
The examples summarized above are a small sample of the thousands of successful
experiences of sustainable agriculture implemented at the local level. Data show that
over time agroecological systems exhibit more stable levels of total production per
unit area than high-input systems; produce economically favorable rates of return;
provide a return to labor and other inputs sufficient for a livelihood acceptable to
small farmers and their families; and ensure soil protection and conservation and
enhance agrobiodiversity.
With increasing evidence and awareness of the advantages of agroecology, why
hasn’t it spread more rapidly and how can it be multiplied and adopted more widely?
Clearly, technological or ecological intentions are not enough. Major changes must
be made in policies, institutions, and research and development to make sure that
agroecological alternatives are adopted, made equitably and broadly accessible, and
multiplied so that their full benefit for sustainable food security can be realized.
Existing subsidies and policy incentives for conventional chemical approaches must
be dismantled, and institutional structures, partnerships, and educational processes
must change to enable the agroecological approach to blossom. In addition, par-
ticipatory, farmer-friendly methods of technology development must be incorpor-
ated. The challenge is to increase investment and research in agroecology and scale
up projects that have already proven successful, thereby generating a meaningful
impact on the income, food security, and environmental well-being of the world’s
population, especially millions of poor farmers yet untouched by modern agricul-
tural technology.
C h a p t e r  2 0
Sustainable Farming
A Political Geography
Robert L. Paarlberg
The sustainable farming debate will remain
deadlocked until it is recast in a region-specific and
politically aware form that emphasizes the vastly
different circumstances of farmers in different 
parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Farming is a threat to the natural environment in rich as well as poor coun-tries, but the human stakes are now much higher in the developing world,where food needs are acute and growing rapidly. Roughly 700 million people
in developing countries do not have access to sufficient food supplies to meet their
needs for a healthy and productive life. Already because of population growth, the
developing world is being asked to feed 88 million additional people every year, the
equivalent of feeding a new Mexico every year. How can this production task be
met if environmentally destructive farming practices continue?
In much of Africa, where crop yields will have to increase, the “mining” of soil
nutrients is now helping to push average crop yields into decline. In much of South
Asia, old irrigated lands are becoming saline and waterlogged and are going out of
use almost as fast as new irrigated lands are coming into production. From Honduras
to Java, soils are washing away on newly cleared sloping lands. In East Asia, South
Asia, and Central America, the natural biological controls for crop pests are being
poisoned with farm chemicals, even while the pests themselves are becoming more
poison resistant.
Worsening this crisis today is a paralyzing technical debate between agricul-
turalists and environmentalists over what environmentally sustainable farming
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would actually look like. Production-oriented agriculturalists argue that environ-
mental protection—especially protection of forests and topsoil—can be advanced
through modern, input-intensive farming. Environmental advocates, by contrast,
associate high-input farming with chemical pollution, a faster exhaustion of water
supplies, and a dangerous loss of biodiversity. They feel it is better to hold onto tra-
ditional farming techniques suited to local ecologies and to the circumstances of
ordinary resource-poor farmers.
These divergent technical preferences between agriculturalists and environmen-
talists have helped paralyze the international policy community. Bilateral and multi-
lateral assistance organizations, not wishing to antagonize powerful environmental
lobby groups, have become increasingly wary of sponsoring input-intensive, science-
based farm modernization projects. This is one reason international assistance to
farming and to farm research has recently faltered. Yet the number of people need-
ing food in the developing world grows larger every year, while the quality of their
farm resource base continues to degrade.
How can this paralyzing policy deadlock be broken? Paying more attention to
geography and to politics is one way to start. In some regions of the developing world
the agriculturalists are right to argue for more use of purchased inputs, while in other
regions less input use is needed, so the environmentalists are right. In some regions
neither group will be entirely correct, since appropriate technical changes will not
take place without more fundamental political and social change.
The Geography of Resource Abuse
In Africa, agriculturalists tend to be right: use of purchased inputs will have to
increase if food production is ever to increase at an acceptable cost to the rural envi-
ronment. Fertilizer use in Africa today, at 12 kilograms per hectare, is only 1/4 the
level of India and only 1/36 the level of Japan. Irrigation covers only 4 percent of
cultivated area in Sub-Saharan Africa, compared with 26 percent in India and 44
percent in China. Africa’s rural environment is at risk because too many farmers are
trying to produce more simply by extending traditional low-input practices—such
as shifting cultivation—into forest land, or onto drier and more fragile lands, or by
shortening fallow times.
In Africa, and also in much of nonirrigated dry or upland Asia, the only way to
boost production in pace with local food needs, without having to cut more trees or
plow up more land, will be to move toward higher purchased input use and higher-
yield farming. The experience of India is telling. By switching to highly responsive
seeds, more fertilizer use, and expanded irrigation, India was able to double its total
wheat production between 1964/65 and 1970/71. This not only helped India avoid
a famine, it also helped protect the rural environment. If India had attempted to use
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traditional low-yield farming techniques to secure the same wheat production gain,
it would have had to plow up an additional 36 million hectares of cropland, result-
ing in further deforestation, substantial habitat destruction, and soil erosion.
Environmentalists who criticize India’s Green Revolution should acknowledge the
need to boost total production and weigh the environmental damage that would have
taken place if this had been attempted without a switch to input-intensive farming.
On the other hand, the environmentalists’ preference for reduced input use is
fully justified in some of the more advanced Asian countries now undergoing rapid
industrial development, such as Taiwan and Korea. An earlier switch to high-yield
farming in these countries helped ease a first generation of rural environmental
problems—soil erosion, tree cutting, and habitat destruction—but it has now
become associated with a dangerous “second generation” of problems, including
excess water and fertilizer use, inadequate nutrient and animal waste containment,
loss of biodiversity, and excessive reliance on pesticides.
Agriculturalists argue that most of these are technical problems that need not
permanently accompany a switch to high-yield farming. If given proper policy sig-
nals (tighter pollution regulations, more liberal trade policies, and input or credit
subsidy reductions), input supply industries will innovate cleaner and safer prod-
ucts, and farmers will learn to profit by using inputs in smaller quantities and with
greater precision. Just as these farmers originally learned to substitute larger quan-
tities of purchased inputs for land, soon they will learn to replace input quantity
with better quality and with improved management (for example, by switching from
exclusive reliance on pesticides to integrated pest management).
This optimistic vision has merit, but too often it discounts political realities.
Environmentally damaging input mismanagement has persisted in the rapidly
industrializing countries of East Asia in part because farmers there (similar to well-
organized farm lobbies in all mature industrial countries) tend to gain dispropor-
tionate political influence and then to use that influence to demand subsidies and
trade protection. The predictable result is a policy set (artificially high commodity
prices, combined with artificially cheap inputs) that induces damaging input use
habits. Similar to politically powerful farmers in Europe or North America, farm-
ers in these rapidly industrializing countries also use their organized influence to
escape accountability for the adverse effects (mostly off-farm) that result from their
careless and excessive water and chemical use.
The Politics of Resource Abuse
At a deeper level, resource abuse in farming often reflects power abuse. In East Asia,
where farmers tend to be politically stronger within their sector than nonfarmers,
much of the environmental damage they do reflects the subsidies they are able to
132 ROBERT L. PAARLBERG
command, and most of the suffering from that damage is felt by politically weak-
er nonfarmers (as when animal wastes pollute congested urban areas or when exces-
sive irrigation and chemical use depletes or pollutes off-farm surface and ground
water supplies). In Africa, by contrast, where farmers tend to be politically weaker
than urban dwellers and vulnerable to the whims of centralized government min-
istries, the environmental damage they do grows out of this weakness. They use too
few inputs rather than too many because their production tends to be overtaxed
rather than subsidized. Lacking secure local control over the resource base, they tend
to exploit and overuse good resources when given the chance, while skimping on
investments in long-term protection. The environmental damage they do mostly
takes place on the farm (overgrazing, loss of trees, soil nutrient depletion), so it harms
farmers more than nonfarmers in yet another manifestation of the underlying
power relationship at work.
These links between political power and environmental resource protection can
be seen in a slightly more complex pattern in Latin America. This is a region where
a politically weak rural majority, often without secure access to good land, farms
alongside a politically privileged minority of commercial farmers. The result is a
dualistic pattern of environmental resource abuse. Privileged commercial farmers
on high-potential lands use government subsidies to overmechanize, overirrigate,
and overspray, even while nearby peasant farmers, with insecure access even to low-
potential lands, are mining soils, invading forest margins, and plowing hillsides in
an environmentally damaging “hit-and-run” fashion.
Where first-generation and second-generation forms of environmental dam-
age are taking place side by side, due to persistent rural social inequities and inse-
curities, technical solutions alone (either agriculturalist or environmentalist) will miss
the point. The solution must include more fundamental rural social and political
reform.
Conclusions
The sustainable farming debate will remain deadlocked until it is recast in a region-
specific and politically aware form that emphasizes the vastly different circum-
stances of farmers in different parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. If regional
precision is maintained, paralyzing technical arguments between powerful agricul-
turalists and environmentalists can be minimized, and important reform impera-
tives that go beyond technical choice can be highlighted as well.
C h a p t e r  2 1
Land Degradation in
the Developing World
Issues and Policy Options for 2020
Sara J. Scherr and Satya Yadav
Although some types of degradation are 
irreversible, most can be prevented or reversed.
By the year 2020, land degradation may pose a serious threat to food produc-tion and rural livelihoods, particularly in poor and densely populated areasof the developing world. Appropriate policies are required to encourage
land-improving investments and better land management if developing countries
are to sustainably meet the food needs of their populations.
Land degradation takes a number of forms, including depletion of soil nutri-
ents, salinization, agrochemical pollution, soil erosion, vegetative degradation as a
result of overgrazing, and the cutting of forests for farmland. All of these types of
degradation cause a decline in the productive capacity of the land, reducing poten-
tial yields. Farmers may need to use more inputs such as fertilizer or manure in order
to maintain yields, or they may temporarily or permanently abandon some plots.
Degradation may also induce farmers to convert land to lower-value uses. For
example, farmers may plant cassava, which demands few nutrients, instead of maize,
or may convert cropland to grazing land.
Farmland degradation can also have important negative effects off the farm,
including deposition of eroded soil in streams or behind dams, contamination of
drinking water by agrochemicals, and loss of habitat.
Existing estimates of the current global extent and severity of the problem
should be considered indicative at best. The Global Land Assessment of Degradation
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(GLASOD), based only on the impressions of experts, estimates that nearly 2
billion hectares worldwide (22 percent of all cropland, pasture, forest, and wood-
land) have been degraded since mid-century. Some 3.5 percent of the 2 billion total
is estimated to have been degraded so severely that the degradation is reversible only
through costly engineering measures, if at all. Just over 10 percent has been
moderately degraded, and this degradation is reversible only through major on-farm
investments. Of the nearly 1.5 billion hectares in cropland worldwide, about 38 per-
cent is degraded to some degree. Africa and Latin America appear to have the
highest proportion of degraded agricultural land, and Asia has the highest propor-
tion of degraded forestland (Figure 21.1).
Various sources suggest that 5 to 10 million hectares are being lost annually to
severe degradation. If this trend continues, 1.4 to 2.8 percent of total cropland, pas-
ture, and forestland will have been lost by 2020. Declining yields (or increasing input
requirements to maintain yields) could be expected over a much larger area. These
data are, however, likely to overestimate the problem, as they do not account for
the effects of land improvements, which also appear to be widespread.
Figure 21.1 Regional Land Degradation by Type of Land Use, 1945–90
Source: L. R. Oldeman, Global Extent of Soil Degradation (Wageningen, the Netherlands:
International Soil Reference and Information Centre, 1992); L. R. Oldeman, R. T. A.
Hakkeling, and W. G. Sombroek, World Map of the Status of Human-Induced Soil
Degradation: An Explanatory Note, rev. ed. (Wageningen, the Netherlands: International
Soil Reference and Information Centre, and Nairobi: United Nations Environment
Programme, 1990).
Note: Degraded land includes slightly, moderately, strongly, and extremely degraded
areas.
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The Impact on Global Agricultural Production
Globally, there are few studies of the impact of degradation on agricultural pro-
duction. Pierre Crosson, in a 1994 study, analyzed GLASOD results and other data
and concluded that there has been a 17 percent cumulative productivity loss over
45 years (1945–90) as a result of degradation. During that same period, growth in
global food production and long-term declines in grain prices were unprecedent-
ed; clearly other factors offset the effects of degradation on aggregate performance.
A 1995 study by Rattan Lal of the impact of degradation in Africa based on field
data estimated that yield reductions due to past erosion may range from 2 percent
to 40 percent, with a mean of 8.2 percent for the continent and 6.2 percent for Sub-
Saharan Africa. If accelerated erosion continues unabated, yield reductions by the year
2020 may be 16.5 percent for the continent and 14.5 percent for Sub-Saharan
Africa. Evidence from four Southeast Asian and three Middle Eastern countries
indicates a degradation-induced decline in productivity greater than 20 percent.
Although the economic importance of this observed degradation has long
been a matter of debate, an extensive literature has developed only recently. A
review of this literature, even with its limitations, suggests that economic effects may
be of much greater importance than previously thought.
The cumulative productivity loss for cropland from soil degradation over the
past 50 years is estimated to be about 13 percent, and for pasture lands 4 percent.
Crop yield losses in Africa from 1970 to 1990 due to water erosion alone are esti-
mated to be 8 percent. Subregional studies have documented large aggregate declines
in crop yields due to degradation in many parts of Africa, China, South Asia, and
Central America. A global agricultural model suggests a slight increase in degrada-
tion relative to baseline trends could result in 17–30 percent higher world prices for
key food commodities in 2020, and increased child malnutrition.
Besides affecting aggregate food supply, soil degradation also diminishes agri-
cultural income and economic growth. In South and Southeast Asia, estimates for
total annual economic loss from degradation range from under 1 to 7 percent of
agricultural gross domestic product (AGDP). Given that more than half of all land
in this region is not affected by degradation, the economic effects in the degrading
areas would appear to be quite serious. Estimates for eight African countries show
annual economic losses ranging from under 1 percent of AGDP in Madagascar to
9 percent in Zimbabwe. Country models simulating the effects of soil degradation
in Ghana and Nicaragua find annual economic growth to be reduced by nearly a
percentage point. The effects of soil degradation on the environment and longer-
term national wealth in soil resources have not been studied adequately, but are like-
ly to add considerably to the economic impact.
Because the poor are particularly dependent on agriculture—on annual crops
(which generally degrade soils more than perennial crops) and on common prop-
136 SARA J. SCHERR AND SATYA YADAV
erty lands (which generally suffer greater degradation than privately managed land),
and because they often lack the capacity to make land-improving investments—the
poor tend to suffer more than the nonpoor from soil degradation. In West Africa,
for example, the proportion of children who died before the age of five was high-
est (more than 30 percent) in areas with high soil degradation. The link between
poverty and soil quality, however, has not been studied widely.
Hot Spots
Declining food supplies from specific regions due to degradation are likely to have
only a modest effect on global food supplies, because of the potential for substitu-
tion from other producing areas. However, land degradation could have dramatic
effects in specific countries and subregions.
Nutrient depletion is predicted by the experts to cause serious problems in the
mid-altitude hills of Nepal; in poor soil quality areas of northeastern India and
Myanmar, now undergoing transition to permanent agriculture; and in areas in
northeastern Thailand, where farmers consistently extract more nutrients from the
soil than they put in. It is also expected to cause major problems in large areas of
Africa under transition to short fallow or permanent cropping, in areas of reduced
silt deposits in the Nile delta, in the subhumid Mesoamerican hillsides, and in the
semi-arid Andean valleys, northeastern Brazil, and the Caribbean Basin lowlands,
where agriculture is undergoing intensification.
Salinization will be a major threat in the irrigation systems of the Indus, Tigris,
and Euphrates River basins, in northeastern Thailand and China, in the Nile delta,
in northern Mexico, and in the Andean highlands.
Agrochemical pollution is expected to be critical in cotton-producing areas in
Turkey, in high-density and coastal areas in East and Southeast Asia, on banana
plantations in Central America, in areas of intensive agriculture in Bolivia, and in
peri-urban agriculture in Southeast Asia and Mexico City.
Soil erosion will create serious production problems in southeast Nigeria, in
Haiti, and on the sloping lands of the Himalayan foothills, southern China,
Southeast Asia, and Central America. Major wind erosion problems will develop in
West Asia as rangelands are converted to grain production, in the Sahel, in West
Africa owing to poor mechanization techniques, in the dry Andean Valley, and in
the Brazilian cerrados.
Vegetative degradation of rangelands will accelerate by 2020, as a result of over-
grazing and overexploitation of vegetation for fuel, in the trans-Himalayas and in
Southern and North Africa. The spread of Imperata grassland areas in Southeast Asia
will also contribute to degradation.
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Agriculture-induced deforestation by 2020 will threaten critical habitats in parts
of Southeast Asia, Madagascar, the humid Amazon, the hillsides and Atlantic low-
lands of Central America, the Pacific rain forest of Colombia and Ecuador, and the
Chaco region of Latin America.
Strategies to Reduce Land Degradation
Historical and socioeconomic evidence suggests that farmers often respond actively
to degradation by modifying their farming systems or practices and through land-
improving investments. Unfortunately, no global or even national data are yet avail-
able estimating the scale and effects of land improvements (for example, area under
terracing or other soil conservation practices), although data collection efforts are
beginning.
Although some types of degradation are irreversible, most can be prevented or
reversed by, for example, adding nutrients to nutrient-depleted soil, rebuilding top-
soil through soil amendments, reestablishing vegetation, or buffering soil acidity.
The practicality of rehabilitating degraded landscapes depends on the costs relative
to the value of the output or environmental benefits expected.
Despite the lack of quantitative data, it is clear that land-improving investments
are creating a number of “bright spots” in the developing world. Agroforestry, com-
munity forestry, and afforestation are beginning to have large-scale positive impacts
in numerous countries. Conservation farming is spreading widely in countries
including Morocco, the Philippines, and Thailand and regionally in East Africa,
parts of West Africa, Mesoamerica, and parts of South America. Water management
is improving through water-saving irrigation, water harvesting, aquaculture, small-
scale irrigation, and salinization control.
Diversification into higher-value perennial crops is protecting soils in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America. Dryland range rehabilitation schemes are showing posi-
tive results in Syria and Jordan, Southern Africa, Mexico, and northern Argentina.
Farmer incentives for land investment are improving through range cooperatives in
Jordan; more favorable property rights in Cambodia, Ethiopia, Laos, and Viet
Nam; and community-based natural resource management in many areas.
Policy Recommendations
An effective response to land degradation calls for improving the incentives for farm-
ers to care for their land and improving their access to the knowledge and inputs
required for proper care. Based on lessons learned from past successes and failures
in managing land degradation, the following policy actions should be considered:
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• Increase research and technology development for land management, and
improve the spread of information, through widely linked, user-friendly in-
formation systems for farmers.
• Promote land-improving investments (for example, building up soil organic
matter, planting trees, and installing small-scale irrigation) through technical
assistance and new financing arrangements suitable for low-income farmers.
• Encourage long-term land improvements by securing property rights and
rights of access to natural resources, particularly for the poor.
• Develop planning systems for sustainable land use that involve key resource
user groups.
• Improve the economic environment for farmers by developing market infra-
structure, correcting distorted price incentives, and encouraging rural income
growth and diversification.
• For marginal regions, encourage more public investment in infrastructure,
social services, and agricultural support services.
C h a p t e r  2 2
The Role of Agriculture in
Saving the Rain Forest
Stephen Vosti
When a farm household in the humid tropical forest
margin slashes and burns as the initial step in an
agricultural cycle, it starts a clock ticking.
Is Conversion of Forest to Agriculture the Problem?
Tropical forests are disappearing rapidly—with potentially high social costs in bio-
diversity loss and carbon emissions. But what does agriculture have to do with this?
Consider the role of small farmers: they account for about two-thirds of rain forest
destruction, by converting land to agriculture (Figure 22.1). Most of them are
poor. They moved to forest margins to escape from poverty elsewhere, and they
deforest in order to survive. Deforestation is not likely to slow until these people
can earn a living and meet their food needs. And their numbers are growing, even
where in-migration has slowed or stopped, as families reconstituted at the forest mar-
gin move through the life cycle. Agriculture to meet these food needs may lie
behind much forest clearing—true. Still, only improvements in agriculture’s per-
formance as part of an opening up of alternatives for meeting basic welfare require-
ments can save the rain forest.
Why Do Small Farmers Deforest?
Like rural households throughout the developing world, farm households in the for-
est margins strive to put enough food on the table for the next day, week, or month.
In their struggle, farmers do not view natural resources as the most important asset,
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to be conserved at all costs, especially human costs. Although degradation is viewed
as undesirable by the farmer and society as a whole, economic necessity predictably
leads to land degradation.
In fact, when a farm household in the humid tropical forest margins slashes and
burns as the initial step in an agricultural cycle, it starts a clock ticking. During the
first tick of the clock, annual crops are the crops of choice. Fertilized by forest residue,
the nutrient-poor soils can support such crops, and recently arrived families, need-
ing food (and without the resources to purchase food), plant them. Annual crop pro-
duction, however, depletes soil, narrowing the crop choice of farm households at
the next tick of the clock. At this point, they favor perennials, which in turn deplete
the land (though at much slower rates). Finally, pasture and fallow—lower than the
original forest in biomass and lowest in per hectare productivity for the farmer—
become the only viable options. While farm households in other agroclimatic zones
may see some narrowing of land-use options over time, in the humid tropical for-
est margins, it is the speed and certainty of this sequence (over several agricultural
cycles) that is striking.
This does not mean that successful agricultural intensification is out of reach
in these areas: with technical innovations, the range of agricultural choices open to
the farmer could widen from current patterns, but few such innovations are cur-
rently available to resource-strapped farm households, and policies for promoting
them are often lacking.
Figure 22.1 Tropical Forest Depletion by Proximate Cause
Source: N. Sharma, ed. Managing the World’s Forests (Washington D.C.: World Bank,
1992).
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Well-known off-farm externalities, such as smoke and carbon dioxide emis-
sions, which dissipate into the air above the farm, have no direct production con-
sequences for the farmer; therefore, they do not play a major role in farm household
decisionmaking. These environmental effects are important on a global basis, but
from the farmer’s perspective, private costs and benefits—the farmer’s—matter
most.
What Has Gone Wrong in the Past?
Because the poverty-stricken small farmer has a short time horizon for planning,
incorporation of pro-environment choices can be difficult. This short-term per-
spective is not myopic, but rational: natural resource mining may be the only way,
not the short-sighted way, to meet short-term goals. Policies that ignore this con-
straint generally fail.
For example, farmers must diversify income sources to survive, and improved
infrastructure is key to such diversification. However, national and regional
governments, often under pressure from the international community looking
toward long-term environmental protection, make limited investments in all-
weather transportation infrastructure. The problem for the small farmer is that
even the investment in infrastructure needed to link existing communities is
limited, which can make farmers more reliant on their natural resource base for
survival.
The emphasis often placed on extracting forest products as an alternative liveli-
hood activity is also illustrative, in that little is known as yet about the interde-
pendence of different components of ecosystems; the impact of different techniques
for extraction on these systems; the potential for marketing extracted products; and
the consequences of, and scope for, expanding extractive activities.
Farmers often have insufficient knowledge to successfully implement sustain-
able agriculture. Populations transplanted from different agroecological environ-
ments do not carry with them the stock of knowledge about local conditions helpful
in designing an environmentally compatible farming system. Where indigenous
knowledge about sustainable livelihood practices does exist, it often cannot support
the higher population density that migration has brought.
Labor conditions must also be right: coffee production, desirable from an
environmental and income viewpoint, requires high labor input and might be
ruled out where labor is scarce. Cattle raising requires much less labor and might
be chosen regardless of environmental consequences.
The bottom line: forest conversion will continue so long as it makes sense to
rural households, given the incentives and constraints they face, regardless of the
costs to society.
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What Can Be Done?
If output generated from deforested plots and the value of natural products
extracted from forests cannot be increased and sustained, the pressure on standing
forests will remain. The “tools of the trade” for development planning—policies,
technologies, and institutional arrangements—play a role in lifting constraints to
implementation of environmentally sound practices. And they help encourage agri-
cultural practices that use natural resources to boost livelihood security without
using them up.
Policies need to change to take into account needs of current resident farmers,
on land already deforested. This means helping them intensify their agriculture
through improved technology and access to well-integrated, reliable markets; credit;
and roads that remain open in all seasons.
The generation and use of new, more sustainable agricultural technologies is
absolutely critical. This requires focusing sights not on agricultural technologies that
just meet growth goals or those that meet only sustainability goals, but on those that
meet both growth and sustainability goals. The approach is controversial: there are
fears that successes in agricultural intensification could attract new waves of
migrants, and that introduction of nontraditional crops might disrupt the ecosystem
in unforeseen ways. But clear definition and enforcement of property rights can help
allay these concerns.
The third “tool” of development planning, the set of institutional arrangements
(formal and informal, public and private) charged with generating, distributing, and
implementing information and policies to achieve sustainability, growth, and
poverty alleviation goals, has expanded dramatically over the past 15 years and now
includes a vast array of governmental, nongovernmental, and hybrid forms. The for-
est margins have seen a dramatic proliferation of organizations—local, state, and
international—but little is known about their relative sustainability or effectiveness,
particularly cost-effectiveness, in meeting development goals.
Interregional Linkages
Forest margin areas generally do not enjoy a comparative advantage in the produc-
tion of food staples: poor soils, severe pest problems, and intense, seasonal rainfall
all keep yields low. These areas do, however, have a comparative advantage in agro-
forestry products, some types of livestock, and products extracted from primary or
secondary forests. But poor infrastructure leading to inefficient or even missing mar-
kets can lower and destabilize prices for nonfood items produced in the forest mar-
gins and raise and destabilize prices of the foods rural households purchase. These
economic signals induce rural households to allocate time, money, and land to pro-
ducing their own food, even though they do so inefficiently. To improve natural
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resource management in the forest margins, therefore, it is necessary to improve
infrastructure and thereby promote the flow of nonfood and food products across
regions.
Importance of Agriculture to Long-Term Solutions
Looking toward 2020, three scenarios are possible. First, if all goes well, improve-
ments in social and physical infrastructure will integrate forest margin areas into the
economy. The combined agricultural productivity growth of the breadbasket and
forest margin areas will be adequate to feed the larger population, lessening the pres-
sure to convert forests to agricultural uses. In the second scenario, regional integra-
tion will only partially be successful. Productivity growth will be swift in the
breadbasket areas, but it will languish in the forest margins, and deforestation will
continue. Under the disastrous third scenario, regional integration will largely fail,
agricultural growth will stagnate everywhere, and deforestation will accelerate.
Which of these scenarios will prevail largely depends on agricultural intensification.
While agriculture is critical to the long-term solution of sustainable livelihood
and food security in the humid tropics, it is only part of the story. To take pressure
off land, nonagricultural sectors of rural economies must be strengthened in addi-
tion to improving agricultural productivity. In short, what is called for is a portfo-
lio of agricultural, extractive, and nonagricultural activities that involve technological
innovation designed for higher productivity of land and labor. These activities must
translate into higher profitability for the farmer at lower cost to the environment
and must be compatible with the constrained resource position of the small farmer.
C h a p t e r  2 3
Dealing with Water Scarcity
in the 21st Century
Mark W. Rosegrant
Most of the world does not treat water 
as the scarce resource that it is.
Reform of water policy is urgently needed to avert severe national, regional,and local water scarcities that will depress agricultural production and worsenwater-related health problems. Water is abundant globally but scarce locally.
Of the earth’s 1,360 million cubic kilometers of water, 97 percent is in the oceans.
Three-quarters of the freshwater is in glaciers and icebergs, another fifth is ground-
water, and less than 1 percent is in lakes and rivers. Almost two-thirds of the renew-
able freshwater provided by annual rainfall over land evaporates. Much of the
rainfall transformed into runoff is lost to floods.
Given current global water use of 4,000 cubic kilometers, the remaining 14,000
cubic kilometers of effective runoff would be adequate to meet demand for the fore-
seeable future if supplies were distributed equally across the world’s population. But
freshwater is distributed extremely unevenly across countries, across regions within
countries, and across seasons.
When does water scarcity become a serious problem? Water analysts use the
following rule of thumb: countries with freshwater resources of 1,000 to 1,600 cubic
meters per capita per year face water stress, with major problems occurring in
drought years. Countries are considered water scarce when annual internal renew-
able water resources are less than 1,000 cubic meters per capita per year. Below this
threshold, water availability is considered a severe constraint on socioeconomic
development and environmental quality. Currently, some 30 countries are consid-
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ered water stressed, of which 20 are absolutely water scarce. By 2020, the number
of water scarce countries will likely approach 35. Equally worrisome, virtually all
developing countries, even those with adequate water in the aggregate, suffer from
debilitating seasonal and regional shortages that urgently need to be addressed.
Challenges for the Future
Low Water Use Efficiency
The foremost challenge related to water scarcity in developing countries is the need
to increase generally inefficient water use in agriculture, urban areas, and industry.
Irrigated area accounts for over two-thirds of world rice and wheat production, so
growth in irrigated output per unit of land and water is essential. Improved efficiency
in agricultural water use is required both to maintain productivity growth and to
allow reallocation of water from agriculture to urban and industrial uses.
Expensive New Water
New sources of water are increasingly expensive to exploit. Water to meet growing
household and industrial demand may thus need to come increasingly from water
savings from irrigated agriculture, which generally accounts for 80 percent of water
diverted for use in developing countries. To truly contribute to reducing water
scarcity, improved efficiency in agricultural use should be accompanied by improved
efficiency in urban and industrial use.
Resource Degradation
The quality of land and water must be sustained in the face of mounting pressure
to degrade these resources through waterlogging, salinization, groundwater mining,
and water pollution.
Water and Health
Pollution of water from industrial effluents, poorly treated sewage, and runoff of
agricultural chemicals is a growing problem. Unsafe water, combined with poor
household and community sanitary conditions, is a major contributor to disease and
malnutrition, particularly among children. One billion people are without clean
drinking water, and 1.7 billion have inadequate sanitation facilities. As many as 1
billion episodes of diarrhea occur annually in developing countries. The World Bank
has estimated that access to safe water and adequate sanitation could result in 2 mil-
lion fewer deaths from diarrhea among young children.
Massive Subsidies and Distorted Incentives
Most of the world does not treat water as the scarce resource that it is. Both urban
and rural water users receive massive subsidies on water use; irrigation water is essen-
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tially unpriced; in urban areas the price of water does not cover the cost of delivery;
capital investment decisions in all sectors are divorced from management of the
resource. In Mexico, subsidies to operate and maintain water systems (that is, not
including capital costs) total 0.5 percent of gross domestic product, far more than
is spent on agricultural research. In Jordan, despite severe water scarcity, subsidies
encourage overuse of irrigation water. Strict rationing is then required to allocate
the resulting scarcities. In most countries, water subsidies go disproportionately to
the better-off: irrigated farmers and urban water users connected to the public sys-
tem. The inequity is exacerbated because subsidies are often financed from regres-
sive taxes.
Development of New Water
The development of new water has slowed considerably since the late 1970s owing
to escalating construction costs for dams and related infrastructure, relatively low
prices of staple cereals, and concerns over the environmental effects and dislocation
of persons caused by dam and reservoir construction. Although the construction
boom of the 1970s will not return, a portion of new demand for water must be met
by carefully selected, economically efficient development of new water, both from
impoundment of surface water and sustainable exploitation of groundwater
resources. In some river basins, efficiency gains from existing systems may be lim-
ited, because whole-basin reuse and recycling of drainage water already occur, even
though individual water users are inefficient. Under these circumstances, new water
development could be necessary.
As scarcity increases, the rising economic value of water should improve the
cost-effectiveness of some new water development projects, particularly multi-
purpose dams that both supply new water and generate revenue from hydropower.
The environmental costs and benefits must be carefully weighed in evaluating new
water sources. In Laos, for example, new water and hydropower development on
the Mekong could offer an alternative energy source to fuelwood, reducing defores-
tation. This benefit, however, must be weighed against the potentially harmful
consequences of construction, including displacement of indigenous people and
inundation of reservoir sites.
Sustainable development of groundwater resources also offers significant oppor-
tunities for some countries. The extent of groundwater storage and recharge is
poorly understood in much of the developing world. Investment in a “groundwa-
ter revolution” in Bangladesh beginning in the 1980s was a key stimulant to rapid
agricultural growth in the 1980s and early 1990s. Nearly 1.5 million hectares of land
was newly irrigated after 1980, in significant part from private installation of shal-
low tubewells spurred by deregulation of tubewell imports. Although localized
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problems of groundwater mining have occurred, in most areas in Bangladesh further
expansion of groundwater use within the bounds of natural recharge is possible. If
dry season water scarcity worsens, investments to divert wet season river flows for
artificial recharge of aquifers may become feasible, and could also reduce wet sea-
son flooding.
Comprehensive Water Policy Reform
A large share of water to meet new demands must come by saving water from
existing uses through comprehensive reform of water policy. Such reform will not
be easy, because both long-standing practice and cultural and religious beliefs have
treated water as a free good, and because entrenched interests benefit from existing
arrangements.
The precise nature of water policy reform will vary from country to country,
depending on underlying conditions such as level of economic development and
institutional capability, relative water scarcity, and level of agricultural intensifica-
tion. Additional research is required to design specific policies within any given
country. However, key elements of comprehensive reform include the following:
Secure Water Rights
Reform must provide secure water rights vested in individual water users or groups
of water users. In some countries and regions, these rights should be tradable,
which further increases the incentives for efficient water use. Such a reform can
empower water users, provide investment incentives, improve water use efficiency,
reduce incentives to degrade the environment, and increase flexibility in resource
allocation.
User Management of Irrigation Systems
In many developing countries, devolving irrigation infrastructure and management
to water user associations will be beneficial. In the past, such steps often failed
because they were not accompanied by secure access to water. Well-defined water
rights provide the incentive for user groups to economize on water use, to bargain
effectively with the water conveyance bureaucracy for timely and efficient service,
and to undertake operations and management.
Reformed Price Incentives
Privatization and regulation of urban water services, together with reduced subsi-
dies for urban water consumption, can also improve efficiency. When incremental
water can be obtained at low cost owing to subsidies there is little incentive to
improve either physical efficiency (such as through investment in pipes or meter-
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ing) or economic efficiency. Secure water rights held by the urban companies and
an active market have encouraged the construction and operation of improved
treatment plants that sell water for agricultural or urban use. Removing subsidies
on urban water use can have dramatic effects. An increase in the water tariff in Bogor,
Indonesia, from US$0.15 to US$0.42 per cubic meter resulted in a 30 percent
decrease in household demand for water. In the industrial sector, increased water
prices will lead to investment in water recycling and conservation technology.
Increased water tariffs induced a 50 percent reduction in water use over a five-year
period by a fertilizer factory in Goa, India. In São Paulo, three industries reduced
water consumption by 40 to 60 percent in response to effluent charges.
The reforms described would free up substantial resources for both productive
investment and targeted subsidies to the poor and groups who might be left out of
the reform process. For example, in Chile the removal of general water subsidies has
allowed the government to increase the level of subsidies targeted directly to the rates
paid for urban water by the poor. Subsidies also go to small farmers to allow them
to acquire water rights from new infrastructure.
Appropriate Technology
Availability of appropriate technology will be essential as incentives are introduced
for water conservation. Small-scale water harvesting techniques can have high pay-
offs in certain agro-climatic environments. As the value of water increases, sprin-
klers, computerized control systems, and drip irrigation using low-cost plastic pipes,
all of which are common in developed countries, could have promising results for
developing countries. In Malaysia’s Muda irrigation system, real-time management
of water releases from the dam, keyed to telemetric monitoring of weather and
streamflow conditions, has significantly improved water use efficiency.
Environmental Protection
Greater protection must be afforded to water and soil quality. The appropriate
approach to environmental protection is likely to include both regulatory and mar-
ket elements. In Mexico, the new water law establishing tradable water rights is the
first to establish strong explicit protection of the environment. The law stipulates a
regulatory, rather than a market or tax/subsidy approach. The government must
specify the quality of discharge for nonagricultural uses when it grants a water
right, and it can restrict water use in the event of damage to ecosystems, over-
exploitation of aquifers, and other environmental effects.
Increased water prices or establishment of tradable water rights can cause farm-
ers to take account of the costs their water use imposes on other farmers, reducing
the pressure to degrade resources. A simple example is the farmer at the head of a
canal who overuses water, thereby waterlogging other farmers’ land through excess
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return flows, seepage, and percolation. If he could trade the excess water instead,
he would conserve resources. Although any society can design effective environ-
mental protection policies, how much environmental protection will be provided
will be a matter of political choice and commitment.
International Cooperation
Water policy reform must transcend national boundaries. In many regions, long-
term solutions will require international cooperation between countries sharing
scarce water resources. Intergovernmental activities to settle conflicts over shared
bodies of water have had mixed success. A 1977 agreement between India and
Bangladesh allocated 63 percent of the dry season flow of the Ganges at the
India/Bangladesh border to Bangladesh. However, the agreement has not been in
effect since 1988, and water disputes remain a serious source of conflict.
More significant headway has been made on talks between Jordan and Israel
over the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers and on shared groundwater resources. However,
the lack of participation of Lebanon and Syria in these talks has made it difficult to
reach comprehensive settlement on the use of water from the Jordan and Yarmuk
Rivers.
Cooperation between countries sharing the same water basin will become
increasingly important as water becomes scarcer. Reconciliation is cheaper than
armed conflict. A key to defusing potential international conflicts over water is
national water policy reform to ensure the most efficient use of available water sup-
plies. Countries must therefore begin the painful process of reforming national water
policies and treating water as a scarce resource.
C h a p t e r  2 4
Global Warming Changes the
Forecast for Agriculture
Reported by Sara E. Wilson
“In the most fundamental way, climate change 
will bring change to agriculture wherever 
it is practiced around the globe.”
—Cynthia Rosenzweig
In January 2001, representatives of 99 countries gathered in Shanghai to considerevidence on global warming as part of the United Nations’ IntergovernmentalPanel on Climate Change (IPCC). Their conclusions, while not new to scien-
tists, set off alarm bells among laypeople and policymakers around the world. The
scientific evidence on global warming is now stronger than ever and points to a rise
in temperatures of 1.4 to 5.8 degrees Celsius over the next century, higher than
earlier predictions. Higher temperatures will be accompanied by rising sea levels and
more frequent occurrence of extreme weather events, such as droughts, floods, and
violent storms.
The IPCC has studied not only the projected changes in climate, but also how
those changes will affect many human activities, including agriculture. “In the most
fundamental way, climate change will bring change to agriculture wherever it is
practiced around the globe,” says Cynthia Rosenzweig, senior research scientist at
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and Columbia
University.
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Agriculture Will Feel the Heat
Although scientists are uncertain about exactly how the world’s climate will change
and how that change will bear on agriculture, they are in increasing agreement on
some likely effects. On the bright side, global warming could increase water avail-
ability in some currently water-scarce areas, increase global timber supply, and raise
crop yields in temperate and some subtropical zones, according to a February 2001
report issued by the IPCC.
Higher crop yields and increased timber supplies could result from “the car-
bon dioxide fertilizer effect.” Richard Adams, professor of agricultural and resource
economics at Oregon State University, explains, “As the amount of carbon diox-
ide in the atmosphere increases, some plants will grow faster and produce more
yield.”
Experiments show the potential benefit of elevated levels of carbon dioxide, but
Adams cautions, “The experiments that have studied this effect have controlled for
all other conditions. That will not be the case in farmers’ fields. Water or nitrogen,
for example, may not be sufficient under field conditions to fully utilize the increased
carbon dioxide, and therefore the carbon dioxide fertilizer effect may not be as great
as it seems in the experiments.”
The benefits of the carbon dioxide fertilizer effect may not be on hand for long
either, because increased carbon dioxide appears to boost crop yields only if aver-
age annual temperatures increase by less than a few degrees. If average temperatures
rise beyond that, temperate zones will lose the carbon dioxide fertilizer effect and
their crop yields will fall. Other regions do not even have the hope of many poten-
tial benefits from climate change. “Very little positive effect is projected in the trop-
ics, even in the short term,” says Rosenzweig. The IPCC predicts reduced crop yields
in most tropical and subtropical regions, increased risk of flooding, and decreased
water supply, especially in the subtropics.
In addition to the direct effects of rising temperatures, changes in levels of pre-
cipitation, and more common extreme weather events, agriculture will also suffer
from the indirect effects of climate change: pests and pathogens may increase, soil
is expected to erode and degrade because of more intense rainfall patterns, and ris-
ing levels of ozone may increase air pollution damage to crops. “These indirect effects
may potentially be more important than the direct effects that have received most
of the attention in existing studies,” says Adams.
Crops will not be the only food source affected by climate change. For exam-
ple, says Meryl Williams, director general of ICLARM—the World Fish Center,
“More and more severe climate and weather events will further stress fish produc-
tion systems, natural and artificial, and increase greatly the challenges for people
whose food and livelihoods depend on them.” Livestock will also suffer from rising
and more extreme temperatures and may also have less forage and feed available to
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them. As a result, individual animals may produce less food for human consump-
tion and overall herd numbers may decrease.
Current projections indicate that global food security will not be threatened
by the end of the 21st century. However, climate change is expected to be more pro-
nounced in developing nations, which already experience lower agricultural yields
and suffer more from extreme weather events. Even if global food security is not
imperiled, climate change is likely to cause hunger and displacement in many parts
of the developing world.
Climate change will not only affect different geographic regions dispropor-
tionately, but will also vary over time. “People don’t seem to recognize that climate
isn’t necessarily going to change in a smooth manner,” says Paul Faeth, program
director of the Economics and Population Program at the World Resources Institute.
Severe weather events, for example, could devastate agriculture in some years and
have little impact in other years.
Agriculture Is a Culprit
Agriculture itself produces about 20 percent of greenhouse gases that are responsi-
ble for global warming. Farming activities release substantial amounts of the gases
methane and nitrous oxide. Methane is produced by the decomposition of organic
matter, particularly in the soil of flooded rice fields and by the digestive process of
ruminant livestock like cattle. Converting land to agricultural use emits nitrous
oxide, as does the use of nitrogen fertilizer. Agriculture is responsible for about 50
percent of human-related methane emissions and 70 percent of nitrous oxide
emissions.
Agriculture plays a relatively small role in by far the biggest contributor to ris-
ing concentrations of greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil
fuels as well as from deforestation and tilling practices. “When you convert from
forest or grassland to agricultural usage, you lose a lot of carbon,” says Stanley Wood,
an IFPRI senior scientist. “After conversion, much less carbon is usually stored in
the soil and in crops and pasture, and carbon is released when crops are harvested
and processed.” Limiting the loss of carbon due to agricultural practices is one way
that farmers can begin to help mitigate the problem of climate change.
Putting the Brakes on Climate Change
“Because agricultural ecosystems are responsible for 18–24 percent of green-house
gas emissions, there have to be some significant things agriculture can do to miti-
gate the problem,” says Sara Scherr, adjunct professor in the Agricultural and
Resource Economics Department at the University of Maryland and a fellow at
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Forest Trends. “Reduction in emissions from the burning of fossil fuels has to be
the highest priority, but it would be foolish to overlook what agriculture can
contribute.”
By cutting overuse of nitrogen fertilizer, for example, farmers can help lower
nitrous oxide emissions. They can reduce methane emissions from livestock by using
improved feed.
Strategies to store more carbon in soil, trees, and other plants will also help
reduce global warming through a process called carbon sequestration, the increased
retention of carbon in soils and vegetation. Examples of this strategy include lim-
iting deforestation through better agricultural techniques (higher yields means less
land needed for agriculture) and reducing the amount of carbon lost during con-
ventional tilling of agricultural lands.
Carbon sequestration can also occur by intentionally creating carbon “sinks”
to increase the amount of carbon stored on the planet. Regrowing forests is the
most obvious example of this policy, but another promising solution can be found
in agroforestry, the use of trees on agricultural lands. This practice is finding
increasing support, according to Pedro Sanchez, director general of the
International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, because it not only helps store
carbon, but can also improve yields on agricultural lands by enhancing soil fertil-
ity, preventing soil erosion, and helping to control weeds. By planting trees on their
lands, poor farmers can increase their own food security while also helping to
reduce the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. “What’s important in
these efforts,” says Sanchez, “is to bring together the human element of people who
are hungry and poor and, at the same time, get a global environmental benefit for
all of us.”
Agroforestry is an example of what is often called a “win-win” strategy among
climate change experts: it not only slows climate change, but also provides an
immediate and direct benefit to farmers. “It’s true of all long-term problems: you
have to look for immediate rewards to convince people to make changes that will
have a longer-term benefit,” says Faeth. “There are lots of things that help produc-
tivity and also have a climate benefit. The synergies are pretty amazing.”
Robin Reid, systems ecologist at the International Livestock Research Institute,
agrees that win-win strategies might have an important role to play but offers a
caveat. After describing a strategy whereby the use of better feed in livestock
improves meat and milk production while also reducing methane emissions, she
says, “But you need to be skeptical of win-wins because they don’t always spell out
the full carbon accounting of the situation. For example, to produce better quality
feed for livestock, you might have to use more fertilizer to grow it. Ultimately, the
emissions from the increased fertilizer might overcompensate for the reduction in
emissions from the livestock.”
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Adjusting to a Global Greenhouse
The effects of climate change are already being felt. According to the IPCC, it is
likely that the 1990s was the hottest decade in the Northern Hemisphere in the past
one thousand years. International efforts to mandate reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions have been underway since the 1980s. Even if emissions are drastically cut,
however, farmers will have to adapt to the changes in climate that are preordained
by the levels of greenhouse gases already in the earth’s atmosphere.
“Our current research continues to support the idea that farmer adaptations
will be the main mechanisms for keeping world agricultural production from falling
very much even if mean global temperature increases by 5 degrees Celsius,” says Roy
Darwin, an agricultural economist at the Economic Research Service of the United
States Department of Agriculture.
Agricultural adaptations include increasing irrigation where water is available,
growing different crop varieties, changing planting and harvesting dates, expand-
ing access to markets, and shifting agricultural production from one area to another.
Some of these coping efforts can be undertaken by individual farmers, while others
will require the joint action of farmers and outside organizations, including develop-
ment agencies, private industry, and national governments.
“Farmers will adapt. There’s no doubt about that,” says Rosenzweig. “But it’s
important to note that we’re not even completely adapted to our climate today.
Agriculture already has to respond to many dynamic factors, such as changing mar-
kets, regulations, and demands. Climate change puts another stress on agricultural
systems.”
The capacity to adapt to the kinds of changes predicted, the IPCC points out,
will require access to information, infrastructure, and technology—resources that
poor people in developing countries already lack. Because many of these people live
in the tropical and subtropical countries most likely to experience the negative effects
of climate change, they are in a position of double jeopardy.
Unfortunately, developing countries are doing little to plan for either mitiga-
tion or adaptation. “One reason is the learning curve on the science of climate
change. It’s just an incredibly complex issue that takes a long time to get a handle
on,” says Scherr. “Even in developed countries, where a lot of sophisticated research
has taken place for many years, policymakers are only beginning to be aware of the
urgency of climate change and willing to do something about it.”
The Standoff over Global Climate Change
“The real problem,” according to Brian Fisher, executive director of the Australian
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, “is getting people to face up to
problems that may not greatly affect us for one hundred years or more. This is espe-
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cially true in developed countries in temperate zones, which won’t feel much impact
even if some of the worst climate projections come true.” Efforts led by the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) to complete nego-
tiations on the Kyoto Protocol, a proposed international agreement on restrictions
of greenhouse gas emissions, stalled in late 2000 but are scheduled to resume in sum-
mer 2001. A major stumbling block is the fundamental disagreement between
developed and developing countries about the fairest way to cut greenhouse gas
emissions.
Developing countries, which are responsible for a relatively small amount of
the greenhouse gases currently in the atmosphere, believe those who caused the prob-
lem should carry the lion’s share of the burden of solving it. On the other hand devel-
oped countries fear that restricting greenhouse gas emissions, particularly those
caused by the burning of fossil fuels, will slow their economies, and they want more
flexible methods to meet proposed reduction requirements. Whether any agreement
at all can be reached under the Kyoto Protocol was recently thrown into doubt by
the announcement of the United States that it plans to withdraw from the talks
scheduled for this summer.
While efforts to set international emissions restrictions are progressing slowly,
some promising initiatives are already underway, especially in the area of carbon trad-
ing. Trading carbon allows those who emit greenhouse gases to earn counteracting
credits by investing in carbon sinks. Pedro Sanchez of ICRAF gives an example: “A
European airline that flies to Nairobi several times a week is exploring ways to com-
pensate farmers in Kenya for the carbon they sequester in agroforestry systems to
counterbalance the greenhouse gases the airplanes emit in the stratosphere.”
In the end, no one will remain unaffected by climate change. To cut emissions
and encourage adaptations in agriculture, many other cooperative efforts will be
needed. Governments and development organizations will need to help farmers,
especially in resource-poor areas, cope with the temperature increases, reduced
water supply, extreme weather events, and reduced soil moisture that are likely to
exacerbate food insecurity in those regions of the globe that are already worst-off.
Current projections do not extend beyond the 21st century, but if mitigating and
adaptive steps are not taken soon, climate change and the agricultural problems asso-
ciated with it will only increase, putting the food security of future generations fur-
ther at risk.
The Hot Spots: Sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia
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Nutrient Depletion in the
Agricultural Soils of Africa
Julio Henao and Carlos Baanante
Depletion of nutrients from soils has
caused crop production to stagnate or
decline in many African countries.
About two-thirds of Africans depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. Thefate of agricultural production, therefore, directly affects economic growth,social improvement, and trade in Africa. As the region’s population contin-
ues to grow rapidly, outpacing the growth rate in other regions of the world, its agri-
cultural land is becoming increasingly degraded. Farmers are intensifying land use
to meet food needs without proper management practices and external inputs. The
resulting depletion of nutrients from soils has caused crop production to stagnate
or decline in many African countries. In some cases, notably in the East African
highlands, the rate of depletion is so high that even drastic measures, such as
doubling the application of fertilizer or manure or halving erosion losses, would not
be enough to offset nutrient deficits. Unless African governments, supported by the
international community, take the lead in confronting the problems of nutrient
depletion, deteriorating agricultural productivity will seriously undermine the foun-
dations of sustainable economic growth in Africa.
The Extent of Nutrient Depletion
All African countries, except Mauritius, Reunion, and Libya, show negative nutri-
ent balances every year (see Figure 25.1). In the semiarid, arid, and Sudano-Sahelian
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areas that are more densely populated, soils lose 60–100 kilograms of nitrogen, phos-
phorus, and potassium (NPK) per hectare each year. The soils of these areas are shal-
low, highly weathered, and subject to intensive cultivation but with low levels of
fertilizer application. Limited water availability and intensified land use due to
increasing population size have restricted crop diversification and the adoption of
proper management practices. Short growing seasons contribute to additional pres-
sure on the land.
In other important agricultural areas, such as those located in the subhumid
and humid regions and in the savannas and forest areas, nutrient losses vary great-
ly. Rates of nutrient depletion range from moderate (30 to 60 kilograms of NPK
per hectare per year) in the humid forests and wetlands in southern Central Africa,
to high (above 60 kilograms) in the East African highlands.
Figure 25.1 Average Annual Nutrient Depletion (NPK) in Africa, 1993–95
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In 1993–95 the difference between nutrient inputs and nutrient losses in the
continent ranged from –14 kilograms of NPK per hectare per year in South Africa
to –136 kilograms in Rwanda. Burundi and Malawi also experienced rates of nutri-
ent depletion above 100 kilograms of NPK per hectare per year. About 86 percent
of African countries show annual nutrient deficits greater than 30 kilograms of NPK
per hectare per year. More countries fall into the high depletion range than the
medium range. Nutrient imbalances are highest where fertilizer use is particularly
low and nutrient loss, mainly from soil erosion, is high. The low gains in nutrients,
inherently low mineral stocks in these soils, and the harsh climate of the interior
plains and plateaus aggravate the consequences of nutrient depletion.
The estimated net annual losses of nutrients vary considerably by subregion:
384,800 metric tons for North Africa, 110,900 metric tons for South Africa, and
7,629,900 metric tons for Sub-Saharan Africa. This represents a total loss of US$1.5
billion per year in terms of the cost of nutrients as fertilizers. Forfeited yields cause
additional financial losses. Most crop yields in Africa did not change substantially
between 1981 and 1995, remaining close to the average obtained by smallholders
with rainfed land and moderate to low soil fertility.
More nitrogen and potassium than phosphorus get depleted from African
soils. Nitrogen and potassium losses primarily arise from leaching and soil erosion.
These soil problems result mainly from continuous cropping of cereals without rota-
tion with legumes, inappropriate soil conservation practices, and inadequate
amounts of fertilizer use. Guinea Bissau and Nigeria experience the highest annual
losses of nitrogen and potassium in West Africa. Nitrogen loss in East Africa is high-
est in Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda, and Uganda, and phosphorus loss is
highest in Burundi, Malawi, and Rwanda.
Losses of potassium are associated with severe erosion. The highest rates of
potassium depletion occur in Guinea Bissau and Nigeria in West Africa, and
Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Swaziland, and Uganda in East and Southern
Africa.
Nutrient Requirements and Soil Management Practices
Nutrient gains in African soils come about mainly through mineral fertilizer appli-
cation, nutrient deposition, and nitrogen fixation. The negative nutrient balances
clearly indicate that not enough nutrients are being applied in most areas. The cur-
rent annual use of nutrients in Africa averages about 12 kilograms of NPK per
hectare. Fertilizer use ranges from nearly 234 kilograms per hectare in Egypt to 46
kilograms in Kenya to less than 10 kilograms in most countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa. North Africa, with about 20 percent of the continent’s land area, accounts
for 41 percent of the fertilizer consumption.
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Fertilizer tends to be used mostly on cash and plantation crops because of the
high profitability of fertilizers in the production of export crops. Food crops get less
fertilizer because of unfavorable crop/fertilizer price ratios and financial constraints
faced by farmers.
To maintain current average levels of crop production without depleting soil
nutrients, Africa will require approximately 11.7 million metric tons of NPK each
year, roughly three times more than it currently uses (3.6 million metric tons) (see
Figure 25.2). Sub-Saharan Africa will need by far the largest proportion of this
amount, 76 percent, because its current average level of fertilizer use is so low. Total
nutrient requirements per hectare per year in this subregion range from Botswana’s
24.5 NPK (a figure 350 percent above current usage) to Reunion’s 437.3 NPK
Figure 25.2 Annual Requirements for Maintaining Current Yields without
Depleting Nutrients, 1993–95
NUTRIENT DEPLETION IN THE AGRICULTURAL SOILS OF AFRICA 163
(about 20 NPK per hectare less than the country consumes). Burkina Faso would
have to increase its NPK consumption more than 11 times to maintain crop pro-
duction levels without depleting nutrients, and Swaziland would have to double its
consumption. Estimated average use for Africa as a whole would have to increase
about 4 times to meet nutrient needs at the current level of production. Generally
more nitrogen is required than potassium, and more potassium than phosphorus.
Although increasing the use of mineral fertilizer may be the centerpiece of the
strategy to balance nutrient depletion and improve soil productivity in Africa, it
should not be taken to mean that fertilizer levels should be increased beyond basic
requirements. Indeed, surpassing recommended levels for less-responsive varieties
and in poorly managed cropping systems can lead to high nutrient losses and low
yields. Moreover, to achieve intended goals, fertilizer use must be combined with a
broad spectrum of complementary practices, such as soil conservation, recycling of
crop residues, livestock management, and use of organic fertilizers. Such practices
could reduce the mineral fertilizer required to maintain current average yields by as
much as 44 percent.
Implications for Policy
If nutrient depletion and land degradation continue at current rates, one has to won-
der how farmers in African countries will be able to grow enough food for ever-larger
populations in the next century. To avoid possible crises, national governments and
donors should address the threat of nutrient depletion and land degradation through
policies and programs that promote increased productivity of land resources and con-
servation of the resource base. Significant policy changes will be required to estab-
lish an environment that makes agricultural inputs easily available, that encourages
farmers to use these inputs more efficiently, and that helps improve local extension
services and farmer support. Structural adjustments, market development, trade and
price policies, credit systems, infrastructure improvement, and institutional support
services should be reevaluated and assessed for their impact on the resource base and
the sustainable expansion of agricultural production and productivity.
Many countries and regions need to integrate natural resource management
with economic and sector policies. More economic and environmental impact
analyses at the country level are needed to help set priorities for agricultural land
issues, to assess the costs and benefits of policy decisions, and to expedite identifi-
cation of the type of investments that will be required to prevent land degradation
and increase production. Prevention of nutrient mining through sound economic
policies, research, information dissemination, and human resource development
should be actively promoted in Africa.
C h a p t e r  2 6
Applying Science to Sub-Saharan
Africa’s Food Needs
Reported by Ellen Wilson
In the drive to develop the best technology to solve
Sub-Saharan Africa’s mounting food needs,
indigenous knowledge should not be forgotten.
With biotechnology and other new agricultural technology on the horizon,millions of Sub-Saharan Africans have reason to wonder whether there willbe a magic bullet that will save their countries from massive food short-
ages. The answer, as given by African leaders and researchers and other global agri-
culture experts, seems to be “no, there will not be a magic bullet.” But biotechnology
should be in the mix of solutions to food insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa. And
equally, if not more important, are food policy changes and new technology that
focus on a range of issues from increasing cassava crop yields to more-effective ways
to capture and store water during the rainy season.
“Africans cannot afford to be left behind in the area of biotechnology,” said
Professor Francis Idachaba, vice-chancellor of the University of Agriculture in
Makurdi, Nigeria. “African farmers must be prepared for advances in biotechnology
so that they can replace their seeds with genetically engineered seeds. However, there
are many other policy problems that need to be addressed first. Food insecurity is
not due to the fact that we have little or no biotechnology.”
Unlike many parts of Asia where famine was averted through Green Revolution
technologies that could be applied consistently across millions of hectares of land,
Sub-Saharan Africa has special challenges—poor soils, unsuitable conditions for irri-
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gation, and overall wide variations in growing conditions. Millions of people sub-
sist in fragile areas—on hillsides, forest margins, and in drylands—areas where
growing any kind of crop is a challenge.
“We’re behind in the development of new technologies that can be applied
to the diverse growing conditions of Sub-Saharan Africa,” said Per Pinstrup-
Andersen, director general of IFPRI. “Much of the agricultural research that has
been done in the past was focused on high-potential areas of Asia and is not well-
suited to Sub-Saharan Africa. We need more research to help these farmers increase
production per unit of land without damaging the environment. We need more
drought tolerance in crops grown in these regions, such as cassava, maize,
sorghum, and millet, and we need varieties that are more high-yielding and resist-
ant to pests and diseases.”
Traditional Plant Breeding Delivers the Goods
Some say that biotechnology is not likely to assist in the process of improving these
crops. “In the area of increasing yields, traditional plant breeding has been deliver-
ing the goods, not biotechnology,” said Margaret Mellon, director of the agriculture
and biotechnology project at the Union of Concerned Scientists. “Biotechnology
cannot deal with complex traits and multiple gene transfers needed in African
crops. All the hype surrounding biotechnology, with the implication that traditional
plant breeding should be swept aside, needs to be deflated. Biotechnology has a role,
but a minor one.”
Agricultural researchers agree that biotechnology is not yet capable of dealing
with complex traits. “Many of the concerns in Sub-Saharan Africa, like most of
the tropics, are environmental stresses—drought, flooding, and soil stresses,” said
Roger Beachy, co-director of the International Laboratory for Tropical Agriculture
and Biotechnology at the Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, California. “It has
thus far not been demonstrated that genetic engineering can confer resistances to
these complex biological traits. But we can certainly expect that in the next 5 or
10 years, genetic engineering will help to arm plants against some of these
problems.”
However, according to Indra Vasil, plant biologist at the University of Florida
and chair of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s
(Unesco’s) Biotechnology Action Council, biotechnology can be put to great use in
traditional plant breeding in Africa right now. “Biotechnology helps to identify new
genes, through gene mapping, which makes it easier for plant breeders to select for
the right gene combinations.” In the case of insects such as aphids, white flies, and
caterpillars, biotechnology will also likely be the primary method of control, replac-
ing chemicals and pesticides, according to Beachy. There has been noteworthy
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progress in the transfer of genes from the bacterium, Bacillus thuringiensis or “Bt,”
into cotton and corn to combat caterpillars.
But understanding local ecology could potentially be the only environmentally
safe way to control the primary culprits that limit production of crops in Sub-
Saharan Africa—locusts, grasshoppers, and mealybugs, according to Beachy. He
notes that in the past, these voracious insects have been controlled through massive
chemical spraying. Recently, the Nigerian-based International Institute of Tropical
Agriculture and other organizations have had great success in keeping insects in
check through biological control by identifying and using natural predators or
using natural fungi or bacteria in sprays.
National Research Programs
The ability to upgrade agriculture in Africa also hinges on the existence of strong
national agricultural research programs. “There has been no Green Revolution in
Africa,” said Vernon Ruttan, regents professor in the Department of Agricultural
and Applied Economics at the University of Minnesota. “And the reason is that agri-
cultural technologies that lead to large increases per hectare of land are typically very
location-specific. But they can only be adapted to particular locations to the extent
that there are strong research programs in those locations.”
Furthermore, the national agricultural research programs offer improvements
in crop technology to farmers free of charge. “Innovation in Africa will not be
accomplished through the private sector,” said Klaus Leisinger, executive director
of the Ciba-Geigy Foundation for Cooperation with Developing Countries. “It
must be accomplished through the public sector, such as through the work of the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), combined
with national programs and other academic institutions. The reason is that the com-
mercial market in Africa is too small to be developed by the private sector and
because, once you create improved crop varieties, they must be within the pur-
chasing power of the small farmer in Africa.”
But agricultural research capabilities have deteriorated in Sub-Saharan Africa.
“Less is being invested in these programs by African governments than was invest-
ed before,” said Pinstrup-Andersen. “And overall investment in agricultural research
by donors has also declined.”
According to Ruttan, the way to build national research programs is by hav-
ing them develop new technology. “It’s a process of learning by doing. You have to
have experiment stations and trained scientists, they have to be supported by inter-
national funding and by national governments, and they have to be in Africa.”
But there is also reason to hope for more productive relationships between the
private sector and the developing world agriculture sector. According to Leisinger,
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“I would hope that there can be closer collaboration between the private sector and
the CGIAR System so that knowledge and patents could be made available in the
developing world either on commercial terms through licenses or through ‘soft
conditions’—lower than market prices or for free.”
Dissemination to Farmers
But new technology is only as good as the mechanism of its dissemination to
farmers. And, according to African leaders, this link has been quite weak. “In my
country, a lot of agricultural research has been undertaken in the last 60 years,” said
Speciosa Wandera Kazibwe, the vice president of Uganda. “But the bulk of these
findings are allowed to gather dust in our archives and research institutions. The
challenge is to communicate the findings to the people who need this information—
the farmers.”
Extension services are also needed to spread the word about better agronomic
practices that could help increase crop yields. Fungal and viral plant diseases are par-
ticularly devastating in Sub-Saharan Africa, according to Beachy, because of the pres-
ence of weeds and the lack of freezing temperatures that help to control them. Weeds
are a major reservoir for viruses and diseases. But extension services have not deliv-
ered this information to many rural and nomadic farmers, who traditionally plant
crops such as cassava on the edge of the forest instead of in plots that are tilled and
kept clear of weeds.
Most of Africa’s agriculture is rainfed, instead of irrigated, and vulnerable to
drought. African leaders cite a need for new, small-scale technologies to irrigate
Africa’s lands during the dry spells. “We must move to agriculture that relies on water
collected during the rainy season,” said Vice President Kazibwe. “We must tap
underground water and the water in our fresh water lakes and rivers. But we must
adopt technologies for storing and using water that are appropriate for our small
farms.”
Technology Part of a Larger Mosaic
There are many sociopolitical issues that mire new technology once it has been devel-
oped. “The developmental impact of recombinant genetics and biotechnology is
only as good as the sociopolitical soil in which they are planted,” said Leisinger.
“Technological innovation is just one stone in a large and complex mosaic.”
According to Idachaba, unsound food policies and governmental instability in
large part hinder the ability of technology to help the small farmer. Some of the poor
policies have included government taxation of agriculture to finance nonagricultural
products; lack of government support of agricultural extension services; poor rural
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infrastructure, including roads, water supplies, and physical markets in which to buy,
sell, and store crops; and unfriendly macroeconomic policy environments, includ-
ing poor exchange rates that hinder African agricultural exports.
Throughout the 1980s and continuing into this decade some of the poor food
policies were reversed, according to Idachaba. “Policy changes are being made that
define the proper role of the government in agriculture,” he said. “But still, from
government to government and from country to country, policy failures persist
because their political cost has been too low. We must raise the cost of governmental
neglect of African agriculture. Rural people must put political pressure on govern-
ments to support improvements in agricultural technologies. In African countries,
there are no ‘farm lobbies,’ but they are urgently needed.”
In the drive to develop the best technology to solve Sub-Saharan Africa’s
mounting food needs, indigenous knowledge should not be forgotten, according
to Kazibwe. It was not long ago that Africa was self-sufficient in its own food pro-
duction. Certainly, some of the lessons of the past can be applied to the future. “Our
people who have been engaged in agriculture since the beginning of time have accu-
mulated a lot of knowledge about crops, soils, insects, the weather, and so on,” she
said. “This body of knowledge should be tapped and related to modern science. If
this knowledge sustained our ancestors in the past, it cannot be totally useless
today.”
C h a p t e r  2 7
Pushing Back Poverty in India
Reported by Heidi Fritschel and Uday Mohan
Reaching India’s millions of rural poor will require
jump starting growth in the rural areas.
In August 1999, India’s population reached 1 billion, and by 2035 experts proj-ect that India will overtake China as the world’s most populous country. But Indiaalready holds first place in another category: the country is home to the world’s
largest number of poor people. Today an estimated 350 million out of 1 billion
Indians fall below the poverty line. This number represents enormous human suf-
fering: while India claims self-sufficiency in production of grains, two-thirds of
Indian children under age 5 are malnourished. Infant mortality is 65 per 1,000 live
births, compared with 33 for China. Adult literacy rates of 65 percent for men and
38 percent for women fall far short of those in China—90 percent for men and 73
percent for women.
To be sure, India has reduced the share of its people living in poverty signif-
icantly, from 55 percent in the early 1970s to about 35 percent today, but India’s
record of poverty reduction pales when compared with that of other Asian coun-
tries. Indonesia, for example, slashed the proportion of its population living in
poverty from 58 percent in 1970 to just 8 percent in 1993 (although the Asian
economic crisis has set the country back significantly). China reduced the inci-
dence of absolute poverty within its borders from 270 million in 1978 to 65 mil-
lion in 1996.
Studies show that economic growth, particularly agricultural growth, has been
the main source of poverty alleviation in India. “In the areas where growth has been
strongest, poverty has fallen the most. The problem is that by itself it’s not enough,”
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says Pranab Bardhan, professor of economics at the University of California at
Berkeley. G. S. Bhalla, coauthor of a forthcoming 2020 Vision discussion paper on
India’s food balances, says, “The underlying sources of agricultural growth during
the past quarter century have largely run their course, and new sources of produc-
tion growth must be found.”
Can India achieve its own economic miracle, pushing back poverty and stim-
ulating a vibrant economy with opportunities for all of its people? The task for India’s
policymakers is to recharge agricultural growth, enabling poor people to contribute
their skills and energies to the country’s economic activities and to reap the bene-
fits of economic success.
The Record on Growth and Poverty
When India achieved independence in 1947, about half of its people lived in pov-
erty, and for the next two decades, poverty remained entrenched. “Before the 1970s,
growth did not help poverty, mainly because the rate of growth was far too slow to
have any impact,” says Siddiq Osmani, professor of development economics at the
University of Ulster, Belfast. “After 1970 growth picked up, not by East Asian stan-
dards, but by India’s own standard. And since growth was especially strong in agri-
culture, on which most of the rural poor depend, poverty did decline, from about
55 percent in 1973 to about 33 percent in 1993.”
What was behind the falling poverty rates? The key was the Green Revolution,
in which farmers used improved crop varieties, fertilizers, and irrigation to raise crop
yields and accelerate agricultural growth. The government’s investments in new tech-
nologies and infrastructure together with the farmers’ efforts in the fields averted a
predicted famine and helped pull millions out of poverty.
Poverty did not fall evenly throughout India, however. In 1990–91, less than
20 percent of the population of Punjab and Haryana was poor, compared with
nearly 60 percent in Bihar. States that managed to make a sizable dent in poverty
followed one of two strategies. One was rural economic growth. Punjab and
Haryana, for example, benefited from the agricultural growth stimulated by the
Green Revolution. As yields rose, poor farmers and even landless agricultural workers
reaped the benefits. The second strategy was development of human resources,
through education. Kerala stressed universal education, but its economy did not
grow enough to absorb all of the skilled labor. As a result many workers migrated
abroad, and their remittances helped reduce poverty in Kerala.
“No Indian state effectively combined both approaches. Research suggests that
if any state had done so, it would have achieved rapid reductions in poverty, com-
parable to the progress made in a number of East Asian countries,” says Martin
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Ravallion, lead economist in the Development Research Group of the World
Bank.
In the early 1990s, India experienced a balance of payments crisis. In response,
the government devalued the rupee, cut government spending, and raised interest
rates. Rural poverty increased temporarily and then returned to its pre-reform level,
where it has remained. “Overall, the post-reform period has seen no reduction in
rural poverty, unlike the decade and a half preceding the reforms, although GDP
growth has been similar, and in fact better since 1992,” says Abhijit Sen of the Center
for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University. According to Sen,
the reasons are several. “Agricultural growth has been somewhat slower in the 1990s
than in the 1980s. Cuts in public spending have slowed the extension of the Green
Revolution to the poorest regions and restrained the growth of rural infrastructure
and rural nonagricultural opportunities. Also, the relative price of cereals has
increased considerably during the 1990s, compared to the reduction of the 1980s.”
The Promise of Agricultural Growth
“The important poverty story in India is the rural sector,” says Ravallion. “In terms
of sheer numbers, this is where the poverty problem lies.” Three out of four of India’s
poor live in the rural areas. “Urban poverty has fallen somewhat in recent years, but
rural poverty has not,” says Ravallion.
“There are still big disparities between regions,” says Gaurav Datt of the World
Bank, “and that speaks to a lot of potential for growth.”
Given the persistence of rural poverty, many experts agree that the key to
reducing poverty in India is agricultural growth, accompanied by strong nonagri-
cultural growth that reaches the rural poor. Moreover, research conducted by
Ravallion and Datt has shown that economic growth in rural areas tends to help
the poor in both the countryside and the cities.
But Benoit Blarel, an economist with the World Bank, is concerned that sub-
stantial rural growth may be hard to come by. “The historical sources of growth and
poverty reduction in rural India are now difficult to find. Rapid technological
change, massive public investments, declining food prices, and agricultural diver-
sification are no longer there to support rural growth, raise wages, and reduce rural
poverty. These historical sources of growth have been undermined by lopsided
public spending, especially on subsidies that do little for either growth or poverty.
And even with 300 million poor people, much-needed reforms are politically
difficult.”
Peter Hazell, director of IFPRI’s Environment and Production Technology
Division and a coauthor with Bhalla of the forthcoming 2020 discussion paper,
agrees: “Further expansion of irrigated area will be more costly, and agriculture must
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increasingly compete with other water users such as industry and urban households
for limited water resources. The Green Revolution technologies have also already
spread widely in the areas where they are most economic, so there is limited scope
for further production gains from the greater use of improved varieties and fertilizer.”
The potential for agricultural growth differs for different growing conditions
in India, says Hazell. Irrigated areas were the source of the rapid growth during the
Green Revolution, but productivity growth is stagnating in these areas, partly
because the biggest gains have already been made and partly because intensive irri-
gated farming is leading to environmental stresses like salinity and waterlogging of
soils. Use of new varieties, better crop management, and better management of irri-
gation water could help raise yields in irrigated areas.
Nonirrigated areas fed by rain may offer the most promise for agricultural
growth. Rainfed areas can be divided into high-potential areas with good rainfall
and fertile soils and low-potential areas that get little and uncertain rain. “On the
whole,” says Bhalla, “high-potential rainfed areas may represent India’s easiest option
for expanding production. Historical trends suggest that improved varieties and
inputs will continue to spread to these areas, and continued improvements in infra-
structure and increases in education will also help raise returns to agriculture.”
In the low-potential rainfed areas, farmers produce mainly sorghum, millet, and
pulses. Some higher-value activities, such as oilseeds and dairying, have expanded
in those areas in recent years in response to favorable incentives, and this raises some
hopes for the future. “But generally, technical solutions here are less clear than in
the more favorable environments, and output growth is likely to be limited,” says
Hazell.
A recent IFPRI study shows that additional investment in agricultural R&D
and rural infrastructure in rainfed areas, even many lower-potential areas, now
offers higher returns for growth and poverty alleviation than additional invest-
ments in many irrigated areas. “These results reflect the high levels of investment
that have already been made in irrigated areas, their stagnating productivity growth,
and the past neglect of many rainfed areas,” says Hazell, one of the coauthors of the
study. Coauthor Shenggen Fan, an IFPRI senior research fellow, cautions, “Rainfed
areas will need better natural resource management to avoid the same environmental
problems that are contributing to stagnant yield growth in irrigated areas.”
Another IFPRI study found that investing in more agricultural R&D and in
more rural roads may be two of the most important steps toward raising growth and
lowering rural poverty. “Our work shows that government investment in agricul-
tural R&D is more effective than any other kind of investment at boosting agri-
cultural growth, by producing new technologies for farmers,” says Hazell. According
to Fan, lead author of the study, “We found that marginal investments in roads have
the biggest impact on rural poverty. This is because roads improve access to mar-
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kets and reduce transport costs, they help people reach new jobs, they help kids get
to school, they help farmers get access to new technologies. Lack of roads can be a
big bottleneck for development.”
Making the Poor Full Participants
Clearly, reaching India’s millions of rural poor will require jump starting growth in
the rural areas. Squeezing more productivity growth out of India’s agricultural lands
will be far from simple, but the task is crucial. Beyond producing more food and
bringing more income to farmers and agricultural workers, agricultural growth can
help revitalize the entire rural economy, including activities outside of agriculture.
“In the long run, creation of well-paying productive employment in the nona-
gricultural sector is the solution,” says Kirit Parikh, director of the Indira Gandhi
Institute of Development Research in Mumbai. “For that, human capital has to be
built up through education.”
Even the poorest and least-favored areas will require investment in their agri-
cultural and nonagricultural economies, says Sen. “The poverty reduction impact
of overall growth is larger if nonagricultural growth generates jobs and if the rural
poor have access to them. This in turn is more likely if nonagricultural growth is
regionally dispersed,” he explains. The state has an important role to play in pro-
viding agricultural research, infrastructure, education, and social security.
“Obviously, the ability of the state to play these essential roles depends on the
resources at its disposal, and since growth eases the resource constraint, these are
more likely to be undertaken if the overall GDP situation is better.”
As India passes the 1 billion mark, the future of its 350 million poor people
hangs in the balance, subject to the decisions of policy leaders. Whether their future
will be one of increasing prosperity, food security, and improved quality of life or
instead a continuing struggle against grinding poverty depends on the steps deci-
sionmakers take now.
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Is Agriculture Raiding South
Asia’s Water Supplies?
Water Scarcity and Water Reform in South Asia
Reported by Ellen Wilson
Across South Asia, both urban and rural water users
are provided with massive subsidies on water use;
irrigation water is essentially unpriced.
Water is increasingly scarce around the world. In South Asia, where half ofthe world’s poor live, international water conflicts are brewing and riotsover water are taking place with increasing frequency. Many researchers,
environmentalists, and others believe that agriculture is using more than its fair share
of the resource. Around the world and in South Asia, agriculture, on average, uses
about 80 percent of the water supply in a given country.
According to some researchers, agriculture is drinking so much water in South
Asia not out of necessity, but because of poor water policies that induce excessive
water use. They say that water use could be reduced without adversely affecting crop
yields, and call for comprehensive reform of water policies. These reforms could save
irrigation water, freeing it up for nonagricultural uses, and, at the same time,
decrease irrigated water’s negative effects on the environment. But others challenge
the assumption that increasing water efficiency could free up a lot of water. They
hold that there is simply not enough water to go around. In the future, this edgi-
ness over water will only increase as population pressures make the need to produce
greater amounts of irrigated food staples even more urgent.
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“There are no easy answers to water scarcity and water allocation issues,” said
Prabhu Pingali, senior economist at the Philippines-based International Rice
Research Institute. “But what is happening all over Asia is that water scarcity is
increasing. As it does increase, farmers will become more conscious about their water
use. Farmers have shown the ability to organize themselves to solve certain prob-
lems in the past. I think we will see farmers organizing to create solutions to water
scarcity in the future. And one of the most important solutions will be to increase
water efficiency.”
Water Scarcity
Researchers say there are water shortages during the dry season in parts of rural areas
and in every major city in South Asia. These shortages are leading to conflicts.
According to Peter Rogers, Gordon McKay Professor of Environmental Engineering
at Harvard University, “The major conflict between Pakistan and India about the
Indus River waters was largely diffused in the 1960s. Now there is a conflict between
India and Bangladesh over the Ganges. But of even greater concern are the water
conflicts between the states in India on every boundary that crosses a major flow of
the Ganges. And also in the south of India, which is not in the Ganges River basin,
people have been killed in riots about intrastate water conflicts.
“In Madras, there is no water in the city pipes,” continued Rogers. “Mobs of
desperate people must chase water delivery trucks twice a week to get their share.
There is plenty of water during the monsoons. But this water is not stored properly
and is mainly used for agriculture.”
Many researchers believe that water is being used excessively in agriculture. “For
our water-intensive crops such as rice and sugar cane, we are going deeper and deeper
underground,” said Ashok Gulati, a director at the National Council for Applied
Economic Research in India. “In the modern part of India’s Punjab, so much water
is being pumped from wells, the water table is going down by one and a half feet
per year.”
Irrigated water in agriculture has had and continues to have negative environ-
mental effects. “Unless there is proper drainage, bringing irrigated water onto fields
can cause waterlogging and salinity buildup in soils,” said Ruth Meinzen-Dick,
research fellow at IFPRI. “This has become especially problematic over large areas
of prime irrigated land in Pakistan and northern India.”
This water-induced land degradation is leading to long-term declines in the
very crops the irrigated water was supposed to be spurring into ever-increasing pro-
duction. “In addition, intensively irrigated land leads to long-term declines in the
soil’s nitrogen supply, and this affects the ability of the soil to produce the same yields
as before,” said Pingali.
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Declining growth in crop yields makes the prospect of decreasing the use of
water on farms particularly scary. But surprisingly, researchers have found that if
farmers decreased their water use on rice paddies, there would be little or no impact
on yields.
“We have enough field level experiments, conducted in various countries in
South Asia, which show that you can reduce irrigation water by as much as 40 per-
cent without affecting crop yields,” said Pingali. “The problem is that farmers have
no incentive to reduce their water use because water is free or costs very little.”
Water: A Business or a Social Program?
Across South Asia, both urban and rural water users are provided with massive
subsidies on water use; irrigation water is essentially unpriced. The government also
subsidizes the electricity required to draw groundwater up from wells.
“With water provided by public systems at little or no cost to the user, no one
in the water allocation business, whether it’s the bureaucrats, the farmers, or urban
citizens, has an incentive to conserve water,” said Mark Rosegrant, research fellow
at IFPRI. “As a result, water is overused. Any excess water ends up going downstream
or seeping into the groundwater, or is otherwise lost to the system, requiring costly
pumping to recover. What is needed is an improvement in the overall, systemwide
efficiency of water use on farms.”
However, some believe there is no water to spare on farms. “If you’re looking
for more water in Asia, be careful about thinking that improved water efficiency will
free up a lot of water,” said Harald Frederiksen, principal engineer at the World
Bank. “Farmers are short of water, just like everyone else, during the dry season
because every river runs dry. When push comes to shove, South Asia, like so many
other regions around the world, is out of water.
“To solve the problem, there are four choices,” continued Frederiksen. “One,
displace people out of urban areas by not providing water; two, displace people
around reservoir sites by building new reservoirs to capture water in the wet season;
three, displace people out of agriculture by turning off irrigation to the rural areas;
or four, population control, the only painless solution. In the longer term, the solu-
tion must be population control, but it’s getting pretty late.”
Nevertheless, there is no disputing the fact that governments across South Asia
seem to be foundering under the burden of water subsidies. “Water reforms will be
increasingly well received because the past policies have become self-defeating,” said
Rosegrant. “Water costs more now because of its growing scarcity. And the costs of
maintaining the subsidies and centralized control of water are skyrocketing.”
One obvious solution to water overuse and escalating costs is to put a price on
water. “Irrigation should be a business and not a social program,” said Harvard’s
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Rogers. “Farmers must be required to pay a price for water that is at least as much
as it is worth to them. Governments should seek to reclaim the full cost of water.
No one will die of thirst. If we just increased the price from close to zero to a price
that is 10 percent more, this would produce so much water, people wouldn’t know
what to do with it.”
But Is Priced Water Feasible?
How feasible would it be to ask farmers to pay for something that was once free?
“It will take great political will and institutional reform to raise the cost of water to
its true cost,” said Gulati. “You can’t ask farmers to pay more without improving
the quality of the water service in return.”
Current irrigation systems do not serve many farmers’ needs, making farmers
ever disgruntled customers. In addition, there is wasteful leakage from current irri-
gation systems. According to Basawan Sinha, the former chief engineer of irrigation
for Bihar State in India, the major problem with water is that the old canal and dis-
tribution systems were not planned and designed to provide water to farmers on
demand, in sufficient amounts, at the right time. “And there are many hectares of
land for which we have failed to provide water at all,” said Sinha.
Researchers also warn that raising the price of water would not do much to con-
serve water unless the method of billing farmers for water use was revised. “Farmers
are currently charged on a per-hectare basis,” said Meinzen-Dick of IFPRI. “If you
just raised the charge, farmers would likely use even more water to get more for their
money. If farmers were charged for the volume of water they use, then raising the
price might encourage conservation.”
However, Meinzen-Dick adds that measuring and monitoring volumes of
water used on farms would be an enormous logistical challenge. “If countries do not
have the administrative capacity to adequately bill for electricity when the tech-
nology is fairly simple, then I have serious doubts that they can bill individual farm-
ers for their water consumption.”
Empowering Farmers with Water Rights
Researchers call for reform of water policies to help solve some of these problems,
including establishing farmer water associations and granting them legal rights to
water. “Strengthening the role of water user associations is one of the most prom-
ising ways to improve the quality of irrigation service while at the same time reduc-
ing the financial burden on governmental agencies of managing irrigation systems,”
said Meinzen-Dick. “Associations could purchase water for several hundred hectares
of land, divide that water among their members, and encourage water conservation.
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Many countries, ranging from the Philippines and Indonesia to Mexico and Chile,
have transferred management responsibility from state agencies to farmer organi-
zations. But for this to work, farmers have to have incentives great enough to off-
set the added costs of managing the irrigation systems. Improvements in water
service and clear water rights for the organizations can provide such incentives.”
According to Rosegrant from IFPRI, water rights could also be bartered or sold
to other farmers or other farmer associations, thus encouraging farmers to use less
water and sell off what they don’t really need. Farmers would also approve new
investments in irrigation system hardware, have more say about when and where
the water is allocated, and ensure that the water reaches all who need it. It would
also be necessary to make minor capital improvements in the old systems and make
these systems more flexible in accommodating farmers’ evolving needs. Portions of
the water system would still be owned by the state; the rest would be owned by the
farmers.
“In the past, turnover of water infrastructure management to farmers has often
failed because it was not accompanied by secure access to water,” said Rosegrant.
“Reform in Chile shows that well-defined water rights provide the incentive for user
groups to economize on water use and to bargain effectively with the governmen-
tal water bureaucracies for timely and efficient service.”
Chile’s water companies have been completely privatized. “A market solution
can make a great contribution to solving water scarcity in the future and can
improve the efficiency of investments in water infrastructure in the present,” said
Renato Gazmuri, former secretary for agriculture in Chile. “Farmers will not approve
unprofitable capital improvements. Because of their increased water efficiency,
Chilean farmers now irrigate 22 percent more land with the same amount of water
as before.”
An increase in the flexibility of water systems would also better accommodate
a possible shift from rice monocultures in the dry season to less water-intensive crops,
such as corn, vegetables, or fodder legumes. Such high-value crops could help farm-
ers pay for priced water. “However, there must be a market demand for these crops
or they can’t be grown,” said Pingali. “We have seen a tremendous shift to nonrice
crops in the dry season in Thailand, driven mainly by an increasing demand from
wealthier urban populations for vegetables and fruit. A large-scale shift across South
Asia would have to be preceded by dramatic income growth. This won’t happen
overnight.”
Water Marketing
In the future, farmer water rights could also free up water for nonagricultural uses
through a system known as water marketing. Farmers could sell their water rights
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to the cities, which would be more than willing to pay for scarce water. “We’ve seen
this work in California where the drought disappeared because of water trades
between the agriculture sector and the municipalities,” said Rogers. “The govern-
ment in California ended up with more water than it could deal with. At the end
of the year, it still had about 200,000 acre-feet left unsold.” But to make this work,
again, there must be a water measuring and monitoring system, and an adequate
“plumbing system” between the farms and the cities, another expensive logistical
challenge.
No one believes that large-scale water marketing can happen quickly in most
developing countries, but some reform of water is on the horizon. “Exactly what
sort of institutional reforms will take place remains to be seen,” said Gulati. “India
is just beginning to change in a direction that is a more bottom-up versus a top-
down approach. As a result, users—the farmers—will be involved in the ownership
and management of irrigation and electricity. We are trying to sell this idea to chief
ministers of different states in India. We hope that some of the reforms in water will
take place within the next two to three years in some of the states. Changes could
take place in electricity as soon as within the next year or two.”
Some have faith that the farmers may move faster than anyone expects.
According to Rogers, “I met a farmer, who, on three hectares of land, was growing
roses and delivering them to the airport each day to be sold around the world. He
used to grow sorghum. Now he’s buying color televisions and sending his kids to
college. Farmers are now using subsidized irrigation water to grow citrus, table
grapes, and roses. They can afford to pay for water. The farmers are ready to begin
to make more rational choices about water use.”
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Transforming the Rural Asian Economy
The Unfinished Revolution
Mark W. Rosegrant and Peter B. R. Hazell
To complete the economic transformation in 
rural Asia requires further growth, but growth 
that is more equitable and environmentally 
sustainable than it has been in the past.
Developing Asia as a whole has taken remarkable strides since the food crisesof the 1960s. Improvements in food security, poverty reduction, and per capi-ta income initiated by the Green Revolution have been substantial and last-
ing. Per capita gross domestic product increased by 190 percent between 1970 and
1995, and calories per person per day by more than 20 percent. In 1975, one out
of every two Asians lived in poverty. By 1995 this ratio fell to one in four. The inci-
dence of rural poverty also decreased, from one in two to one in three between 1975
and 1995, and the total number of rural poor fell by 7 percent despite a substan-
tial increase in population.
Although life has improved for most rural Asians, about 670 million still live in
poverty, and they must tolerate lower levels of health, education, and general well-
being than their urban counterparts. About 2 billion people live in rural Asia.
Another 300 million are expected to join their ranks by 2020. The vast majority of
these rural inhabitants still rely, directly or indirectly, on agriculture, forestry, or fish-
ing for their livelihoods, a dependence that places enormous pressure on natural
resources. The continuing degradation of these resources could well cause social con-
flict over remaining resources and discontent about the widening gap between urban
and rural quality of life. These problems would be particularly severe in South Asia.
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Meeting the Challenges of the Future
To complete the economic transformation in rural Asia requires further growth, but
growth that is more equitable and environmentally sustainable than it has been in
the past. Meeting this challenge will warrant more efficient application of the les-
sons already learned about agricultural growth, public-sector investment, rural
poverty reduction, and natural resource protection. The following six emerging chal-
lenges will also need special attention.
Making Growth Pro-Poor
Because the poor live mostly in rural areas and generally depend on the farm sector
for their incomes, growth that stems from agricultural productivity and that raises
the incomes of small-scale farmers and landless laborers is particularly important in
reducing poverty. But growth alone will not rapidly reduce poverty. Policymakers
must reach the poor directly, by investing in health, nutrition, and education. In
the case of particularly vulnerable or marginalized groups, policymakers can use
income transfers or safety nets to help relieve short-term stress. For the poor to par-
ticipate in growth, land must be distributed relatively equitably; agricultural research
must focus on the problems of small farmers as well as large; new technologies must
be scale-neutral and profitable for all farm sizes; efficient input, credit, and prod-
uct markets must ensure that all farms have access to needed modern farm inputs
and receive similar prices for their products; the labor force must be able to migrate
or diversify into rural nonfarm activities; and policies must not discriminate against
agriculture in general and small farms in particular.
Managing the Legacy of the Economic Crisis
The 1997 economic crisis in East and Southeast Asia caused serious drops in real
income and employment. Although recovery has begun, the affected countries will
need time to recover from the loss in real income and cuts in government invest-
ment in rural growth and safety nets. Governments and donors need to give high
priority to restoring investment fundamentals in the crisis economies and strength-
ening safety nets. Good-governance reforms must seek greater transparency and
accountability in public-sector activities and the regulation of financial institutions
and corporations to reduce the possibility of future financial crises.
Managing Globalization
Globalization offers immense market, technological, and financial opportunities for
further economic growth in Asia. Open markets and global integration have already
boosted rural growth, but such processes also risk economic losses to superior com-
petitors, instability, and worsening inequality. The solution to these problems lies
in creative policies, not in withdrawal into isolation. Competition can be managed,
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for example, through a phased transition, as many of the Southeast Asian countries
have shown. The pace of liberalization should take into account institutional capac-
ities, competitive readiness of agriculture and industry, and the effects on social and
political stability. The management of the transition to globalization should favor
not only an open economy and growth, but also macroeconomic stability, human
capital formation, and poverty reduction.
Revitalizing Agricultural Research and Technology Dissemination
New agricultural technologies in Asia are increasingly complex, knowledge-intensive,
and location-specific. They require a more decentralized research and extension sys-
tem and more information and skills for successful adoption than did Green
Revolution varieties and fertilizers. Extension and research that is driven by infor-
mation from the bottom up could help farmers cope with the complexity of the new
technologies. The private sector could also help revitalize agricultural research,
though with some risks. Governments are making it easier for the private sector to
appropriate and use research results and hybrids. And biotechnology innovations
are likely to increase private-sector involvement in agricultural research. But the pub-
lic sector will continue to play an important role in agricultural research because cor-
porations may not want to invest in technologies that governments consider
important for equity and poverty alleviation. Moreover, the private sector has gen-
erally shown little interest in increasing the yield of key commodities such as wheat
or rice varieties adapted to Asian agroclimatic zones. And it has made virtually no
investments in tropical crops, fruits, and vegetables.
Managing Land and Water Scarcity and Degradation
Population pressure on the land; agricultural intensification and inappropriate
farming practices; and waste disposal from a rapidly growing livestock sector all pose
significant threats to the rural environment. But water scarcity and quality are
probably the most severe challenges facing developing Asia and will reach crisis levels
in many Asian countries in the next decade or two. Water is becoming scarce not
only because of growing demand from agriculture, industry, and households, but
because the potential for expanding the water supply is diminishing. Deteriorating
water quality will further aggravate water shortages. Policies that can improve water
management include removal of subsidies and taxes that encourage misuse of
resources and establishment of secure property rights. Water users will need to have
greater power to make their own decisions regarding water use, and markets will
need to send correct signals about the real value of water.
Building Good Governance and Social Capital
Asian societies are changing because of rising incomes and globalization. People are
demanding greater participation in policy decisions, more democratic and de-
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centralized forms of governance, and more accountability from public agencies. At
the same time, the nature of many public goods is changing. The private sector is
playing a larger role in agricultural research and the supply of health and education
services, and nongovernmental organizations are organizing communities for col-
lective activity and investment. These changes require that the roles of the public
and private sectors and civil society be reconfigured to provide public goods and serv-
ices in a more cost-effective manner and in a way that better meets the needs of rural
people. For consumers whose limited purchasing power prevents a satisfactory
response from the private sector, governments inevitably will continue to play a large
role in meeting basic needs.
Alternative Scenarios for Developing Asia
Even though the size of the agricultural sector has declined relative to other sectors
during the course of Asia’s economic transformation, agricultural output has con-
tinued to grow, as it must. Slower agricultural growth could jeopardize food secu-
rity and increase child malnutrition in many countries, cause significant new
unemployment and poverty (particularly in rural areas), and reduce nonagricultural
growth.
If, under a pessimistic scenario, governments become even more complacent
than they are today about agriculture, invest less in rural areas, and fail to make need-
ed policy reforms, projections based on IFPRI’s IMPACT model show that the
number of malnourished children, a good indicator of current and future poverty,
will remain virtually unchanged in 2010 from the 1993 level of 140 million. On
the other hand, if government policies continue as usual, that number would drop
to 113 million children. But if governments become a little less complacent about
agriculture and complete economic reforms as well, the number of malnourished
children would drop sharply to 76 million, 65 million less than in the pessimistic
scenario. South Asian children would suffer most from government complacency.
(The publication cited at the end of this brief gives details about the assumptions
made in the various scenarios.)
In two decades it is feasible to virtually eradicate poverty and child malnutri-
tion according to the IMPACT model. But to do so, most of the poorest Asian
economies would have to grow at rates close to the peaks experienced by the most
dynamic economies in the region, agricultural productivity would have to reach the
levels achieved during the heyday of the Green Revolution, and Asian governments
would have to make significant new investments in agriculture and rural areas and
spend 50 percent more annually on social programs. Although, realistically, South
Asia would need to take a longer view, China and Southeast Asia could reasonably
eradicate child malnutrition by 2020.
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Conclusions
Asian policymakers on the threshold of the 21st century must make major decisions
that could delay the completion of the economic transformation in rural areas or
hasten it. Although the region’s economy has hit a rough spot, governments must
not turn away from a market orientation if they are to carry through the transfor-
mation. Rather, they should support the private sector where possible and supple-
ment it where its growth is not sufficiently compatible with poverty alleviation and
environmental improvement. Good governance is another key to sustained growth.
Transparent and responsive governments must increase the level of investment
made in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension, education, and
health, and expand the reach of social safety-net programs. Some countries could
meet a significant part of these costs by reducing wasteful public expenditures in
rural areas, particularly on input and credit subsidies, and by improving the effi-
ciency of public institutions. Natural resources should be better managed as well.
Completion of the rural transformation, radical reduction in poverty, and improve-
ment in food security in rural Asia are attainable if governments resist complacency.
Microcredit for the Rural Poor
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Rural Financial Services
for Poverty Alleviation
The Role of Public Policy
Manfred Zeller and Manohar Sharma
Successful financial outreach to the rural poor requires
institutional innovations that reduce the risks and
costs of lending small amounts of money.
For poor rural families in developing countries, access to credit and savings facil-ities such as banks has the potential to make the difference between grindingpoverty and an economically secure life. Well-managed savings facilities permit
households to build up funds for future investment or consumption. Credit enables
them to tap finances beyond their own resources and take advantage of profitable
investment opportunities. Farmers may invest in land or in new agricultural tech-
nology that will provide higher incomes, while rural households that do not own
land can establish or expand family enterprises. Credit and savings also serve as insur-
ance for the poor. In rural areas of developing countries, short-term loans or past
savings are often used to provide basic necessities when household incomes decline
temporarily—after a bad harvest or between agricultural seasons, for example.
But in most developing countries, rural financial services are sadly inadequate.
In countries as diverse as Ghana, Malawi, and Pakistan, access to credit and savings
facilities is severely limited for small farmers, tenants, and entrepreneurs, particu-
larly women. In many countries only about half of the loan applicants can borrow
an adequate amount at the going interest rate, either from formal institutions such
as banks and cooperatives or from the informal sector—friends, relatives, pawn-
brokers, and moneylenders. Those who want to borrow from the formal sector are
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usually deterred by the strict collateral requirements and high transaction costs fre-
quently involved in doing business with formal institutions, including time spent
in travel and doing paperwork. Many potential borrowers are in such need of credit
that they are willing to pay substantially higher interest rates in the informal
markets—sometimes as high as 80 percent per year. But the amount of credit avail-
able through informal markets is often constrained by bottlenecks in the local
supply of funds. Even households with annual incomes well above the poverty line
may experience difficulty in purchasing enough food during the preharvest season
when previous food stocks have been depleted.
The story on the savings side is similar. Costs involved in making small deposits
at faraway banks are high. Moreover, the transaction cost per dollar of deposit rises as
the size of the deposit becomes smaller, discouraging farmers and rural entrepreneurs
from making a series of tiny deposits, as they prefer to do. Many rural financial insti-
tutions choose not to accept deposits; others are legally forbidden to do so to protect
depositors from fraud and for other reasons. Because most credit and savings programs
still depend on the urban-based banking system for depositing their clients’ savings
and for channeling and disbursing loans, they usually are not able to reach out to loca-
tions far away from branches of state-owned or privately owned banks.
Traditional Institutions and the Rural Poor
As important as rural finances are, the task of providing credit and saving oppor-
tunities at a reasonable cost to those who have only meager assets has been neither
straightforward nor easy. Until the 1980s, in many developing countries, state-run
agricultural development banks—armed with subsidized funds and eloquent pro-
poor directives—took the lead in establishing formal credit markets in rural areas.
However, the shortcomings of the institutional principles they were based on—
collateralized lending, an organizational setup without any incentives to do busi-
ness with the poor, and pervasive political patronage—severely handicapped their
performance. Not only did they fail to serve the poor who could not pledge collat-
eral, but their inefficiency made them so dependent on state subsidies that they
became financially unsustainable. Since then, support for state-sponsored agri-
cultural banks has greatly declined, and the need for financial market reforms to
rectify distortions caused by past policies is almost universally acknowledged.
Now, the most basic roles of government—establishing macroeconomic sta-
bility, ensuring that financial markets are free to respond to economic incentives
while following sound banking practices, and maintaining and enforcing a legal
framework that ensures contract compliance—are beyond dispute. However, these
actions alone cannot trigger development of rural financial institutions that serve
the poor. This is because rural financial markets have inherent problems that make
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investments risky as well as costly, and formal financial institutions have been
unable to devise profitable savings and loan services for the rural poor. Information
about potential borrowers, especially in far-flung areas, is difficult to obtain, mak-
ing loan applications excessively costly to evaluate, especially when loans are small.
The poor also own few assets, making it infeasible for the financial institution to
secure its lending with collateral. As a result, private investors either shy away from
the financial sector or limit their services to financial institutions in the urban econ-
omy, where information on prospective borrowers is less costly to obtain. IFPRI
studies have found private commercial banks in most rural areas of developing coun-
tries conspicuous by their absence, except in a few high-potential, densely populated
areas. For example, in the rural areas of Cameroon and Pakistan, less than 10 per-
cent of loan transactions take place in the formal sector.
This is not to say that private-sector banks will not have a role in the rural finan-
cial sector in the future. Many countries such as Bangladesh, Madagascar, Malawi,
and Nepal initiated serious financial reforms only in the second half of the 1980s.
Therefore, it is too early to conclude that private banks, which are just now estab-
lishing themselves in urban areas, will not gradually expand their services to rural
areas as these become more developed and prosperous.
Currently, though, it is the lenders in informal markets that provide the bulk
of loans to the rural poor, according to IFPRI studies in Bangladesh, Egypt,
Madagascar, and Pakistan. In all these countries, informal lenders make loans with-
out collateral, using various techniques for screening applicants and enforcing repay-
ment. In Bangladesh, Cameroon, Madagascar, Nepal, and Pakistan, for example,
more than 90 percent of the loans are not secured by physical collateral. Households
or even small communities may enter into mutually beneficial risk-pooling schemes;
traders disburse credit to farmers in exchange for the right to market the growing
crop; shopkeepers increase sales by providing credit for food, farm inputs, and
household necessities; and large landholders secure access to labor in the peak sea-
son in return for earlier loan advances to laborers. In countries like Cameroon and
Egypt, informal credit and savings associations play an important role in the pro-
vision of financial services. In fact, the ingenuity of informal lenders and self-help
organizations in tailoring loan products to the requirements of their clients or
members makes them indispensable in both the urban and rural financial landscape
of developing countries.
But innovative and useful as the informal sector may be, it frequently runs up
against severe constraints. Informal credit markets, by their very nature, are seg-
mented. A “market” typically consists of a single village community. And informal
lenders seldom manage savings deposits. Hence, financial intermediation in the
sense of providing a common clearinghouse for borrowers and lenders does not take
place to the fullest extent possible. As a result, the supply of credit is limited, result-
194 MANFRED ZELLER AND MANOHAR SHARMA
ing in either severe credit rationing or extremely high interest rates for some lenders.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in all studies conducted by IFPRI, informal sec-
tor transactions are generally small, short-term loans taken to finance the purchase
of urgently needed goods for household consumption—especially food—or, to a
lesser extent, inputs such as seeds and fertilizer. In Bangladesh, for example, the aver-
age size of a loan in the informal sector was about US$15 taken for about three
months. Invariably, when larger projects need to be financed, such as a new enter-
prise, an irrigation pump, or agricultural land, people turn to institutional lenders
in the formal sector. Also, especially in agricultural regions, risks arising out of
droughts or floods affect both informal lenders and borrowers simultaneously, so a
credit supply crunch is likely to take place just when the demand for credit peaks.
Formal institutions offer several advantages in this respect. Banks usually have
a network of branches across different regions of a country and are therefore in a bet-
ter position to diversify risks. And when banks are allowed to collect savings deposits,
they serve the needs of savers as well as borrowers. Formal institutions can also lever-
age funds in other financial markets such as the bond market. But, as already noted,
only a relatively few borrowers have access to formal financial institutions.
Overall, it is clear that the task of delivering financial services to the rural poor
cannot be left entirely to market forces.
The Promise of Innovative Institutions
Successful financial outreach to the rural poor requires institutional innovations that
reduce the risks and costs of lending small amounts of money. So far, most inno-
vations in microfinance have come from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
that do not have commercial profit as their principal objective. By taking fresh
approaches, these new microfinance institutions have penetrated rural financial
markets and serviced an underclass of borrowers in a way that was unimaginable
some 20 years ago. In 1988, IFPRI published one of the most detailed studies then
available of the innovations in group-based banking introduced by the Grameen
Bank of Bangladesh, which has provided credit to 2.1 million women in 36,000 vil-
lages. Since then, IFPRI has examined the experiences of other institutions, includ-
ing member-owned village banks in Madagascar; other large-scale, group-based
credit programs in Bangladesh and Malawi; and savings and credit cooperatives in
Cameroon. These innovative microfinance institutions have provided financial
services to the poor, increased their welfare, and often maintained impressive repay-
ment rates.
Far from being one-shot transfers, loans from such institutions have helped
poor families make permanent positive changes in the quality of their lives. In
Bangladesh, Madagascar, and Malawi, IFPRI studies show that over time poor
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households participating in innovative credit programs have increased their house-
hold income more than nonparticipants have. In Pakistan, access to credit was asso-
ciated with greater use of improved seed, fertilizer, and other inputs to enhance crop
yields. And in Malawi, profits from nonfarm businesses funded by the special credit
programs were reinvested in farms, through increased expenditures on improved
seed and fertilizer. By boosting farm production and overall household income, these
innovative institutions enabled poor households to acquire more and better food.
Of course, lack of capital is only one factor keeping poor rural households from
improving their welfare. In rural areas of developing countries, illiteracy is high, basic
social and market infrastructure is lacking, and many people are in poor health.
When seed or irrigation water for the farmer, market access for the rural producer,
or elementary bookkeeping skills for the would-be entrepreneur are absent, the
returns to financial services will be low or sometimes even wasted. It is not a co-
incidence, then, that in several countries the most successful NGO institutions have
operated in relatively well-endowed rural areas. In other cases, innovations have
offered financial services in combination with other complementary services. For
example, microfinance institutions such as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee (BRAC) and the Grameen Bank combine credit services with basic lit-
eracy programs, training in enterprise management, and education in health and
family planning. This bundling of services has, among other things, enabled these
institutions to successfully penetrate into high poverty areas and to achieve repay-
ment rates in excess of 95 percent.
Public Policy for the Future
It would be unwise to conclude that the new microfinance institutions such as the
Grameen Bank have found the right formula and all that is needed now is replica-
tion. One lesson is becoming increasingly clear: there is no single blueprint for suc-
cess. Recent experience has shown that programs must be designed to harness a
community’s particular strengths—based, for example, on local resources, historical
and cultural experiences, ethnicity, and occupational patterns—in order to reduce
costs of screening participants, monitoring financial activity, and enforcing contrac-
tual obligations. The group-based system has worked well in Bangladesh, whereas sev-
eral programs in Indonesia successfully use local agents to assess borrowers’
creditworthiness. Institutional design varies even for similar target groups within the
same country. In Bangladesh, for example, the Association for Social Advancement
and BRAC give loans to clients themselves, while Rangpur-Dinajpur Rural Services
forms and trains groups, which then obtain agricultural loans from banks.
Designing, experimenting with, and building financial institutions for the
poor require economic resources and adequate consideration of longer-term social
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returns. By itself, the market has not been able to stimulate much institutional in-
novation. In the last two decades, NGOs have taken the lead partly because the
subsidies they receive from donors and government organizations make it feasible
for them to invest in innovations. Just as public policy should play a role in pro-
moting technological innovations that generate social benefits, it should also help
promote institutional innovations that assist the disadvantaged or address intrinsic
market failures. As policymakers seek to make rational policy choices, they must
weigh the social costs of designing and building financial institutions for the poor
against their social benefits. Well-directed support, including initial subsidies, to
promising microfinance institutions is likely to have payoffs in both equity (services
to the poor) and long-term efficiency (reduced cost of services). This is a point of
view that those who argue for a complete removal of subsidies should not ignore.
Of course, some experiments in institutional innovations will succeed, while
others will fail. Public policy will need to support and evaluate this experimenta-
tion process and nurture those designs or institutions that hold promise of future
success. Governments, donors, practitioners, and research institutions must work
together closely to pinpoint the costs, benefits, and future potential of emerging
financial institutions.
In the long run, the payoff to public investment in institutional innovations
will lie in the transformation of now nascent microfinance institutions into full-
fledged, financial intermediaries that offer savings and credit services to small-
holders, tenant farmers, and rural entrepreneurs, thus alleviating poverty. Evidence
of this transformation is already emerging in countries such as Bangladesh,
Indonesia, and Thailand. The payoff will also come from the development of viable
lending methodologies that private commercial banks can readily adopt to profitably
provide savings and loan services to the poor. This is already happening in some parts
of the world: in urban Latin America, for example, private commercial banks have
started to adopt group-based lending methods developed and tested by nonprofit
organizations that initially depended on public support. With the right combina-
tion of public policy, private initiative, and objective research, public investments
in financial institutions designed to serve the poor in other rural areas of Africa, Asia,
and Latin America will bear fruit as well.
C h a p t e r  3 1
Microfinance
Reaching Poor Rural Women
Manohar Sharma
Microfinance programs provide a handy, potentially
cost-effective, and politically feasible tool for 
moving toward gender equality. 
Promises and Ambiguities
Among financial institutions serving poor households around the world, micro-
finance programs have emerged as important players. These programs typically make
small loans—sometimes as small as $50 to $100, and sometimes as large as several
thousand dollars—to households lacking access to formal-sector banks. One impor-
tant achievement of the microfinance movement has been its relative success in delib-
erately reaching out to poor women living in diverse socioeconomic environments.
Of the nearly 90,000 village bank members worldwide that have received loans from
the Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA), 95 percent are
women. The Association for Social Advancement (ASA), one of the most prominent
microfinance institutions in Bangladesh, has provided US$200 million exclusively to
women borrowers. In Malawi, 95 percent of loans provided by the Malawi Muzdi
Fund go to women borrowers. Since 1979, Women’s World Banking has made more
than 200,000 loans to low-income women around the world. Literally hundreds of
similar examples can be found in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The premises behind such targeting are twofold: (1) that microfinance is an
effective tool in improving women’s status, and (2) that overall household welfare
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is likely to be higher when microfinance is provided to women rather than men.
Women’s status, household welfare, and microfinance interact in the following
ways:
• A woman’s status in a household is linked to how well she can enforce com-
mand over available resources. Increased ability to tap financial resources
independently enhances her control, and, therefore, her influence in 
household decisionmaking processes.
• Newly financed microenterprises open up an important social platform for
women to interact with markets and other social institutions outside the
household, enabling them to gain useful knowledge and social capital. Many
microfinance programs organize women into groups, not just to reduce
transactions costs in credit delivery, but also to assist women in building 
and making effective use of these opportunities.
• Women’s preferences regarding household business management and house-
hold consumption goals differ from men’s, particularly in societies with severe
gender bias. In such situations, placing additional resources in the hands of
women is not a mere equalizer: it also materially affects both the quality of
investments financed by the microfinance programs and how extra income is
spent. IFPRI studies have underlined the importance of women’s control of
resources in achieving better welfare outcomes in food, nutrition, education,
and other health statuses of children and their families.
• Women are thought to make better borrowers than men: timely repayment of
loans is more likely to take place when women borrow. An IFPRI study in
1997, for example, shows that Bangladeshi groups with a higher proportion 
of women had significantly better repayment rates.
• Loans are not simple handouts. If microfinance programs are designed to cover
all costs, a potential win-win situation emerges. Development goals related to
women’s empowerment and improved household welfare are self-financing and
no subsidies are required.
Unfortunately, positive empowerment effects cannot be unconditionally guar-
anteed. In some male-dominated societies, men may use the agency of the woman
to gain access to microfinance funds, diminishing women’s role to being mere con-
duits of cash. Even if women can maintain autonomy in how they access and use
microfinance services, their management of newly financed enterprises and shoul-
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dering of all attendant risks may alter interhousehold dynamics. Since loans have
to be repaid even if the project fails, new activities may increase exposure to finan-
cial risks and may impose additional pressures on the already overburdened woman.
Finally, in societies following the practice of female seclusion, the new pressures to
interact in the marketplace may initially involve a difficult learning period and trig-
ger negative responses. Project failures may lead to serious reprimand and additional
negative sanctions against the woman, especially if household resources have to be
diverted to repay outstanding debt.
Emerging Evidence
If the arguments presented thus far about the impact of microfinance on women’s
empowerment are ambiguous, then does empirical evidence resolve the ambigui-
ties? While the record on outreach has been quite impressive, evidence on impact
is not yet conclusive. Part of the problem is methodological. First, “empowerment”
is not readily observable, necessitating the use of proxy indicators. Empowerment
is most strongly manifested in the decisionmaking process; but when outcome
variables—such as changes in income and education levels—are used as proxies, not
much light is shed on either the decisionmaking dynamics or the mechanism of
impact. Second, “empowerment” is a cultural and personal concept; the informant
and the researcher may frequently have differing notions of what empowerment
means and how it is expressed. Third, there is the perennial problem of bias arising
out of self-selection in programs. If microfinance programs tend to attract already-
empowered women, ignoring this fact will overestimate the empowerment effect.
Similarly, an underestimate of the empowerment effect will result if programs
attract or seek out relatively more oppressed women.
Despite these shortcomings, what does the empirical evidence on impact show?
Much of the completed research on empowerment effects of microfinance comes
from Bangladesh, where the campaign to use microfinance as a vehicle for women’s
empowerment has been most aggressively pursued. However, policymakers must be
careful not to generalize findings from Bangladesh to other sociocultural settings.
The most widely cited series of studies on gender-differentiated impacts of
microfinance, and one that takes special care to control for selection bias, was
recently completed by the World Bank based on data collected during 1991–92
from 87 villages in Bangladesh. The study found that welfare impacts on the house-
hold were significantly better when borrowers were women. For every Bangladeshi
taka lent to women, the increase in household consumption was 0.18 taka, com-
pared to 0.11 taka when borrowers were men. Only when women borrowed was
there a large and important effect on the nutritional status of both sons and daugh-
ters. Assets other than land also increased substantially when women borrowed—
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but not when men borrowed. Similarly, it was only when women borrowed that
education of girls (rather than just boys) increased. Men, on the other hand, tend-
ed to take more leisure as a result of borrowing.
Other studies have more directly attempted to assess impact on empowerment.
One widely cited study that made special efforts to construct measures of empower-
ment incorporating client perspectives is based on a 1996 survey of 1,300 married
Bangladeshi women members of the leading microfinance institutions, Grameen
Bank and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). The study
found that married women participating in these credit programs scored higher than
nonparticipating women on a number of empowerment indicators such as involve-
ment in major family decisionmaking, participation in public action, physical
mobility, political and legal awareness, and the ability to make small and large pur-
chases. An IFPRI study in Bangladesh similarly indicated significant positive impacts
on physical mobility of women and increased social interactions in the community.
However, empirical studies point out that positive gender effects cannot always
be taken for granted. Many women, lacking skills and confidence, lean on their hus-
bands to make use of their loans. A 1995 study in Bangladesh indicated that while
94 percent of Grameen Bank’s borrowers are female, only 37 percent of them are
able to exercise control over loan use. Another survey in Bangladesh in 1998 indi-
cated that only 3 percent of the 150 women borrowers surveyed used the money
on their own. The others gave it to their husbands or other male relatives. In fact,
some conclude that women’s lack of empowerment is what makes it easier for
program managers to enforce loan conditions, therefore making women preferred
borrowers. Microfinance institutions tend to downplay this plausible but not yet
widely accepted conclusion.
Directions for the Future
This short review calls for a positive but cautionary assessment. Microfinance pro-
grams targeting women obviously have a strong potential to empower women
whose daily lives are constrained by a pitiful lack of command over household and
societal resources. Targeting does not mean simply requiring women to sign off on
loan papers, since there is no automatic guarantee that this will allow women to
retain control over the use of the loan. For the empowerment effect to be signifi-
cant and lasting, financial products and institutional packages need to be tailored
to the specific local preference and skill-base of women.
Hard-nosed market research is required to identify microenterprises in which
women have a strong niche and stand to gain good financial returns. This will con-
siderably reduce incentives for powerful male relatives to commandeer the newly
available resource to their own benefit. Saving services should provide women the
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freedom to manage cash flow productively and safely. Women’s property rights on
the newly financed assets should be clearly established and enforced. The Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh, for example, requires homes financed through their loans to
be legally registered in the borrower’s name.
Finally, the institutions used to draw women into microfinance programs have
to respond to pre-existing social and cultural constraints. In Bangladesh, women’s
credit groups have been particularly successful in strengthening social capital and
providing traditionally secluded women a non-intimidating and socially acceptable
platform from which to learn and conduct business outside the house. They have
also provided a critical launching pad for women to increase and exchange knowl-
edge and assert themselves as visible and important partners in the community.
Success in other sociocultural settings will require making equivalent adaptations.
Innovations must also focus on reducing costs of service delivery to maintain the
popular support that microfinance has so far received.
Ultimately, women’s empowerment requires fundamental changes in society
that call for more direct policy instruments. New policies should renegotiate prop-
erty rights, replace rules sustaining gender inequality, and improve access to and
quality of education. Fundamental change of this scale can hardly be worked out
easily or quickly, especially in countries where gender bias has been a norm for cen-
turies. Over the short run, microfinance programs provide a handy, potentially cost-
effective, and politically feasible tool for moving toward gender equality.
Group-based activities by women have served as important catalysts of change in
Asia and Africa. The scale of change they ultimately catalyze will depend, however,
on how seriously other social reforms bearing on women’s empowerment are
pursued.
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Generating Food Security
in the Year 2020
Women as Producers, Gatekeepers,
and Shock Absorbers
Lynn R. Brown, Hilary Feldstein, Lawrence Haddad,
Christine Peña, and Agnes Quisumbing
Women could achieve much more in food production,
provision, and utilization if agricultural researchers,
plant scientists, extension agents, and policymakers
would level the agricultural playing field.
Meeting world food needs in the year 2020 will depend even more than it doesnow on the capabilities and resources of women. Women are responsiblefor generating food security for their families in many developing countries,
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Women not only process, purchase, and prepare
food, but they also play a significant role in national agricultural production, pro-
ducing both food and cash crops. Population growth, urbanization, and the limited
potential for increasing production through the expansion of cultivated area imply
that, for food needs to be met in the future, yields will have to increase. Agricultural
research continues to develop new varieties with higher yields and increased tol-
erance to unfavorable environmental conditions, but an untapped source of
productivity gains could lie in addressing gender disparities in agriculture. This brief
examines the key roles that women play in maintaining the three pillars of food
security—food production, food access, and food utilization—and it looks at how
strengthening these pillars through policies that enhance women’s abilities and
resources provides a solution to meeting world food needs in the year 2020.
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Women as Food Producers
The sustainable production of food is the first pillar of food security. Millions of
women work as farmers, farm workers, and natural resource managers. In doing so
they contribute to national agricultural output, maintenance of the environment,
and family food security. Women account for 70 to 80 percent of household food
production in Sub-Saharan Africa, 65 percent in Asia, and 45 percent in Latin
America and the Caribbean. They achieve this despite unequal access to land, to
inputs such as improved seeds and fertilizer, and to information.
Women farmers have shown that they can be experts in their own domain. For
example, scientists at the Rwandan Agricultural Research Institute (ISAR) and the
International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) in Colombia collaborated with
local women farmers in an attempt to breed improved bean varieties. Formerly, the
breeders’ success at predicting the 2 or 3 bean varieties that displayed most poten-
tial under actual growing conditions resulted in mildly successful increases in bean
productivity. In this collaboration, the women farmers were invited to examine more
than 20 bean varieties at the research station and take home and grow the 2 or 3
they thought most promising. The selections of the women farmers substantially
outperformed the selections of the bean breeders. Similar results have come from
India and the Philippines, demonstrating that a vast reservoir of expert human cap-
ital remains largely untapped: few women are agricultural extension agents, and agri-
cultural research and extension institutions rarely seek the expertise of local women
farmers.
Studies that demonstrate lower yields from plots of land controlled by women
than from those controlled by men may contribute to the idea that women lack
farming expertise. Other studies, however, show that these lower yields are usually
the result of lower use of labor and fertilizer per acre rather than managerial and tech-
nical inefficiency. Unequal rights and obligations within the household, as well as
limited time and financial resources, pose a greater constraint to women. Given
equal access to resources and human capital, women farmers can achieve equal or
even, as some studies show, significantly higher yields than men. Including women
in the evaluation of new technologies is an excellent way of efficiently diffusing tech-
nology since women are likely to share their knowledge with other women farm-
ers, whereas male farmers are reluctant to impart such information to women.
Laws governing women’s rights to land vary widely. Some religious laws forbid
female landownership. Even when civil law gives women the right to inherit land,
local custom may rule otherwise. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where women have prime
responsibility for food production, they are generally limited to user (or usufruct)
rights to land, and then only with the consent of a male relative. Women tend to
be allocated poorer land, whose quality deteriorates even further as it is intensively
cultivated. Some resettlement and irrigation projects have actually eroded women’s
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rights to land by providing formal titles only to men. This insecurity of tenure
reduces the likelihood that women will invest much time and many resources in
usufruct land or adopt environmentally sustainable farming practices.
The weakness of women’s land rights also results in an inability to use land as
collateral to obtain access to credit, which is often critical to the timely purchase of
productivity-enhancing inputs such as improved seed varieties and fertilizer. The
absence of credit limits women’s ability to adopt new technology, to hire labor when
it is needed, to grow crops that require large outlays of cash up front, to purchase
their own land where women do have legal rights to land, or to purchase capital
goods. Yet, the evidence indicates that when women are able to overcome these con-
straints they are equally if not more likely than men to be innovators. In Zambia,
a recent study found that wealthier farm households headed by females were more
likely than households headed by males to adopt improved maize varieties.
Agricultural extension agents are a critically important source of information
for women farmers, given that women generally have lower levels of education than
men. Yet in 1988 the United Nations Environment Programme reported that less
than 1 percent of government-employed agricultural advisers in Asia and the Middle
East are women. The corresponding figures for Africa and Latin America are 3.0
percent and 8.5 percent respectively. Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, despite the long
tradition of female farming, male farmers have far greater contact with extension
services. Employing female agricultural extension workers is particularly important
in societies that forbid the interaction of female farmers with male agricultural exten-
sion agents. But employing female agents is not sufficient. They must be trained in
agricultural subjects rather than home economics, so that they can deliver agri-
cultural extension messages effectively.
Women as Gatekeepers
The second pillar of food security is making sure that household members, partic-
ularly the children, receive an adequate share of the food that is potentially avail-
able. Women act as the “gatekeepers” of their households’ food security through the
allocation of their own time and income.
Real income is one of the key determinants of household food consumption.
However, a growing number of studies now suggest that it is not simply the level
of household income but who earns that income that influences food security.
Evidence suggests that men spend a higher proportion of their incremental income
on goods for their personal consumption. By contrast, women are more likely to
purchase goods for their children and for general household consumption.
An increasing body of evidence from Asia, Africa, and Latin America confirms
the positive impact of female control of income on household food expenditure,
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calorie intake, and anthropometric indicators. At similar levels of overall income,
households where women control a larger share of income are more likely to meet
calorie requirements. One of the most careful studies of this issue finds that the pos-
itive effect on the probability that a child will survive in urban Brazil is almost 20
times greater when certain income sources accrue to women rather than men.
Given the positive nutritional outcomes associated with increasing women’s
incomes, the growing percentage of female-headed households is a cause for con-
cern, for recent evidence suggests that women are overrepresented among the poor.
Poverty is a major threat to the food security both of the family and of particular
individuals within the family, and the combination of poverty and gender inequal-
ity is an even greater one. Lower levels of education and other resources can severely
limit earning potential for the growing number of women who are the sole income
earners for their families.
The third pillar of food security—food utilization—means ensuring that the
food consumed contributes to good physical and cognitive development. This
entails the provision of “care,” namely, paying adequate time and attention to meet-
ing the physical, mental, and social needs of growing children and other household
members. Care affects food security in two broad ways: first, through feeding prac-
tices such as breast-feeding and the preparation of nutritious foods for weaned
infants and others in the family, and second, through health and hygiene practices
such as the bathing of children and the washing of hands before food preparation.
These caring behaviors are time-intensive. Given women’s roles in agricultural pro-
duction, domestic production, and reproduction, women in developing countries
are relatively short of time, compared with men. The time constraint is especially
acute for female heads of households.
In addition, in many regions of the world, women spend up to five hours a day
collecting fuelwood and water and up to four hours a day preparing food. This does
not leave much time for child care. Indeed, the rapid pace of urbanization and
increased female participation in the labor force imply even greater demands on
women’s time. Women turn to processed foods and “street foods” to save time.
Development of technology that relieves women’s time burdens in agricultural
production and household maintenance without sacrificing their ability to earn
independent incomes is therefore critical.
Women as Shock Absorbers
During times of economic hardship, it is assumed (often by women themselves) that
women will act to absorb shocks to household welfare by expanding their already
tightly stretched working day. This behavior stems from an undervaluation of
women’s time (by both men and women), due in large part to the invisibility of
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women’s economic contribution inside and outside the home. Even when women
participate in the labor force, it is often assumed that they are secondary income
earners. Yet this additional income is important, and is the only income source for
female heads of households. A less well documented observation is that women may
act as shock absorbers through the liquidation of their own nutritional status.
Studies of the seasonality of maternal and preschooler nutrition status have shown
that in times of food surplus women’s nutrition status returns to normal more
quickly than that of preschoolers, but in the lean season female nutrition status is
depleted more rapidly than that of preschoolers. Policymakers need to establish
safety nets to protect vulnerable groups—the poor, women, and children—from
income shocks.
Conclusions
Women are major contributors to agriculture and play a prime role in ensuring the
food security and nutrition status of their household members. Yet women could
achieve much more in food production, provision, and utilization if agricultural
researchers, plant scientists, extension agents, and policymakers would level the agri-
cultural playing field. Women face an uphill struggle as a result of weak land tenure
rights; exclusion from an active role in seed development and selection; neglect by
agricultural extension services; and barriers to access to complementary inputs such
as fertilizer, improved seeds, and credit. These impediments are likely to result in
forgone economic growth through lower crop yields, delayed adoption of new
technology and plant varieties, and environmental degradation.
Reductions in asymmetries between men and women in access to agricultural
and other resources, the use of women’s expertise in the early evaluation of new tech-
nologies, and the development of technologies that relieve women’s time constraints
are essential if the three pillars of household and national food security are to be
strengthened by the year 2020.
C h a p t e r  3 3
Urban Women
Balancing Work and Childcare
Patrice L. Engle
Urban women now are more likely to work for
income when their children are very young and to stay
in the labor force longer than they previously did.
As the urban population in all developing regions grows over the next 20 years,governments and families will face unique challenges in their efforts toensure the well-being of millions of children. They will have to take into
account changes in women’s roles, in strategies for childcare, and in the means of
obtaining food security. All these changes will have major implications for the
livelihoods of people residing in the new urban megacities.
Extent of Labor-Force Participation
Many studies in developing countries show that women contribute as much or more
than men do to family food security and children’s nutritional status when unpaid
work is included in the estimation. Nowadays more women also work for income
than ever before. Globally women’s rates of participation in the labor force were 54
percent in 1950 and 66 percent in 1990 and are projected to reach almost 70 per-
cent in 2010. Urban women now are more likely to work for income when their
children are very young and to stay in the labor force longer than they previously
did. Worldwide they enter the labor market at high rates in their 20s, increase labor
force participation through their 30s and 40s, and leave work only after age 50.
The percent of households that rely on women’s financial contribution for food
security is also increasing. Women provide the main source of income in more than
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20 percent of households in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and most of Asia.
Even in dual-parent families, women are contributing a higher percentage of income
than before.
The forces that have increased women’s labor force participation—urbaniza-
tion and globalization—have pulled women into jobs that are of lower quality (low-
skilled jobs with no security or protection), part-time, home-based, or all of these.
More than 80 percent of women work in largely gender-segregated occupations, and
women on average still earn less than 70 percent of what men earn. Since women
are in lower-skilled and temporary jobs, they are more likely to lose jobs than are
men during financial crises. Women also still lag far behind men in having the skills
to handle new technologies, making them less likely to get higher-paying jobs that
require these skills.
Consequences of Labor-Force Participation
Urban residence can have mixed consequences for women and children. On the one
hand, women workers in an urban economy can potentially earn a higher percent-
age of the family income. Since percentage of income earned has been shown to relate
to decisionmaking in the family, these women might be less tied to traditional restric-
tions, such as food taboos during pregnancy. According to a recent United Nations
study, urban women also have fewer children, and they and their children are much
more likely to be literate than rural women and theirs. Services such as family plan-
ning may be more available in urban areas, and women’s increased independence may
lead to higher self-esteem and recognition of rights.
On the other hand, urban women who work may be more vulnerable to vio-
lence and harassment at the workplace than rural women and may be forced into
informal work such as street vending that offers few protections. Many women with
little income must raise their children surrounded by the inadequate infrastructure
of urban slums. For new migrants to urban squatter settlements, support systems
may be weak, leading to stress and family dysfunction. Poor or sporadic job oppor-
tunities for men, as well as the need to obtain food with cash, may result in a decline
in male support for families and less food security.
Women are now much more likely to work when their children are under
12 months old, a period of time when children have the greatest need of inten-
sive care for good growth and development. Workers in the formal sector, for
example, are limited to 12 weeks of maternity leave in most countries, even
though about 6 months of exclusive breastfeeding is recommended. For women
working in the informal sector, any leave at all is taken at the risk of losing
income and job opportunities.
Although in some countries working mothers breastfeed less, work itself does
not necessarily limit breastfeeding, nor does mothers’ work seem to affect children’s
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nutritional status in some developing countries. In two studies in urban Latin
America, income earned by the mother when the child was at least 12 months of
age was positively associated with the child’s nutritional status when income levels
were controlled for. Women’s income had a stronger positive association with chil-
dren’s nutrition than men’s income. However, when women did not have the power
to decide how to spend their income on children, wage work led to negative effects
on children’s nutritional status.
Adequate childcare is essential for working mothers. In urban Ghana, women’s
strategies for providing childcare were more important for children’s nutritional sta-
tus than family income. In urban Guatemala, maternal employment did not increase
children’s chances of malnutrition unless they were cared for by a preteen. Work at
home, however, often considered to be a positive option, has been associated with
poorer nutritional status for children if demands of the work are intense and time-
bound (for example, piecework).
In sum, when mothers are poor—with time-intensive, low-paid, and inflexi-
ble work; no control over earnings; and no good alternative caregivers—infants are
at risk of poor growth. Some women who work during their child’s first year of life
have no other sources of support. For these women, work is a survival strategy; the
alternative is starvation for mother and child.
Current Limits of Childcare
Day care in the urban slums of developing countries, particularly for children under
three, is usually woefully inadequate in coverage and quality. The most common
day-care centers are run by governments or private voluntary organizations. These
centers are likely to be attended only by children over three and have extremely lim-
ited coverage because of the large investment needed in buildings and equipment.
Yet childcare is clearly necessary. United Nations data from 23 countries in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America show that a majority of working women with children
under five work away from home.
Some innovative approaches to childcare include family day-care homes, in
which one mother watches five or six neighbor children in her home; or mobile
crèches, which involve childcare facilities set up near the employment site of work-
ing mothers. In lieu of day-care options, families use older female siblings (much
more than male siblings), thus keeping girls out of school; other family members;
and neighbors. There are cases of families resorting to drastic strategies, such as giv-
ing children a dose of opium so that they will sleep during the day.
Improving Working Mothers’ Ability to Provide Care
More women will work for earnings in the next 20 years, particularly when their chil-
dren are young. Although the smaller family sizes associated with urbanization
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should decrease the time needed for childcare, this may turn out not to be the case.
Many urban parents will want their children to be schooled in order to attain the best
opportunities for a successful life. The consequent focus on developing children’s lan-
guage and social skills may increase rather than decrease time commitments for care.
Three factors have been shown to reduce the negative effects of maternal work
on young children: helping mothers not to work when their children are very
young, providing an adequate wage rate and flexible working hours, and providing
reasonable alternative childcare. Ensuring these will be necessary for the health and
well-being of an urbanizing society.
Policies are also needed that provide women protection against returning to
work too soon after giving birth. Maternity protection legislation is woefully in-
adequate. Whereas 192 countries have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, only 38 have ratified the International Labour Organization’s 1952 Maternity
Protection Convention. Even if signed, the latter’s provisions apply to only a small
proportion of the population.
Cultural and social attitudes also need to reflect women’s equality in the work
force. For example, although girls are attending school at much higher rates and are
performing as well as or better than boys in many countries, these gains have not been
translated into correspondingly equal employment and training opportunities, accord-
ing to the International Labour Organization’s 1999 World Employment Report.
Policies can go a long way toward improving women’s income by, for example,
implementing gender-blind minimum wage rates, organizing informal or self-
employed labor, and supporting urban development projects. To improve outcomes
for children, governments can legalize squatter settlements after a period of time to allow
people living in them access to services, and they can invest in health, day care, and infra-
structure. Training women for skilled jobs is also a key component for raising incomes
and thereby improving child health. Outside pressures, such as the Beijing Con-
ference on Women, and efforts of United Nations and bilateral agencies, can help, but
sustained efforts are needed within countries to implement and monitor good policies.
Caring adequately for urban children will be essential for their nutritional status
and the health of urban society. Providing alternative childcare means that women’s
work in childcare, which was traditionally unpaid, must now be paid for. Model urban
programs, such as Child Friendly Cities Programs, do invest in childcare for working
women, but these efforts are not enough. Innovative approaches are needed to pro-
vide good childcare, especially for the youngest age group. These approaches must rely
on partnerships between employers, workers, and government to provide adequate
care. Innovative strategies could include support for parental childcare cooperatives,
social insurance to enable mothers or fathers to stay home after the birth of a child,
childcare linked to schools, and even the involvement of elders in childcare. Good
childcare is not cheap, but the investments made at this age are perhaps the most
important for the next generation and for working women themselves.
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The Fruits of Girls’ Education
Reported by Heidi Fritschel and Uday Mohan
“Educating girls yields a higher rate of return than any
other investment available in the developing world.”
—Lawrence Summers
For millions of women around the globe, lack of education is a handicap forwhich they pay a heavy price. Some 565 million women are illiterate, main-ly in poor rural areas. These women cannot sign their names, decipher simple
instructions, or fill out an application form. Their lack of education limits their abil-
ity to earn money and get credit, to participate in decisionmaking in their families
and communities, to delay childbearing, and to offer their children the best life
chances. The failure to educate these women when they were girls is the result of a
range of factors, including the need for girls’ labor in the home, attitudes that
devalue education for girls, fears about girls’ security outside the home, and lack of
resources to pay for education.
Research has shown that educating girls offers a multitude of benefits for girls
themselves, their current and future families, and their societies. Many of the ben-
efits of educating girls are the same as those of educating boys: education helps cre-
ate more productive workers and thereby improves income equity. It helps people
participate more meaningfully in political and civic life. It improves overall economic
growth and leads to greater care of the environment. And it helps people adapt to
the demands of globalization and to shape it. Other benefits are particular to edu-
cating girls, such as the improvements in quality of life both for educated girls and
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for their future children. In 1992, Lawrence Summers, then vice president and chief
economist of the World Bank and now U.S. treasury secretary, said, “When one
takes into account all its benefits, educating girls yields a higher rate of return than
any other investment available in the developing world.”
The barriers to girls’ education, however, are complex and persistent. Although
national governments, local communities, and development organizations around
the world now recognize the need to educate girls and are implementing programs
for doing so, 73 million girls of primary school age are still without access to basic
education, according to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). But if the
world is to make a sizable dent in poverty and hunger in the next two decades, get-
ting these girls into school will clearly have to be part of the equation.
Education for a Better Life
Evidence is irrefutable that education improves girls’ own lives now and in the future.
“Women understand this quite acutely themselves,” says Michelle Adato, a research
fellow at IFPRI who has examined the effects of a Mexican antipoverty program that
gives cash and in-kind benefits to poor rural mothers whose children attend school
and visit health clinics. “Rural Mexican women we interviewed emphasized the
importance of girls’ education. Most of them stated that it led to some or better
employment. Others simply said that education led to a better life. And still others
told us that it enabled girls and women to improve their standing in relationships,
that it allowed them to better defend themselves and to take care of themselves and
their children if their marriage did not work out.” Here, for example, is how one
rural woman put it: “In my case I didn’t study, so I didn’t know anything. If I had
a daughter, I would say it would be better for her to study so she wouldn’t be the
same as I was.”
One of the strongest nonmarket effects of girls’ education—one that nonethe-
less reverberates across households and national economies—is the reduction in fer-
tility. Better-educated females marry later and have fewer unwanted pregnancies.
And their higher earning power may lower the number of children parents want as
income earners. Moreover, educated females reduce the infant mortality rate through
better childcare, thus reducing the number of replacement babies they have. A 1992
World Bank paper showed that one additional year of female education reduces fer-
tility by 5 to 10 percent.
“Educating boys does not have noticeable effects on fertility rates,” says Beryl
Levinger, senior director for global learning at the U.S.-based Education
Development Center and distinguished professor at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies. “Schooling for girls, on the other hand, is a potent popula-
tion intervention. And these girls will pass down what they learn to their children.
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The policy some countries have of expelling pregnant girls from school is extremely
counterproductive.”
A dramatic example of reduced fertility is provided by a girls’ education
project in rural Zimbabwe run by the Cambridge Female Education Trust
(CamFed). Ann Cotton, CamFed’s executive director, says that only 5 percent of
the 387 girls who graduated from secondary school with the help of CamFed
became mothers between the ages of 18 and 24. This represents a sharp turn away
from the national average of 47 percent of girls aged 20–24, many of them with
little education, who gave birth by the time they turned 20. “The social safety net
we provide, in conjunction with the community committees that we’ve helped
set up, provide the vital support a girl may need to complete the education she
desires,” says Cotton. “The value of education is so strong that girls do want to
continue it if they are given the chance. Moreover, they want to secure their eco-
nomic situation before starting a family,” she adds. There are now 79 growing
businesses run by young women in the CamFed project areas in rural Zimbabwe,
where there were none before.
The income-earning benefits that girls’ education confers can hardly be in dis-
pute. But its advantages relative to other means of acquiring wealth are less well
known. A study by Agnes Quisumbing, a senior IFPRI research fellow, and two col-
leagues from Tokyo Metropolitan University shows that of the two key means of
transferring wealth to the next generation in the Philippines—bequeathing land and
investing in schooling—the latter carries far larger effects. “We found that sons
inherit 0.19 hectare of land more than daughters, on average, while daughters stay
in school for 1.5 years more than sons. Because of higher rates of return to educa-
tion in nonfarm jobs, the average additional lifetime income of daughters is 10 to
100 percent higher than the additional lifetime income of sons. For other countries
this finding implies that as jobs and wages for women increase, parents may close
the education gap and invest more in their daughters’ education.”
According to a recent World Bank study by David Dollar and Roberta Gatti,
closing the education gap would help not only women, their families, and their com-
munities, but also the economies of the countries they live in. They report that “girls’
access to education creates a better environment for economic growth and that the
result is particularly strong for middle-income countries. Thus, societies that have
a preference for not investing in girls pay a price for it in terms of slower growth
and reduced income.”
Girls’ education also has effects that cannot be quantified but are powerful
nonetheless. It can transform consciousness, not only of women but of men as well.
Peggy McIntosh, associate director of the Center for Research on Women at
Wellesley College, says that as girls get educated they begin to see themselves as deci-
sionmakers beyond the household and as carriers and makers of knowledge. A
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whole new political, social, and economic narrative comes into view. “And boys,”
says McIntosh, “are better for it because they begin to take girls seriously.”
A Boon for the Next Generation
Besides improving the lives of girls themselves, education makes them better care-
givers when they have children of their own. A forthcoming 2020 Vision discus-
sion paper by IFPRI researchers Lisa Smith and Lawrence Haddad examines the
factors contributing to reduced child malnutrition in 63 developing countries.
They found that female education was by far the most important reason why child
malnutrition decreased by 15.5 percent between 1970 and 1995—much more
important than, for instance, improved health environments or food availability.
“The fundamental importance of female education for raising children’s nutri-
tion levels is beyond question,” says Haddad. “Partly because a mother uses her new
knowledge and the additional income she earns from it to improve diets, care, and
sanitation for her children, female education is probably the strongest instrument
we have for reducing infant mortality and child malnutrition.” Indeed, the 1993
World Development Report notes that a 10 percent increase in female literacy
reduced child mortality by the same amount in 13 African countries between 1975
and 1985. An increase in male literacy had little effect. The report also notes that
infant mortality drops with more maternal schooling. In the late 1980s in Peru, for
example, 4–6 years of maternal schooling reduced the risk of infant mortality by
almost 40 percent; 7 or more years reduced it by 75 percent.
Growing evidence shows that girls’ education also leads to better education for
their future children. “Children of educated mothers,” says John Hoddinott, an
IFPRI research fellow, “do better in school because children are healthier, mothers can
help them with their homework, educated mothers can be role models, especially for
girls, and mothers may be less intimidated by their children’s teachers, so if a teacher
says, ‘Your child won’t amount to anything,’ the mother is more likely to argue back.”
A recent study by Jere Behrman, professor of economics at the University of
Pennsylvania, and his colleagues shows that children of literate mothers in rural India
spent 1.8 hours more a day on their studies than similar children of illiterate moth-
ers. “The data also show,” says Behrman, “that in rural India a woman’s dowry is almost
three-fourths lower if she has a few years of education, probably because her prospec-
tive husband thinks she will participate more in the education of their children.”
What Keeps Girls out of School?
Evidence on the benefits of girls’ education is overwhelming. So why are so many
girls still not being educated? The obstacles are many and complex. Some are com-
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mon to many different geographic areas, while others are specific to a particular
country or village.
Parents often perceive that education is not as necessary for their daughters as
for their sons. According to Sudhanshu Handa, an IFPRI research fellow who has
studied education issues in Mozambique and Mexico, “Parents may say, ‘Girls are
going to stay home, so there’s no point in educating them.’”
The positive link between mothers’ education and children’s health and well-
being may not be obvious to parents. May Rihani of the Academy for Educational
Development, who is now in charge of AED’s girls’ education programs in Pakistan,
India, Guinea, and Mali, recalls a community meeting in Mali where she was
explaining that educated mothers tend to have healthier children. She was soon chal-
lenged by a man from the village. “He said, outraged, ‘Do you mean to say that un-
educated women love their children less than educated women?’ ‘You’re right,’ I said,
‘it has nothing to do with love. It has to do with mothers’ ability to read and write.
Educated mothers can, for example, read instructions on medications.’ He said, ‘If
what you are saying is right, we may have to think about that.’”
A perceived lack of job opportunities for women may also keep parents from
sending their daughters to school. But the logic about keeping girls out of school
can become a vicious circle: girls do not get educated because there is a lack of wage-
earning opportunities for women, and women who are uneducated cannot get wage-
earning employment. Parents may also perceive that their sons will be the ones to
support them in their old age and that any economic gain that results from edu-
cating a girl will go to her future husband and his family.
Handa’s work shows that in rural areas in particular, lack of education among
parents is a sizable obstacle, for parents’ decisions about whether to educate girls
often depends on their own education levels. “In Mozambique, the difference in
boys’ and girls’ enrollment rates is much less in urban areas—something that is true
for most countries. That’s because in urban areas parental education is higher, and
there are more job opportunities for women and girls.”
Security is another big concern of parents. In rural areas, schools can be far from
home. “If a girl has to walk a long way to school, parents don’t want that for security rea-
sons,” says Rihani. “Parents don’t want girls walking home in seasons when school con-
tinues until dark. If these conditions are not dealt with, girls’ education won’t happen.”
Inadequate school facilities can also keep girls away. “Some school facilities can
actually make it difficult for girls to go to school,” says Levinger. “For example, when
a girl reaches puberty and there are no sanitary facilities, that becomes a problem.
Also, the presence or absence of facilities to care for siblings can affect girls’ atten-
dance, because they often take care of their siblings.”
In Pakistan, says Rihani, it is taboo for male teachers to instruct girls, but female
teachers are hard to find. “For girls, mingling with men and boys is unacceptable,”
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she explains. “There are government schools for girls and these have women teach-
ers, but they are too few to serve everyone. And if a school is in a remote area, it is
hard to get female teachers because there isn’t a big pool of educated women.” To
overcome this situation, leaders of a project in Pakistan decided to recruit less-
educated women to teach in remote rural schools. “One of our biggest successes,”
says Rihani, “was convincing the government that the criteria for teachers in this
project could be different and that attendance and quality wouldn’t suffer.”
The cost of educating girls is a deterrent to many families. Even when school-
ing itself is free, other costs may arise. In Pakistan, government books are free, but
families may have to travel some distance to pick them up, thereby incurring trans-
portation costs, explains Rihani. In other areas, the loss of the girl’s time is count-
ed as a significant cost. Families often rely on girls to help care for younger siblings
and perform other household chores and even, in some cases, to earn income. They
simply cannot afford to lose the household labor that girls represent.
Chipping Away at the Barriers
Although the barriers to girls’ education may be many and complex, they are not
insurmountable. The cultural and economic barriers will probably continue to
weaken as economies grow, priorities get reordered, and cultures come under pres-
sure to adapt to new realities. Knowledge about the benefits of educating girls may
also help transform attitudes and priorities.
Countries worldwide are overcoming education barriers for girls by develop-
ing innovative programs that lower costs, offer stipends, involve communities in
identifying problems, and building infrastructure. Mexico’s PROGRESA program,
for instance, gives families higher cash payments for girls in secondary school than
for boys.
To get girls into school, Malawi has eliminated school tuition fees for girls (and
later for boys as well), and relaxed the requirement that girls wear uniforms to school.
And to spread the message about the importance of girls’ education, they borrowed
a technique first used in Latin America: “social mobilization” through theater per-
formances designed to initiate dialog at the village level. University drama and
music students travel to Malawian communities, where they listen to villagers and
then perform skits on the role of girls in the community. The skits address fears and
expectations regarding girls’ schooling and stimulate discussion on how to help girls
become educated.
Surveys show that pregnancy is the most common reason girls drop out of
school in Malawi. So in 1993 the country changed its policies to allow girls to
resume their education after giving birth. According to John Hatch of the U.S.
Agency for International Development’s Girls’ and Women’s Education Project,
THE FRUITS OF GIRLS’ EDUCATION 221
“Girls return to school after one year. The girls do go to a different school from the
one they attended before, and they must show that the child is being well cared for.”
Ironically, successful campaigns to increase enrollment can exacerbate another
problem faced by many developing countries: overcrowded schools. Colombia is
confronting the problem by offering poor children vouchers they can use to enroll
in private schools. “The government could build more public schools,” says
Elizabeth King, principal economist at the World Bank, “but there’s already excess
capacity in the private schools, so they’re using that capacity.” The vouchers have
had a greater effect on girls’ enrollment than on boys’, she points out, because “girls’
enrollment is more sensitive to price.”
In Guinea, a national effort to raise girls’ enrollment helps local communities
identify constraints and seek solutions. In one remote northern village, for exam-
ple, girls who completed primary school had to go to a school in Mali to continue
their studies, according to Aly Badara Doukoure, the girls’ education administra-
tor of Guinea. “This was very difficult for them. In 1998 the community identi-
fied having a school nearby as a solution, and now, in 1999, they have already built
a three-classroom school for their girls,” says Doukoure. Similarly, another village
identified the expense and inconvenience of procuring school materials as a barri-
er to girls’ education. “So they set up a community store where all families can buy
school materials at a reduced price,” Doukoure says.
Bangladesh has also made a massive push to educate more girls. Part of the gov-
ernment’s strategy is to offer girls a stipend for secondary schooling, in the hope that
this will lead to increased enrollment in primary school. Bangladesh also benefits
from a well-known partnership with the Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee. BRAC, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), runs some 30,000
primary schools serving about 900,000 students. The BRAC schools aim to have
each school made up of at least 75 percent girls. These schools, which have longer
school years and lower student-teacher ratios than public schools, attract many girls
who have either dropped out of public school or never attended.
Government Cannot Go It Alone
In most developing countries, the task of getting girls into school, especially poor
girls in rural areas, is simply too large for government to accomplish alone.
Partnerships between governments, communities, donors, businesses, and NGOs
appear to be the solution. Support from these partners for girls’ education may be
financial, in-kind services, or just leadership, expertise, and time. “In Morocco,
NGOs successfully petitioned for funds to make improvements to schools that com-
munities had identified as necessary to attract and keep girls, and local business-
people have helped with the improvements,” says Hatch. “Peru and Guatemala have
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had good interest and support from business groups. In some communities, reli-
gious organizations have set up babysitting co-ops for younger siblings of students
so that girls can attend school. In Guinea parent groups monitor attendance of both
students and teachers.”
“We’re trying to make a revolutionary change in how people think about edu-
cation,” says Rihani. “We want to change the idea that education can be offered as
a service only if the government offers it. The private sector can also do it. The com-
munity can do it. They can build a school and pay a teacher.”
Obviously, the moral imperative that sees education as a critical individual and
public good extends to everyone, including girls. Besides this moral rationale, the
economic and social benefits offer convincing arguments in favor of stepping up
efforts to educate all girls. Few development investments can match the overwhelm-
ing evidence on the returns to girls’ education, yet too few resources are still being
devoted to this effort. In a recent report called Education Now, Oxfam calculates
the additional cost of universal primary education worldwide as $8 billion per year
for 10 years—the equivalent of four days’ worth of global military spending. By
paying this relatively small price now, governments, communities, and their part-
ners can lay the groundwork for rewards that will extend into the future for many
generations.
What Will Globalization Bring?
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Globalization, Trade Reform,
and the Developing Countries
Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla and Sherman Robinson
Globalization, particularly trade expansion and
capital flows, offers new opportunities but also 
raises new challenges for developing countries.
Since the first round of trade negotiations under the General Agreement onTariffs and Trade (GATT) after World War II, multilateral trade liberaliza-tion has progressed at a fairly steady pace, mostly among the developed coun-
tries. But the Millennium Round of trade negotiations, if it proceeds, will look
somewhat different. Of the 134 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in February 1999, some 70 percent are developing countries. This growing devel-
oping-country involvement in the WTO, as well as in regional trading blocs and
other trade arrangements, represents a distinct break with the past.
While there were relatively few developing-country members of GATT, they
did take a more active role in the Uruguay Round of negotiations (which were com-
pleted in 1993) than they had in earlier rounds. This round saw some substantive
progress toward adoption of issues of importance to developing countries. One such
area was agriculture, where the Uruguay Round established a new framework for
international trade rules encompassing export subsidies, domestic subsidies, and
market access, while related agreements covered other issues of importance for agri-
cultural production such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
Still, recognizing that the new rules agreed upon were only the beginning of
the reform process, the participating countries decided to resume the negotiations
in the year 1999. Therefore, with or without a Millennium Round, agricultural
negotiations will recommence sometime at the end of this year.
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This essay looks at the evolution of agricultural markets leading to the Uruguay
Round negotiations and places them in the context of an increasingly global world
economy, focusing on developing countries. The essay then considers, also from the
perspective of the developing countries, several issues that are likely to arise in the
coming negotiations.
Moving toward a Global Economy
The Forces of Globalization
Globalization refers mainly to the recent trends toward stronger economic, politi-
cal, and cultural ties among many of the world’s nations. One of its most impor-
tant manifestations is the expansion of international trade, but it also encompasses
increased international flows of capital, technology, and labor around the world,
along with tendencies toward universal application of some institutional, legal,
political, and cultural practices.
Within that context, some developing countries have had a strong growth per-
formance, while others have fallen behind, both relative to other countries and, in
some unfortunate cases, in absolute terms. Increased participation by countries in
global markets has also been uneven. The expansion of trade has been driven by a
number of forces that have affected developed and developing countries in differ-
ent ways. An important factor has been the progressive dismantling of trade barri-
ers for goods and services between countries through both successive rounds of
GATT negotiations and unilateral liberalization in many countries.
A separate influence has been rapid technological change. Investment in trans-
portation, communications, and information processing systems has skyrocketed.
Major changes in production technology in many sectors, combined with improved
transportation and communications, have allowed producers to separate stages of
the production process geographically, sending raw materials far away from where
they are grown to be processed and packaged. Producers can also pursue economies
of scale and specialize by making large quantities of a single item to be sold through-
out the world. Within manufacturing, the process of specialization has accelerated
trade in the components that go into finished products. While these trends have
been most evident in developed countries, a number of semi-industrial countries
have participated and benefited from growth based on increased trade in manufac-
tures. The early pioneers, such as the Asian “gang of four” (Hong Kong, Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan), achieved spectacular growth during the 1970s and 1980s.
Following the lead of the Asian countries, many developing countries have shifted
from inward-looking to outward-oriented development strategies, deepening their
links to world markets.
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Yet globalization involves more than just commodity markets. Increasing inte-
gration of world capital markets has greatly expanded international flows of both
short-term and long-term private financial capital, with important effects on invest-
ment and growth. However, the poorest countries, with undeveloped capital mar-
kets and high risk premiums, have largely been left out of this growing international
financial market. Also, some countries, as a consequence of global economic devel-
opments beyond their control as well as inappropriate domestic policies, have faced
damaging episodes of macroeconomic instability, requiring “structural adjustment”
to restore growth and stability.
Globalization of world financial markets has also led to problems. The recent
Asian financial crisis revealed weaknesses in both the international financial system
and the financial systems of a number of developing countries. Many developing
countries are simply unable to absorb or efficiently manage the kinds of large short-
term capital flows that have become more common.
Globalization, particularly trade expansion and capital flows, offers new oppor-
tunities but also raises new challenges for developing countries. As they approach
the Millennium Round, these countries should evaluate their current development
strategies and domestic macroeconomic policies, as well as their stance at the nego-
tiating table, in order to gain the greatest benefits from the new global economy.
Changing Agricultural Markets
In addition to the obvious influences of population, weather, and wars, growth in
world agricultural production and trade in the postwar era has been affected by
changes in three main areas: macroeconomic policies, trade and agricultural poli-
cies, and technology.
At the macroeconomic level, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies during
the 1960s and 1970s led to faster economic growth, but also eventually to higher
inflation and negative real interest rates, which hurt growth. The macroeconomic
environment changed radically during the 1980s, when tight monetary policies low-
ered real growth and inflation rates and turned real interest rates strongly positive
for the entire decade. By the second half of the 1990s, inflation had fallen to levels
similar to the 1960s. What has been labeled the “rise and fall of inflation” had an
important impact on agriculture. In the 1970s high real commodity prices com-
bined with negative real interest rates led farmers to expand their productive capac-
ity, but prices fell steeply in the 1980s when macroeconomic policies were changed
and farmers faced weak demand for their expanded supplies of agricultural goods.
Second, trade and agricultural policies in different countries and regions have
gone through dramatic changes in recent decades. The Soviet Union went from
being an important component of world demand in agricultural markets since the
mid-1970s to collapsing as a political entity by the end of the 1980s. China sizably
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increased its agricultural production thanks to sweeping policy changes instituted
at the end of the 1970s that emphasized decentralization and price incentives for
farmers. The European Union (EU), driven by large production and export sub-
sidies under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), moved from being a net
importer of grains, meat, and sugar in the 1960s and 1970s to becoming a net
exporter. Also, the United States pursued farm support policies that led to large sur-
pluses in production and increased exports, some of which were sold with subsidies
in world markets starting in the mid-1980s.
A variety of developing and emerging economies have shifted from inward-
oriented development strategies in the 1960s and 1970s to greater reliance on free
markets and international trade, particularly since the late 1980s. These new strate-
gies have led policymakers to undertake major domestic agricultural policy reforms.
In the past, IFPRI research found that a combination of overvalued exchange rates,
protection of domestic industry, and explicit taxation of agricultural exports led to
economic biases against agriculture, especially in very poor countries in Africa.
After the policy changes of recent years, research at IFPRI and elsewhere suggests
that such reforms have greatly reduced and in some cases eliminated the bias against
agriculture in many developing countries. Although further improvements in
domestic trade and macroeconomic policies are still needed in various developing
countries, the reforms already undertaken provide a better framework for traditional
investment policies and projects in the agricultural sector, focusing on human cap-
ital, land, water, property rights, management, technology, and infrastructure. These
agricultural policies had been largely abandoned during the period when redirec-
tion of the overall macroeconomic and trade framework appeared central.
Third, changes in agricultural technology, such as mechanization, use of chem-
icals, and improvements in biology, have been continuous, as the Green Revolution
emerged and spread in developing countries. The development of new seeds and
more recent advances in genetic engineering have already provided dramatic
productivity increases and will likely be the basis for continuing growth in the next
century. Likewise, existing technologies disseminated from the developed to the
developing countries provide a major impetus to their agricultural growth and are
expected to do so for some time.
All in all, these macroeconomic, trade, and technological factors contributed
to a phase of high growth in world agricultural production during the 1970s and
later to a period of weaker demand and growth in the 1980s and early 1990s. By
the end of the 1980s, the high and rising fiscal costs of the EU and U.S. policies
were becoming politically unsupportable. These policies also led to instability in
world markets, causing concern among other agricultural producers. For a few
developed countries with large agricultural sectors (such as Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand) and for a few developing countries (such as Argentina, Brazil, and
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Thailand), agricultural exports have always been extremely important. The major
agricultural exporters outside the European Union and the United States organized
themselves into a negotiating bloc called the Cairns Group, which effectively rep-
resented their interests in the Uruguay Round negotiations. After much effort, the
combination of concerns about distorted world markets, fiscal constraints in the
United States and the European Union, and diplomatic pressure from agricultural
exporting countries, led to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions in 1994. The result was probably less reform than was hoped for when the nego-
tiations began but more than was expected by the end. There is still much to do.
Agricultural producers in all countries now operate in less distorted domestic
and international environments where they are subject to more market discipline
and where international trade plays a greater role. Policymakers must adjust their
domestic policies to the new conditions and have a stake in shaping that environ-
ment through trade negotiations. This is particularly important for developing
countries that have already made significant domestic policy changes but still have
to contend with developed-country agricultural policies that have negative welfare
effects for the whole world.
Getting Ready for New Trade Negotiations
Bringing agricultural policies under international scrutiny was an important accom-
plishment of the Uruguay Round, but the reform process has not finished.
Agricultural negotiations, alone or as part of a new round, will resume during
1999.
The world economy and the trade policy environment have changed substan-
tially since the completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The European
Union is expanding its membership and is considering further reforms to its
Common Agricultural Policy to accommodate new members. The North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Southern Cone Common Market (MER-
COSUR) are up and running, and regional institutions such as the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), which were embryonic at the time of the Uruguay Round, have become
more prominent. Subregional trade agreements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America
are expanding and consolidating.
New problems have also appeared. Asia, the largest source of net demand for
world agricultural products, has seen income and demand fall, as the countries cut
their trade deficits in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Partly resulting from that
crisis, the U.S. trade deficit has already started to increase dramatically, leading to
renewed protectionist pressures. Low world agricultural prices and fiscal surpluses
have led to increased demands to abandon the market-oriented reforms of the
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1995 Farm Bill. President Clinton has yet to secure “fast-track” negotiating author-
ity, considered necessary for serious trade negotiations. In Europe recent changes in
agricultural policy do not appear enough to restrain growing agricultural surpluses
that hurt agricultural producers in other countries.
The international financial crisis points to the complexity of international
financial transactions and could pose a long-run threat to greater market openness.
Therefore, coordinating macroeconomic policies and designing more resilient inter-
national financial architecture may be at least as important as WTO negotiations
for expanding international trade.
Completing the Unfinished Agenda of the Uruguay Round
While many developing countries have significantly reduced distortionary domes-
tic agricultural policies, the benefits these countries and the world can enjoy are
thwarted by the subsidies of developed countries. In future negotiations developing
countries should seek to eliminate developed-country export subsidies, strengthen
surveillance of state trading enterprises, and establish an integrated framework for
food aid and export credits. As for domestic subsidies, developing countries should
seek further limits on developed countries’ trade-distorting payments to farmers.
Least developed and developing countries are allowed “special and differential”
treatment on these issues, which is desirable if they use their flexibility wisely,
smoothing rather than fighting needed adjustment and structural change.
If the developing countries are to succeed in diversifying their agricultural sec-
tors, they must have expanded access to markets in developed countries. The devel-
oped countries must increase the volume of imports allowed under the current
regime of tariffs and quotas, make the administration of tariffs and quotas more
transparent and equitable, further reduce high tariffs on some key products, and
complete the process of tariffication where exemptions were granted. Also, elimi-
nating or at least reducing tariff escalation in nonagricultural products is important
for developing countries. Rising tariffs undermine the production and export of
processed goods that use agricultural inputs.
Considering the Needs of the Most Vulnerable
Upon completion of the Uruguay Round, participating trade ministers agreed on
a declaration recognizing the special concerns of the least-developed and net-food-
importing countries. These concerns include the preservation of adequate food aid,
the provision of technical assistance and financial support to develop agriculture in
those countries, and the expansion of financial facilities to help with structural
adjustment and short-term difficulties in financing food imports. If prices in world
markets become more volatile or if agricultural policies in the developed countries
are not further reformed, these poorer countries may lose secure access to food sup-
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plies at reasonable prices. Because world grain stocks have been declining as a share
of consumption, officials must monitor volatility in agricultural prices carefully.
Negotiating countries should also work on improving mechanisms to give early
warning of potential food shortages, lowering food transportation and storage costs,
and providing better-targeted food aid programs and financial facilities for
emergencies.
The impact of changes in trade and agricultural policy on poorer consumers
and producers is a matter of debate. Certainly the goals of development and pov-
erty alleviation will not be served by trade-distorting interventions that operate as
taxes on food consumers (with the greater burden falling on the poor) or by subsi-
dies that allocate scarce fiscal revenues to wasteful programs. Under the agreements
reached in the Uruguay Round, unfair competition that hurts poor farmers, such
as subsidized (or dumped) agricultural exports, are being disciplined. At the same
time, the agreement allows developing countries to continue most agricultural and
social policies linked to poverty alleviation and agricultural development.
Other Trade-Related Issues
Genetically modified agricultural products present a special challenge. The public
may block the development of important new technologies to feed the world in
coming decades if policymakers do not handle the issues surrounding genetically
altered food sensitively, particularly through rigorous analysis of the risks to human
health and biodiversity.
Debates over links between trade, labor, and the environment will continue to
require scrutiny of the different claims regarding the impact of low wages and envi-
ronmental standards on agricultural trade.
New WTO Members
Although the issue of WTO accession of new members is not part of the upcom-
ing agricultural negotiations—those discussions proceed on different tracks—the
way it is handled can have important consequences for world agricultural markets.
Particularly important is China, the world’s largest agricultural producer, repre-
senting about 20 percent of world production. The list of eventual members of
WTO also includes countries such as Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, and Viet Nam, all
important players on both the supply and demand sides of world agricultural
markets.
The Political Economy of Trade Negotiations
During the Uruguay Round agriculture was part of a wider negotiation that allowed
negotiators to consider trade-offs between agricultural and nonagricultural interest
groups within countries. The United States and the European Union were under
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pressure to reduce the fiscal cost of agricultural support; world agricultural markets
were badly distorted; and the U.S.-EU subsidy war was disrupting world markets.
Now negotiators face different issues. The fiscal position of the United States has
improved significantly, and the European Union has reduced its fiscal deficits,
although the cost of EU support for agriculture remains high. Some of the distor-
tions in world agricultural markets have been reduced, and export subsidies for sev-
eral products have declined below the levels required by the Uruguay Round
agreement. Also, if the negotiations on agriculture are conducted apart from other
issues, the leverage of countries interested in further reforms will be reduced. In any
case, as in the past, the new WTO agricultural negotiations may well be defined by
the pace and shape of the reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, currently
under discussion.
The Role of Developing Countries in New Trade Talks
Results from the IMPACT global projection model developed at IFPRI show that
past trends in agricultural growth will continue into the next century, with world
trade in agricultural goods becoming more important. The projections also indi-
cate that countries that pursue comparative advantage will benefit from increasing
specialization in agricultural production. In that context, developing countries, as
small players in the global arena, should be active participants in designing and
implementing international rules that limit larger countries’ ability to resort to
power politics and unilateral action. Developing countries may overcome some of
the constraints to participation by resorting to collective action. For instance, they
could consider creating alliances based on shared policy concerns, like the Cairns
Group. This approach could reduce the fixed costs of negotiations by spreading them
over groups of countries, allow better use of scarce technical expertise, and improve
their bargaining position.
It is clearly in the interest of the developing countries to be active and informed
participants in general trade and financial talks, as well as in agricultural trade
negotiations. IFPRI’s research on global trade and macroeconomic issues will con-
tinue to produce data and policy analysis to try to clarify the different commercial
and financial scenarios and analyze their likely effects on developing nations, look-
ing particularly at low-income countries and the poorer producers and consumers
within them. In the final analysis, the developing countries as a group have much
to gain from continued progress toward a transparent, rule-based trading system in
agriculture as an integral part of a more solid and balanced world trade and finan-
cial system.
C h a p t e r  3 6
Globalization and Nutrition
Julie Babinard and Per Pinstrup-Andersen
Despite its potential for improving nutrition, several
aspects of the globalization process may worsen 
human nutrition in developing countries.
Of the world’s 6 billion people, about 800 million do not have enough to eat.Globally, nutrition has improved in recent decades, but malnutrition—including deficiencies in micronutrients—is still widespread. Hunger, com-
bined with low intake of important micronutrients such as vitamin A, zinc, iron,
and iodine, contributes to low birth weight, infections, and increased risk of death.
In developing countries, close to 24 percent of all newborns have impaired growth due
to poor nutrition during fetal development. About 33 percent of all children under
the age of five are stunted. Because of iron deficiencies, about 2 billion people world-
wide suffer from anemia, and 9 out of 10 of them live in developing countries.
Improving nutrition will continue to be a challenge, and the current move
toward accelerated globalization can play either a positive or a negative role in
reducing malnutrition and hunger. Policies that reduce the negative and enhance
the positive effects of globalization on nutrition and groups most at risk will be need-
ed, at both the international and national levels.
The Positive Impact of Globalization on Nutrition
Global expansion of agricultural trade and finance can prevent fluctuations in food
supply, thereby enabling developing countries to import food at adequate and stable
prices. Three-fourths of the world’s poor live in rural areas and depend—directly and
indirectly—on agriculture. In about 25 percent of developing countries more than
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two-thirds of total exports are agricultural commodities. Improved market access
for these countries can increase agricultural exports, thereby increasing foreign
exchange earnings and imports of food (and capital goods). Raising the level of
income and employment among low-income rural families also increases the
amount of food poor people can afford and protects them from higher food prices
in the event of shortages in domestic markets.
The globalization of advances in technology and transport can improve tradi-
tional methods of agricultural production and marketing, contributing to the
achievement of food security and providing access to better nutrition in the long
run. Poor populations often lack access to markets, information, and communica-
tion technologies, putting them at a competitive disadvantage in world markets.
However, recently developed technologies could be adapted to the constraints faced
by developing countries and the poor. For example, wireless phones require a lower
capital investment to set up and are particularly suited to remote locations.
Improved access to information and data via the Internet can allow researchers
and policymakers to learn about new nutrition initiatives, share information, obtain
best practices, and map food production and undernutrition by country and by
regions within countries. Information networks can provide a forum for debate on
nutrition-related issues, increasing global awareness.
The integration of labor markets gives the poor and malnourished a greater vari-
ety of employment possibilities and opportunities to acquire and diversify their
income. The growth in relatively labor-intensive, long-distance services—data pro-
cessing, software programming, clerical and professional services—could increase
the commercial service exports of developing countries. These opportunities in-
directly offer potential improvements in nutrition, but there is also the risk that
malnourished and unhealthy individuals may not be able to capture these jobs.
Nutritional Risks and Emerging Dietary Challenges
Despite its potential for improving nutrition, several aspects of the globalization
process may worsen human nutrition in developing countries. Increasing trade could
create a major shift in the structure of diets, resulting in a growing epidemic of the
so-called “diseases of affluence.” Traditional, low-cost diets, rich in fiber and grain,
are likely to be replaced by high-cost diets that include greater proportions of sug-
ars, oils, and animal fats, giving rise to higher food costs and an increase in weight
gain, obesity, and associated chronic diseases that affect children and adults alike.
Aggressive promotion of such goods by producers and distributors can further accel-
erate adverse changes in diet. In China, for example, the number of overweight adults
jumped by more than half—from 9 to 15 percent—between 1989 and 1992. These
problems are no longer limited to the well-off. A recent IFPRI study found that a
large share of poor Asian households have at least one obese member.
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In addition to potentially harmful dietary changes, huge cross-border capital
flows leave developing countries particularly vulnerable to international economic
fluctuations. For example, recent evidence from Indonesia, whose economy was
badly hit during the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998, shows an increase
in poverty and nutritional deficiencies for that period.
The impact of globalization on nutrition also depends on the domestic policies
of industrialized countries. While efforts have been made over the years to improve
market access, developed countries are still reluctant to open up their domestic mar-
kets. Distorting policies and high tariffs, sometimes 100 percent or higher, set for
meat, dairy, and other products in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, restrict trade in prod-
ucts of particular importance to poor farmers in developing countries—a situation
that denies them the benefits of trade liberalization and increasing globalization.
As globalization proceeds, food safety standards are becoming more uniform
across countries. For groups already at risk nutritionally, elevating these standards
could mean a trade-off between food safety and food security. The safety concerns
of developed countries may further restrict market access for food products from
developing countries. Farmers in developing countries may not be able to meet the
standards because they lack the adequate institutions and infrastructure. In addi-
tion, imposing these standards on developing countries could result in higher food
prices for poor consumers.
Shaping Globalization to Improve Nutrition
An urgent task for the international community is to help developing countries
become better integrated into the world economy. This can be done by helping them
build up needed supporting institutions and policies, by helping them adjust to and
comply with international agreements and terms of trade, and by enhancing their
access to world markets.
Reducing the high, trade-distorting barriers that are in place in most industri-
alized countries would facilitate developing countries’ market access and create a
favorable environment for agricultural development in these countries. Progress has
been made in reducing tariff barriers on unprocessed tropical products like coffee,
tea, and cocoa. Many more developing countries would benefit if similar improve-
ments in market access were granted for other agricultural products, such as tem-
perate-zone horticultural products, sugar, cereals, and meat, as well as for processed
agricultural products. Multilateral liberalization would also substantially increase
world prices for these commodities, thus benefiting producers.
The nutrition and health communities must respond to problems of unhealthy
diets and overnutrition. While the stigma against obesity is absent in most devel-
oping countries, people affected by these trends will be hurt in the long run if meas-
ures to address them are not taken. Through cost-effective nutrition interventions,
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education programs, and dissemination strategies, an infrastructure must be set up to
help foster a balanced and low-cost diet that will limit the risks of obesity and coro-
nary disease. New policies should encourage the production and marketing of veg-
etables, fruits, legumes, and a variety of other foods of plant origin, along with
decreasing support for the production of fat, sugar, and fatty, sugary foods and drinks.
Modern science and new technologies in information, biology, and communica-
tions can provide the poor and malnourished with a voice in policymaking and the tools
to become more effective at facing the competitive forces and risks brought about by
globalization. For such opportunities to materialize, innovations must be specifically
targeted to solving the nutritional and agricultural problems of these groups. For exam-
ple, while science based on molecular biology is moving at great speed, its application
to small-scale agriculture in developing countries has thus far been limited to cotton
in China. If focused on reducing hunger and malnutrition, biotechnology could help
combat widespread nutritional problems such as iron and vitamin A deficiencies.
Improvements in health care and access to drugs must also be facilitated. The
World Health Organization estimates that only eight percent of the $50 to $60 bil-
lion in health research worldwide goes to diseases that afflict people in developing
counties. Given the synergy between nutrition and health, targeted research and
health interventions can contribute significantly to the promotion of nutritional well-
being. A health infrastructure capable of delivering comprehensive care and adequate
follow-up can help identify and rehabilitate people who are malnourished. At the
same time, the access of poor people to essential medications at affordable prices must
be protected.
In countries exposed to globalization, the role of the public sector in many areas
of food security and nutrition appears to be shrinking, while the involvement of civil
society and the private sector is increasing. Such a shift may be appropriate, but glob-
alization should not substitute for appropriate national policies. Recent research and
experience shows how important an effective public sector is in areas related to nutri-
tion and food security. Access to land, primary education, primary health care, and
other pro-poor policies become even more important as the at-risk groups are exposed
to the competitive forces, risks, and opportunities brought by globalization.
Governments should assess how globalization will affect at-risk populations, deter-
mine whether they can limit the negative impact, and design and implement com-
pensatory schemes and safety nets where needed.
Good governance is needed to guide the transformation of the agricultural sec-
tor in a direction beneficial to the poor. Inadequate domestic policies and lack of
access to resources and markets are presently making it difficult for the poor to gain
from globalization. Governments should ensure that markets remain competitive.
They need to implement the appropriate policies and make the necessary changes
that will reduce marketing costs and price distortions and allow the agricultural sec-
tor to benefit from new technological opportunities.
Biotechnology and
Information Technology:
How Can the Poor Benefit?
P A R T  1 0
C h a p t e r  3 7
Biotechnology for
Developing-Country Agriculture
Problems and Opportunities
Gabrielle J. Persley and John J. Doyle
Modern biotechnology will not solve all the problems
of food insecurity and poverty. But it could provide a
key component to a solution if given the chance.
Today, almost a billion people live in absolute poverty and suffer from chronichunger. Seventy percent of these individuals are farmers—men, women, andchildren—who eke out a living from small plots of poor soils, mainly in trop-
ical environments that are increasingly prone to drought, flood, bushfires, and hur-
ricanes. Crop yields in these areas are stagnant and epidemics of pests and weeds
often ruin crops. Livestock suffer from parasitic diseases, some of which also affect
humans. Inputs such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides are expensive, and the lat-
ter can affect the health of farm families, destroy wildlife, and contaminate water
courses when used in excess. The only way families can grow more food and have
a surplus for sale seems to be to clear more forest. Older children move to the city,
where they, too, find it difficult to earn enough money to buy the food and medi-
cine they need for themselves and their young children.
As these detrimental social and environmental changes are occurring in the
developing world, a revolution in biotechnology and associated information tech-
nology is improving the health, well-being, and lifestyle of the privileged and cre-
ating more wealth in a few rich countries. Can this revolution also be harnessed to
serve the food and nutrition needs of the world’s poor? What are the opportunities,
problems, and risks involved with the new technologies and can they be managed?
The last question is particularly pressing in light of the current controversy between
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the United States and the European Union over genetically modified foods. The
benefits and risks of biotechnology weigh differently for food in areas of food sur-
plus than they do for life-threatening diseases in those same areas.
Opportunities
In 1998 the global market for biotechnology products (see box for definition of
terms) totaled at least US$13 billion. About 80 products, most of them medically
related, are on the market or nearly ready for it. In recent years, the fruits of two
decades of intensive and expensive research and development (R&D) in agricultural
biotechnology has begun to pay off. Approximately 28 million hectares of land were
planted with 40 transgenic crops in 1998. Most of these crops were new varieties
of cotton, corn, soybean, and rapeseed. Developing countries held 15 percent of the
area planted with the transgenic varieties.
Most biotechnology-based solutions for agriculture are likely to be delivered
in the form of new plant seeds or new strains of livestock. These solutions contin-
ue the tradition of selection and improvement of cultivated crops and livestock
developed over the centuries. The difference is that new gene technology identifies
desirable traits more quickly and accurately than conventional plant and livestock
breeding. Modern biotechnology can also introduce the genes that control desir-
able traits into plant and animal strains with far greater precision and control than
can conventional methods.
Biotechnology applications in agriculture are in their infancy. The first gener-
ation of genetically engineered plant varieties have been modified only for a single
trait, such as herbicide tolerance or pest resistance. The rapid progress being made
in genomics will transform plant, tree, and livestock breeding as the functions of
more genes are identified. Breeding for complex traits such as drought tolerance,
which is controlled by many genes, should then become common. This is an area
of great potential benefit for tropical crops, which are often grown in harsh envi-
ronments and on poor soils.
To determine if modern biotechnology can benefit the poor in developing
countries, policymakers at the national, regional, and international levels need to
analyze the problems that are currently constraining agricultural productivity or
damaging the environment, assess whether these problems may be solved by inte-
grating modern biotechnology with conventional R&D, and prioritize solutions.
This may seem self-evident, but such strategic analyses are indispensable for an-
ticipating the potential benefits and risks that may arise while using modern bio-
technology to solve specific problems. In addition to analyses, both public and
private resources for R&D need to be mobilized if the poor in developing coun-
tries are to profit from the genetic revolution.
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Policy Framework
Modern biotechnology will not solve all the problems of food insecurity and poverty.
But it could provide a key component to a solution if given the chance, and if steered
by a set of appropriate policies. These policies should guide (1) increased public
investments in R&D, including that in modern biotechnology; (2) regulatory
arrangements that inform and protect the public from any risks arising from the
release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs); (3) intellectual property man-
agement to encourage greater private-sector investment; and (4) regulation of the
private seed and agricultural research sector to protect the interests of small farm-
ers and poor consumers in developing countries.
Public-Sector R&D
Pro-poor policies can help expand agricultural R&D, including traditional and
modern biotechnological research, in order to solve problems of particular impor-
tance to the poor. The problems of orphan commodities (important subsistence food
and/or tropical export commodities that hold little commercial interest for the pri-
Definitions of Biotechnology and 
Its Component Technologies
Biotechnology is any technique that uses living organisms or substances from
those organisms to make or modify a product, improve plants or animals, or
develop microorganisms for specific uses. The key components of modern
biotechnology are
• Genomics: the molecular characterization of all species;
• Bioinfomatics: the assembly of data from genomic analysis into accessible
forms;
• Transformation: the introduction of single genes conferring potentially
useful traits into plant, livestock, fish, and tree species;
• Molecular breeding: the identification and evaluation of desirable traits in
breeding programs with the use of marker-assisted selection;
• Diagnostics: the use of molecular characterization to provide more accurate
and quicker identification of pathogens;
• Vaccine technology: use of modern immunology to develop recombinant
DNA vaccines for improving control of lethal diseases.
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vate sector) require particular attention. Given the high rates of return, more pub-
lic support for agricultural R&D should be encouraged in most developing coun-
tries. Additional public financial support for R&D at the national, regional, and
international levels would help to develop public goods the poor can afford.
Biosafety
The term biosafety describes a set of measures used to assess and manage any risks
associated with GMOs. Such risks may transcend or be inherent in the technology
and need to be managed accordingly. Technology-transcending risks emanate from
the political and social context in which the technology is used. They include con-
cerns that biotechnology may increase the prosperity gap between the rich and the
poor, and may contribute to a loss of biodiversity. Ethical concerns about patent-
ing living organisms and moving genes between species also fall into this category.
The principles and practices for assessing and managing technology-inherent
risks are well established in several countries. They take into account the nature of
the organism, the familiarity of the product, any distinguishing features of the
process by which a product was produced, and the environment into which it will
be introduced. A science-based assessment of these factors on a case by case basis,
and identification of any concerns expressed by stakeholders, enable regulators to
find out what risks may be associated with a particular product and to make appro-
priate recommendations. A regulatory system that enjoys the confidence of the pub-
lic and the business and farming communities is essential for the effective use of
biotechnology. The current and proposed international agreements that govern
movements of GMOs also contribute to biosafety.
Intellectual Property Management
The purpose of intellectual property management is to protect local inventions and
enable access to technologies developed elsewhere. Trade-related intellectual prop-
erty rights (TRIPs) are a matter of ongoing concern within the World Trade
Organization. The present patent system favors those countries that have a strong
innovation base. Despite much effort, no satisfactory system exists to recompense
traditional owners and improvers of germplasm. The lack of intellectual property
protection also constrains private-sector investment in developing countries.
The Private Sector
The participation of the private sector is critical to the development and delivery
of new biotechnology products. The enabling environment to encourage private-
sector participation includes a regulatory system that accurately informs the public
of the benefits and risks involved in the use of new technologies; a legal framework
for protecting intellectual property; adequate infrastructure for power, transport, and
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telecommunications; a fair tax system and investment incentives; a skilled workforce,
including a well-supported university sector; public funding for R&D; and incen-
tives to establish innovative public-private collaboration and joint ventures at the
national and international levels.
Delivering Solutions for the Poor
The successful application of modern biotechnology to the problems that cause
undernourishment and poverty could be called a biosolution. The delivery of new
biosolutions to the problems of food security and poverty will require continual pol-
icy development and actions at the national, regional, and international levels.
These efforts will involve the following five areas: (1) determining priorities and
assessing relative risks and benefits in consultation with the poor, who are often over-
looked while others decide what is best for them; (2) setting policies that benefit
the poor and that minimize technology-transcending risks that adversely affect the
poor; (3) establishing an environment that facilitates the safe use of biotechnology
through investment, regulation, intellectual property protection, and good gover-
nance; (4) actively linking biotechnology and information technology so that new
scientific discoveries worldwide can be assessed and applied to the problems of food
insecurity and poverty in a timely manner; and (5) determining what investments
governments and the international development community will have to make in
human and financial resources in order to ensure that biosolutions to the problems
of food security reach the poor.
C h a p t e r  3 8
Developing Appropriate
Biotechnology Policies for
Developing-Country Agriculture
Per Pinstrup-Andersen
Modern biotechnology research may help reduce poverty,
improve food security and nutrition, and make the use of
natural resources more sustainable, only if it focuses on the
problems and opportunities poor people in developing
countries face and only if appropriate policies accompany it.
Modern biotechnology can enhance agricultural productivity in developingcountries in a way that further reduces poverty, improves food security andnutrition, and promotes sustainable use of natural resources. But such bene-
fits from biotechnology require policy action on a number of fronts. The small
farmer in developing countries faces a variety of problems and constraints. Crop
losses due to insects, diseases, weeds, and drought threaten income and food avail-
ability. Acid soils, low soil fertility and lack of access to reasonably priced plant nutri-
ents, and other biotic and abiotic factors also contribute to low yields. Poor
infrastructure and dysfunctional markets for inputs and outputs, along with lack of
access to credit and technical assistance, add to the problems plaguing the small
farmer. Solutions to these problems will benefit both farmers and consumers.
Although modern biotechnology cannot solve all these problems, it can provide a
critical component to the solution if it is guided by appropriate policies. Four sets
of policies are particularly important. Each of these is briefly discussed below.
Policies to Guide Research for the Poor
Policies must expand and guide research and technology development to solve the
problems of particular importance to the poor. These problems include diets with
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inadequate levels of energy, protein, and micronutrients, and crop losses due to biot-
ic and abiotic factors. Research should focus on the crops of particular importance
to small farmers and poor consumers in developing countries. Bananas, cassava,
yams, sweet potatoes, rice, maize, wheat, and millet, along with livestock products,
feature most prominently in the diets and production activities of the poor. Except
for limited work on rice, bananas, and cassava, little biotechnology research currently
focuses on helping the small farmer and poor consumer solve their productivity and
nutrition problems. The prediction so often heard that the poor in developing coun-
tries are unlikely to benefit from modern agricultural biotechnology in the foresee-
able future could well come true—not because the technology has little to offer but
because it will not be given a chance.
Allocate Additional Public Resources to Agricultural Research
There are three ways to expand biotechnology research for the benefit of the poor.
First, allocate additional public resources to agricultural research, including biotech-
nology research, that promises large social benefits. Existing national and inter-
national agricultural research systems have to be strengthened or new ones built.
Low-income developing countries currently invest less than 0.5 percent of the value
of agricultural production in agricultural research, compared to about 2 percent in
developed countries. Underinvestment is widespread despite high annual economic
rates of return from investments in agricultural research. A recent assessment of more
than 1,000 research projects and programs found an average annual rate of return
of 88 percent. Investments by the private sector are limited to research that permits
a large enough profit from the returns. Nonetheless, privately funded research can
still generate large benefits to farmers and consumers, as illustrated by a recent study
of the distribution of benefits from the use of genetically modified (GM) soybeans
in the United States. The private patent holders and private seed companies cap-
tured one-third of the total economic benefits, farmers and consumers gained two-
thirds. While private-sector agricultural research has increased rapidly in the
industrialized countries during the last 10 to 15 years, it currently accounts for a
small share of agricultural research in most developing countries.
Convert Some Social Benefits to Private Benefits
Second, expand private-sector research for the poor by converting some of the
social benefits of research to private benefits for the private sector. The public sec-
tor can entice the private sector to develop technologies for the poor by offering up
front to buy the exclusive rights to newly developed technology and make it avail-
able either for free or for a nominal charge to small farmers. The amount of the offer
could be determined on the basis of expected social benefits, using an annual rate
of return normally expected from agricultural research, for example, 60–80 percent.
DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICIES 247
The risk of failing to develop the specified technology would rest with the research
agency, just as it does when technology is developed for the market. The public sec-
tor offer would come due to the research agency that first develops the technology,
but only when the technology is developed, tested, and made available. Both pri-
vate- and public-sector agencies could participate in this research. Opportunities for
collaboration between multinational life science companies and public-sector agri-
cultural research agencies in both developing and developed countries might increase
the probability of success. With necessary refinements, the arrangement proposed
here should be of interest to international development assistance agencies. This pro-
posal builds on a similar idea that Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University proposed for
developing vaccines for tropical diseases.
Protect Intellectual Property Rights
The third way to expand biotechnology research to help the poor is to protect the intel-
lectual property rights of a private research agency that develops a particular technol-
ogy, for example, seed with infertile offspring, or that contracts directly with the
farmer, in both cases forcing the farmer to buy new seed every season. This would make
it easier for the private sector to recuperate the incomes needed to justify the research.
But seeds with infertile offspring may be inappropriate for small farmers in develop-
ing countries because they pose large risks to food security. Existing infrastructure and
production processes may not be able to keep fertile and infertile seeds apart. Small
farmers could face severe consequences if they planted infertile seeds by mistake.
Monitoring and enforcing contracts that prohibit large numbers of small farmers from
using the crops they produce as seed would be expensive and difficult to do.
Policies to Protect against Health Risks
GM foods are not intrinsically good or bad for human health. Their health effect
depends on their specific content. GM foods with a higher content of digestible iron
are likely to benefit consumers with iron deficiencies. But the transfer of genes from
one species to another may also transfer characteristics that cause allergic reactions.
Thus, GM foods need to be tested for allergy transfers before they are commer-
cialized. It was precisely such testing that avoided the commercialization of maize
with a Brazil nut gene. GM foods with possible allergy risks should be fully labeled.
Labeling may also be needed to identify content for cultural and religious reasons
or simply because consumers want to know. Finally, labeling may be required to
identify the production process itself when that, rather than any specific health risk,
interests consumers.
Failure to remove antibiotic-resistant marker genes used in research before a
GM food is commercialized presents a potential although unproven health risk.
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Recent legislation in the European Union requires that such marker genes be
removed before a GM food is deemed safe for consumers. Risks and opportunities
associated with GM foods should be integrated into the general food safety regula-
tions of a country.
Policies to Address Ecological Risks
Effective national biosafety regulations should be in place before modern biotech-
nology is introduced into a country’s agriculture. Such regulations should be coun-
try-specific and reflect relevant risk factors. The ecological risks policymakers need
to assess include the spread of traits such as herbicide resistance from genetically
modified plants to plants (including weeds) that are not modified, and the build-
up of resistance in insect populations. Seeds that produce infertile offspring may be
an effective solution to the risk associated with cross pollination but, as mentioned
earlier, they may be inappropriate for small farmers. The approach used to develop
terminator seeds, however, offers great promise for the development of a seed that
will avoid the spread of new traits through cross-pollination. The seed would
contain the desired traits, such as pest resistance or drought tolerance, but each trait
would be activated only after treatment with a particular chemical. Without treat-
ment, the seed would maintain its normal characteristics. Thus, if a farmer planted
an improved seed, the offspring would not be sterile; rather they would revert back
to being normal seeds (before improved traits were introduced). The farmer would
then have the choice of planting the normal seed or bringing back the improved
traits by applying a particular chemical. Contrary to the terminator gene, this
approach complies with the principle of doing no harm.
Both food safety and biosafety regulations should reflect international agree-
ments and a society’s acceptable risk levels, including the risks associated with not
using modern biotechnology to achieve desired goals. The poor should be includ-
ed directly in the debate and decisionmaking about their desire for technological
change, the risks of that change, and the consequences of no or alternative kinds
of change.
Policies to Regulate the Private Sector
Recent mergers and acquisitions have resulted in increasing concentration among
companies engaged in biotechnology research. The outcome of this growing con-
centration may be reduced competition, monopoly or oligopoly profits, exploita-
tion of small farmers and consumers, and successful efforts to gain special favors
from governments. Effective antitrust legislation and institutions to enforce the leg-
islation are needed, particularly in small developing countries where one or only a
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few seed distribution companies operate. Effective legislation is also required to
enforce intellectual property rights, including those of farmers to germplasm, along
the lines agreed to within the frameworks of the World Trade Organization and the
Convention on Biological Diversity.
Conclusions
Modern biotechnology research may help reduce poverty, improve food security and
nutrition, and make the use of natural resources more sustainable, only if it focus-
es on the problems and opportunities poor people in developing countries face and
only if appropriate policies accompany it. Modern biotechnology is not a silver bul-
let, but it may be a powerful tool in the fight against poverty and should be made
available to poor farmers and consumers.
C h a p t e r  3 9
Governing the GM Crop Revolution
Policy Choices for Developing Countries
Robert L. Paarlberg
The inclination of developing countries to promote 
or block the spread of GM crops can be judged 
by the policy choices they make.
Will developing countries adopt policies that promote the planting of genet-ically modified (GM) crops, or will they select policies that slow the spreadof the GM crop revolution? The evidence so far is mixed. In some
prominent countries such as China, policies are in place that encourage the inde-
pendent development and planting of GM crops. Yet in a number of other equally
prominent countries the planting of GM crops is not yet officially approved.
The inclination of developing countries to promote or block the spread of GM
crops can be judged by the policy choices they make in five separate areas: intellec-
tual property rights (IPR) policy, biosafety policy, trade policy, food safety policy,
and public research investments (Table 39.1).
Policy Options toward GM Crops
Intellectual Property Rights
If developing countries want to bring GM crop technologies into their farming sys-
tems, they may have to recognize some of the intellectual property rights claims of
the private companies that have been developing GM crops. At one extreme, they
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might even adopt the U.S. approach and provide full patent protection. A some-
what less promotional policy could offer only plant breeders’ rights as IPR guaran-
tees, which entitle breeders to use protected varieties as an initial source of variation
for the creation of new varieties as in the 1991 agreement of the International Union
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). A still weaker approach would
be to embrace an earlier 1978 version of UPOV, which preserves the privilege of
farmers to replant seeds from protected varieties on their own farms. Weaker still
would be to provide no IPRs at all for plant breeders.
No IPRs for plants or ani-
mals, or IPRs on paper
that are not enforced
No careful case-by-case
screening; risk
assumed because of
GM process
GM seed and plant
imports blocked; GM-
free status maintained
in hopes of capturing
export market
premiums
GM food sales banned,
or warning labels that
stigmatize GM foods
as unsafe to con-
sumers required
Neither treasury nor
donor funds spent on
any adaptation or
development of GM
crop technology
Table 39.1 Policy Options toward GM crops
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Note: UPOV = International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants; PBRs = plant breeders’
rights; WTO = World Trade Organization.
Intellectual
property
rights
Biosafety
Trade
Food safety
and con-
sumer
choice
Public
research
invest-
ment
Full patent protection,
plus plant breeders’
rights under UPOV
1991
No careful screening,
only token screening,
or approval based on
approvals in other
countries
GM crops promoted to
lower commodity pro-
duction costs and
boost exports; no
restrictions on imports
of GM seeds of plant
materials
No regulatory distinction
drawn between GM
and non-GM foods
when testing or label-
ing for food safety
Treasury resources spent
on both development
and local adaptations
of GM crop
technologies
PBRs under UPOV 1991
Case-by-case screening
for demonstrated risk,
depending on intended
use of product
GM crops neither pro-
moted nor prevented;
imports of GM com-
modities limited in
same way as non-GM
in accordance with sci-
ence-based WTO
standards
Distinction made
between GM and non-
GM foods on some
existing food labels but
not so as to require
segregation of market
channels
Treasury resources spent
on local adaptations of
GM crop technologies
but not on develop-
ment of new trans-
genes
PBRs under UPOV 1978,
which preserves farm-
ers’ privilege
Case-by-case screening
also for scientific
uncertainties owing to
novelty of GM process
Imports of GM seeds and
materials screened or
restrained separately
and more tightly than
non-GM; labeling
requirements imposed
on import of GM foods
or commodities
Comprehensive positive
labeling of all GM
foods required and
enforced with segre-
gated market channels
No significant treasury
resources spent on
GM crop research or
adaptation; donors
allowed to finance
local adaptations of
GM crops
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Biosafety
In the area of biological safety, the most promotional policy toward GM crops would
be to approve the use of these crops without any careful case-by-case screening for
unwanted geneflow or damage to nontarget species. A less promotional approach
would be to screen GM crops case by case but only for risks that can be scientifi-
cally demonstrated. A more cautious approach would be to hold crops off the mar-
ket case by case even without proof of risk so long as some scientific uncertainties
remained. The most cautious approach would be to assume risk in all cases because
of the novelty of the GM process.
Trade
Consumer acceptance of GM crops in major importing countries continues to
evolve. Assuming adequate consumer acceptance, a promotional trade policy toward
GM crops would be to seek the import of GM plant materials and seeds without
restriction and promote the planting of GM crops in hopes of cutting farm pro-
duction costs and becoming a more competitive exporter. A more neutral approach
would be to neither promote nor prevent the planting of GM crops and to treat GM
seed and commodity imports the same way as non-GM imports. A more cautious
trade policy approach would be to develop and implement a separate and more
restrictive method for regulating and labeling the import of GM seeds or com-
modities compared with non-GM. A preventive trade policy choice would be to ban
GM imports and block the planting of GM crops. If consumer acceptance of GM
crops in international markets continues to weaken, such a ban on planting GM crops
could be defended on trade grounds as a way to seek price premiums on the world
market as a “GM-free” exporter.
Food Safety and Consumer Choice
In this area a promotional policy would be to conclude that GM crops currently on
the market pose no new hazards to human health and to impose no additional inspec-
tion or labeling burdens on them. A less promotional approach would be to require
labeling of some GM foods in the interest of a consumer’s right to know but to make
the labeling standards lenient enough so that a complete segregation of GM from
non-GM commodities is not required. A still more cautious approach would be to
impose mandatory comprehensive labeling for all GM foods in a manner that would
require market segregation. A fully preventive approach would be to ban all GM foods
or to label them in ways intended to stigmatize and prevent their use.
Public Research Investments
Developing countries must also make a range of agricultural research investment
choices toward GM crops. At one extreme they might spend treasury resources to
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develop their own GM crops. As a second option they could invest only in the more
limited goal of backcrossing GM traits developed by others into their own domes-
tic germplasm. As a still more limited option they could allow their scientists to pur-
sue backcrossing of transgenes into local varieties only if donors were willing to pay
for it. At a preventive extreme they could decide not to spend any money, even donor
money, on GM crop research.
Policy Choices in Four Developing Countries
This system can be used to classify the actual policy choices toward GM crops that
were made by governments in Brazil, China, India, and Kenya in 1999–2000
(Table 39.2). Whereas China opted for relatively permissive policies toward GM
crops, Brazil, India, and Kenya have in most respects been more precautionary.
In Brazil, India, and Kenya biosafety approval has emerged as the principal
point of resistance against moving the GM crop revolution forward. This is a sur-
prising discovery given the fact that biosafety approvals for GM crops have not been
such a strong sticking point in the industrial world, given the traditionally weak agri-
cultural biosafety policies of most developing countries, and given the potential
biosafety benefits of some GM crop applications (those that permit fewer and less
toxic chemical sprays). It is particularly surprising that Brazil and India have moved
so slowly on biosafety approvals for GM crops, given the significant state investments
that are simultaneously being made in both countries to develop GM crops.
Table 39.2 Policies toward GM Crops in Brazil, China, India, and Kenya, 
1999–2000
Promotional Permissive Precautionary Preventive
Intellectual property rights Brazil Kenya India
Chna
Biosafety China Kenya
Brazil
India
Trade China Kenya India
Brazil
Food safety and consumer choice Kenya Brazil
China India
Public research investment Brazil Kenya
India
China
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International pressures of four kinds help explain this pattern of caution in the
developing world: (1) environmental groups based in Europe and North America
have used media campaigns, lawsuits, and direct actions to project into the devel-
oping world a tone of extreme caution toward GM crops; (2) consumer doubts in
Europe and Japan regarding GM crops have discouraged planting of those crops by
developing-country exporters; (3) the precautionary tone of the 2000 Biosafety
Protocol governing transboundary movements of GM crops is reinforcing bio-
safety caution in the developing world; and (4) donor assistance to developing
countries in the area of agribiotechnology has often focused more on the possible
biosafety risks of the new technology than on its possible agronomic or economic
advantages. One reason for China’s more permissive biosafety policy is its greater in-
sulation from some of these international influences promoting caution elsewhere.
A further spread of GM crops into the developing world will therefore depend
on more than just the availability of suitable technologies. It will also depend upon
the future willingness of biosafety authorities in developing countries to give farm-
ers permission to plant GM crops. This willingness, in turn, will likely depend as
much on the external pressures and influences faced by these regulators as upon actu-
al documented threats to biosafety from GM crops.
C h a p t e r  4 0
Bridging the Digital Divide
Reported by Uday Mohan
Expensive, potentially disruptive, and extraordinarily
beneficial, ICTs are here to stay, and developing
countries can ill afford to sit on the sidelines.
Before the Internet came to Veerampattinam, a coastal village in southernIndia, the local fisher folk went to get their daily catch without knowing seaconditions or the location of fish shoals. Lives were sometimes lost because
of particularly high waves and rough seas. But in late 1998, the M.S. Swaminathan
Research Foundation (MSSRF), an Indian research center, installed a computer in
a “village information shop” with financial assistance from the International
Development Research Centre, Canada.
Through a wireless local-area network based on radio frequencies, the computer
makes available daily data on wave height and wind forecasts from a U.S. Navy web-
site. This information is broadcast to the villagers in the early morning via loud-
speakers on the roof of the information shop.
Armed with this knowledge as well as with details about fish location, the fish-
ermen now ply the seas in greater safety and with more efficiency. Not only has the
Internet-enabled computer made the main work of the village easier, but it has also
made information about prices, health and transportation facilities, and entitlement
schemes accessible. Indeed, before the computer arrived, villagers were unaware of
housing loans that they were entitled to. Most fishermen in the village have now
benefited from these low-cost loans.
Veerampattinam is one of many recent examples of the way the Internet has
reached and benefited the poor in developing countries. Although small in scale,
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these examples have posed a challenge to the view that the Internet belongs to the
technologically advanced and that it would be out of place in poor rural areas. As
M.S. Swaminathan, MSSRF’s chairman of the board, says, “The technological
empowerment of the poor adds value to their work and lives. Just as with the Green
Revolution, information technology in the hands of small producers, particularly
women, benefits everyone, whereas information technology in the hands only of the
rich does not.”
Without doubt the Internet and other information and communication tech-
nologies (ICTs), such as faxes, video, digital radio, mobile phones, and satellite
technologies, have helped people gain access to, process, respond to, and distribute
information in a faster and more far-reaching way than ever before. This ongoing
shift toward a more information-intensive society gives both added weight and new
meaning to the old maxim, “information is power.”
ICTs at a minimum can enhance the livelihoods of the poor and improve mar-
ket efficiency. As development tools in their own right, ICTs can also help lead to
higher literacy rates through distance learning; gender equality through the em-
powerment of women who gain greater access to economic opportunities and civil
society; sustainable development through easier dissemination of appropriate in-
formation; more balanced social relations through the greater accountability
imposed on the powerful by the marginalized; and other global goods. Hans
d’Orville, former director of the Information Technology for Development Pro-
gramme at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), puts it this way:
“Information technology has a place alongside adequate food, health care, educa-
tion, and other fundamentals. By taking this place it has broadened our definition
of poverty. Those people or countries who cannot or will not participate fully in the
new information economy will find it all the more difficult to climb out of poverty.”
The Digital Divide
The importance of ICTs is precisely why concern has escalated over the “digital
divide”—the gap in information and communication technologies that exists
between technologically advanced and developing countries, poor and rich, men and
women, and urban and rural areas. Recent high-level international meetings, such
as the Global Knowledge II conference this past March in Malaysia and the July
G-8 summit in Japan, have pressed for solutions to the divide.
An array of numbers illustrates the vast gap that has to be bridged: Nua Internet
Surveys estimates that about 333 million people worldwide were online as of June
of this year, but as many as 72 percent of them resided in North America and
Europe. Africa claimed only 2.8 million Internet subscribers, Asia/Pacific 75.5 mil-
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lion, Middle East 1.9 million, and South America 13.2 million. In 1998, according
to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), low-income countries had
6.2 personal computers and 45 fixed-line and mobile phones per 1,000 people,
whereas high-income countries had 311 and 832, respectively.
The digital divide is not only enormous—dwarfing even the per capita income
gap ratio between high- and low-income countries—but it is increasing, according
to a recent World Bank study. The authors of the study, Francisco Rodriguez and
Ernest Wilson III, estimate that even East Asia, which is adopting ICTs at a rapid
pace, will take another 40 years to catch up with the developed world. Inevitably,
access varies widely among and within developing countries as well. Only 11 of 53
African countries for which there are data have 10,000 or more Internet users; 17
have fewer than 1,000. Gender, income, age, and other disparities also abound. In
Ethiopia, for example, 98 percent of Internet users in 1998 were university gradu-
ates and 86 percent were male.
As the Internet becomes the norm for commerce and information exchange in
the developed world, the poorer countries will have little choice but to try to bridge
the digital divide in all its forms. They will go online to become competitive in the
new economy or forgo significant growth. The stakes involve not only social develop-
ment and productivity growth, but also the burgeoning e-commerce sector, which is
expected to reach between US$2 and 3 trillion in transactions in the next three years.
Connecting the Poor
The last few years have witnessed a flurry of activity as the development commu-
nity has put forward position papers and proposals and launched pilot projects to
include the poor in the information revolution. Projects have ranged from provid-
ing price information to farmers to boosting microcredit-based sales via the web.
The hallmarks of this activity have been diversity and innovation in organiza-
tion, technology, and funding. Results are trickling in, and no formula has emerged,
though some ingredients appear to be critical. According to Roger Noll, professor
of economics and director of the Public Policy Program at Stanford University,
“Technological change has greatly affected the optimal strategy for starting ICT serv-
ice. In many cases, fixed wireless is better for new networks because of its lower cost
and quicker availability. And because economies of scale are not very important in
wireless, competition is often feasible right from the start. Another common ingre-
dient is that western-style universal service is not a practical reality in developing
countries, where much of the population is too poor to afford individual access. The
focus instead should be on convenient access through sharing, such as with tele-
centers and pay phones.”
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Meeting Community Needs with ICTs
This need to minimize cost but maximize rural access drives most ICT projects in
developing countries. Not surprisingly, the Internet still often plays a lesser role than
other technologies in the distribution of information in rural areas. Most farmers,
for example, are years away from getting price information through the Internet
because of cost and lack of human resources and adequate phone infrastructure in
rural areas. But because a farmer’s decisions about where, when, and how much to
sell depend on the signals sent by national and international market prices, ICT pro-
ponents see the delivery of timely price information as one of the key benefits farmers
can receive from the new information technologies. Consequently a number of ICT
projects focus on making it easier for agricultural producers to access prices.
“Price information helps connect farmers to markets,” says Mike Weber, pro-
fessor and codirector of a food security program run by the Department of Agri-
cultural Economics at Michigan State University (MSU), “and the more up-to-date
the price information, the better for the farmer and the market.” Weber’s own group
uses both low- and high-tech means to distribute prices. For the past ten years, the
food security project has delivered weekly agricultural prices by newspaper and fax
to government offices, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) in Mozambique. MediaFax, a fax-based newspaper, provides the same
information each week to a wider audience. NGOs make copies of the weekly price
lists and distribute the information to farmers.
“Our first line of defense for the farmer is the fax and newspaper because they
are inexpensive, and we also use the radio where possible,” says Weber, “but the
Internet plays a role too for those who can afford it. Our department at MSU hosts
a website that provides comprehensive links to global market information, includ-
ing the weekly price lists for Mozambique, but more than 50 percent of the hits right
now come from U.S. farmers, traders, and analysts.”
The Internet need not remain elusive, of course, as MSSRF has shown.
Veerampattinam, the village in India, is actually one of five now hooked to the
Internet as part of MSSRF’s village information project. One of the villages serves
as the information hub, with full access to the Internet. The others have wireless
access only to the hub, to which they send information and requests for informa-
tion. The hub searches the web and electronically delivers the requested informa-
tion to the other centers, along with standard information in an email newsletter.
This hub-and-spoke model avoids the cost of providing full Internet access to all
villages and also creates a network for information sharing across the villages.
MSSRF and its granters fund the project, asking only that the villagers house and
operate the technology.
Some projects are devised to pay for themselves while providing developing-
country poor with access to ICTs for socioeconomic development. Such is the case
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with the projects facilitated by the International Institute for Communication and
Development (IICD), which was established by the Dutch Ministry for
Development Cooperation in 1997. In Jamaica, for example, IICD and its partners
are helping to put in place a comprehensive agribusiness information system that
will enable small farmers, who are losing ground in the global marketplace, to get
both print- and web-based information about markets, products, registration
requirements, and technical assistance.
This demand-driven system makes information available through a continu-
ally updated database on domestic agricultural production and marketing and
through the Internet. Extension agents collect the information from producers and
traders using palm-top computers. The information is then downloaded to PCs
located in primary extension offices. These PCs are linked to the central database
at the headquarters of the Rural Agricultural Development Authority. The system
is currently being tested with 80 small farmers and traders in two regions in Jamaica.
The method for delivering information is still evolving. Currently large farm-
ers and traders with access to the Internet get the information easily. Smaller farmers
and traders generally visit the extension offices, where they can obtain standardized
and customized reports in hard copy. If literacy is a problem, extension officers help
interpret documents. A small subscription fee makes the project sustainable, and
small farmers can pool their resources and subscribe as a group.
The project will eventually extend throughout Jamaica and is expected to reach
50,000 direct users and 150,000 indirect users. Ingrid Hagen, IICD’s manager of
Private and Public Sector Partnerships, observes, “Access is giving these Jamaican
farmers a chance to compete seriously with imports that are crowding them out of
markets, even for the main domestic products. The technical, regulatory, and mar-
ket demands increasingly in force due to globalization can be met only with the help
of ICTs.”
The belief that ICTs have a role to play in the lives of small farmers has led to
their introduction in many rural areas. But most projects remain relatively small-
scale and not widely replicated because of cost, the multitude of approaches and local
needs, and lack of interest from the private sector.
These factors, and the fact that ICT introduction is still at an early stage in
developing countries, make the impact of projects hard to judge. “Undoubtedly
ICTs are very useful for the people who have an opportunity to use them, but there
is also a lot of hype about what computers and the Internet can do for rural peo-
ple,” says Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, deputy director of the United Nations
Research Institute for Social Development and coordinator of its program on
Information Technologies and Social Development. “Some serious social science
research is needed to understand the institutional context that can make these tech-
nologies really useful and sustainable in specific rural settings,” she adds, “and it is
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not the Internet that is always most important. Older technologies too, such as com-
munity radio, are opening up societies and allowing people to talk to each other.
The telephone, of course, remains vital to people’s well-being.”
Using Mobile Phones
Perhaps the best-known example of bringing telephones to the poor is Gra-
meenPhone, the Grameen Bank’s rapidly growing cellular phone business in Bangla-
desh. A little more than three years old, the venture has already put mobile phones
in the hands of women in more than 1,200 Bangladeshi villages. At the same time,
GrameenPhone has secured more than 50 percent of the national, primarily urban,
mobile phone market in Bangladesh, thus helping to assure both its financial abil-
ity to serve rural areas and its technical ability to create a reliable urban network with
which to link the rural population.
In the villages, GrameenPhone works on the same principle as the Grameen
Bank’s microloan program, giving rural women from landless households access to
credit. A woman who has already established good credit with the Bank, whose house
is located in a fairly central part of the village, and whose family has one member
familiar with the English letters and numbers on a phone, can borrow the roughly
$350 needed to purchase a solar-powered mobile phone. After a day’s training, the
woman is set to provide phone service to other villagers for a price. This access to
technology not only generates substantial income for the “telephone woman,” who
on average earns $450 a year after expenses, but also provides villagers with access
to information and services that would otherwise remain far outside their reach.
The villagers, for example, can contact medical help immediately; get prevail-
ing market prices for the crops they grow, thus avoiding underpayment by oppor-
tunistic traders; engage in commercial activities that require quick or frequent access
to timetables, regulations, or other market-related information; and easily keep in
touch with family members living in the cities or abroad. The arrival of the cell
phone has also, for once, turned the social pecking order on its head as the relatively
wealthy rely on the poor to keep in touch with the outside world.
“Money, the old saying goes, speaks loudest, but it is user-friendly technology that
begets money in the first place,” says Nuimuddin Chowdhury, an IFPRI consultant
on ICTs. “The GrameenPhone project has shown once again that the rural poor are
among the most eager to innovate, and they could significantly improve their income
if given access to ICTs, which are, moreover, environmentally clean technologies.”
Using Satellites
For developing countries, bridging the digital divide generally means bridging the
gap between super-sophisticated technology on the one hand and local logistics and
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financial ability to pay on the other. Because satellites can bring ICTs to rural areas
at a relatively low cost, some NGOs promote them to help fill the information and
communication needs in developing countries. Volunteers in Technical Assistance
(VITA), a U.S.-based NGO, for example, links its satellite with ground terminals
that enable users to send and receive stored emails four to six times a day as the satel-
lite passes overhead.
Kept in a community center or some other central location, each terminal is
estimated to serve an area of roughly 10,000 people via the email access it gives to
schools, clinics, NGOs, business people, and individual users. VITA’s planned serv-
ices include continually updated web indexes designed to meet the information
needs of remote communities and a research service to maximize the impact of the
50-page limit that can be downloaded each day by each terminal. Costs for these
services and for supporting the system will be defrayed by a relatively small annual
fee per terminal and by proposed private-sector use of a portion of VITA’s satellite
bandwidth in exchange for technological production and support.
Currently at the experimental stage, the project serves 25 terminals. VITA plans
to deploy 2,500 terminals throughout the developing world. “Basically we’re try-
ing to push the envelope to give the poor access to a culture of information,” says
George Scharffenberger, president of VITA. “Instant access to the Internet is excit-
ing, but for a third to a half of humanity affordable access is still several years away.
In the meantime, satellites can provide low-cost communication and information
services to poor and remote areas while building critical information skills among
teachers, health workers, people in small businesses, women, and youth.”
VITA’s other partner in this venture, SATELLIFE, also runs a health infor-
mation system, HealthNet, which works through a satellite-terminal system simi-
lar to VITA’s and through modem-to-modem telephone links. One of Africa’s first
sources for email, HealthNet also provides electronic publications, access to the web,
and discussion groups, including one on AIDS, to about 10,000 health professionals
worldwide. Locally owned and operated, HealthNet has been helpful in dramatic
cases, such as containment of an Ebola virus outbreak in Gabon, as well as in more
routine health care. It has succeeded in those countries where an adequate institu-
tional structure exists or can be built to support ICTs, where training of technical
staff matches investments in technology, and where a successful business model has
been implemented to offset operating expenses.
“Once familiarity with a computer-based information culture has taken root and
the medical benefits have become evident,” says Rebecca Riccio, SATELLIFE’s direc-
tor of programs, “we’ve routinely seen health professionals further develop that culture
and demand a wider array of ICT applications, not only from us but from others.”
After training at SATELLIFE’s Regional Information Technology Training
Centre in Kenya, for example, one participant, a medical director of a charitable dis-
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pensary in Tanzania, became a telemedicine enthusiast, setting up a mailing list for
his fellow trainees and seeking out how to transmit electrocardiograms and heart
and lung sounds via the Internet to specialists for interpretation. “He also convinced
management to provide two computers and set up an ICT training facility for his
colleagues at the dispensary,” says Eliazar Karan, project manager of HealthNet
Kenya.
Improving Women’s Access to ICTs
As ICTs begin to play a greater role in development, concerns are growing that
women will be left out of the picture. Available data show that women account for
25 percent of ICT users in Brazil, 17 percent in South Africa, 7 percent in China,
and 4 percent in Arab states. All the gender faultlines are present in ICT access, with
poor, uneducated, and older women particularly affected.
To address these concerns, the United Nations Development Fund for Women
(UNIFEM), ITU, and UNDP recently signed an agreement guaranteeing the
inclusion of gender issues in their policy dialogue and decisionmaking about ICTs.
Going further, Noeleen Heyzer, UNIFEM’s executive director, has advocated that
UN bodies that are developing programs to promote ICTs should consider allo-
cating 50 percent of these program funds and program activities to women and girls
until the digital divide closes.
“ICTs give us a new opportunity to build a confident, skilled, and participa-
tory knowledge community that includes women,” says Heyzer, “and failure to do
this will only worsen the existing gender-related gaps. We should be striving for ‘e-
quality.’ Women and girls must receive the training and preparation to become users
and producers of ICT technologies and to understand and shape the regulations and
policies associated with these technologies.”
Overcoming the Barriers to Universal Access
The success of some local-level projects says little yet about what should be the
method and timetable for delivering universal access. Even the dilemma about
whether to focus first on building a national infrastructure for instant access or on
building ICTs around specific development problems remains unresolved.
Some developing countries, such as Malaysia, have made commitments to rapid
and widespread ICT introduction. Others may move forward, at least in the near
future, on two tracks: partnering with the private sector to install ICTs in urban areas
and looking to donors, lowest-cost methods, and innovative schemes for subsidiz-
ing subscription fees to connect rural areas, with the two tracks sometimes over-
lapping.
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“The countries that have been most successful in promoting ICT-based devel-
opment,” says Carlos Primo Braga, program manager at infoDev (the World Bank’s
Information for Development Program), “are those that have created a broad frame-
work for fostering both competition and universal access. They’ve focused on expan-
sion of the capacity to connect to ICTs, education to use that connectivity,
appropriate content in the local language to make that connectivity useful, and com-
petition to lower prices and increase market growth.”
Perhaps the most neglected component of this framework is a well-developed
legal system to facilitate effective regulatory policy. “Developing countries repeat-
edly treat this issue cavalierly,” says Noll, “as if constructing an independent, effec-
tive, and efficient administrative system is something that can be set up casually over
a long weekend.”
As if these systemic hurdles were not enough, some governments are wary of
the power of information and the political and economic uses it can be put to, or
simply skeptical about its importance. They show reluctance to embrace the ICT
revolution.
But the most pressing and universal barrier remains money. D’Orville estimates
that a telecenter that serves 2,000–6,000 people costs roughly $60,000–$80,000,
a sum that includes provisions for training, content development, operations, main-
tenance, and management. Even so, the picture may not be so daunting because
costs are decreasing and new technical devices are emerging. “Medium-developed
countries already have high TV penetration, and devices to access the Internet are
going to fall below the cost of TVs,” says Josh Calder senior associate at Coates &
Jarratt, Inc., a Washington, D.C.-based consulting firm that analyzes and forecasts
ICT applications. “More people are expected to access the Web via mobile devices
than through PCs in a few years, and mobile phones already have extensive pene-
tration even in quite poor countries. High-tech systems tend to go where they are
demanded—note the ubiquitous presence of sonogram clinics in the poorest neigh-
borhoods of India.”
Expensive, potentially disruptive, and extraordinarily beneficial, ICTs are here
to stay, and developing countries can ill afford to sit on the sidelines. As Richard
Heeks, senior lecturer in information systems and development at the University
of Manchester, puts it, “Information and communication technology is a runaway
horse, and the choice for the world’s poorer nations is stark: stand by and watch it
carry the richer nations forward, or jump on and hope to steer it as best they can.”
Conclusion
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Required Policy Action
Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Rajul Pandya-Lorch
The vision of a world where nobody needs to go hungry and where naturalresources are managed sustainably can be achieved by 2020. But achieving itwill require policy action of a nature and magnitude not currently pursued
by most governments. Governments must decide that creating such a world is of
paramount importance and give it the highest priority. Decisionmakers in the pub-
lic and private sector must join forces with civil society around the common goal
of facilitating sustainable food security for all and together take the necessary steps.
Agreeing that access to sufficient food to live a healthy and productive life is a basic
human right for all, rings hollow if those in power do not make every effort to assist
individuals and communities in getting access.
What specific actions should be taken and who should take them will vary
across communities, countries, and regions and over time. This chapter identifies
the policy actions that we believe developing countries and aid agencies should con-
sider. We suggest that local and national actions be tailored and implemented in a
participatory way that includes the intended beneficiaries.
International Driving Forces
Two overriding forces—globalization and technological change—may help or hin-
der efforts to achieve sustainable food security for all. Globalization, in the form of
trade liberalization, reduced national protection and taxation of agriculture and
industry, more integrated international capital markets, and a freer flow of labor,
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information, and technology across national borders, is likely to continue and even
accelerate. Technological change is driven by rapid scientific progress in biology and
information and communications technologies. Relying exclusively on the market
to direct these forces will result in a distribution of benefits and costs incompatible
with the vision of sustainable global food security. It is increasingly clear that inter-
national, national, and local policies and institutions must guide globalization and
technology to assure an acceptable distribution of benefits and losses.
At the international level, existing institutions such as the World Trade
Organization should work closely with civil society and national governments to
identify and remove factors that harm the poor. Such factors include ineffective com-
petition and price distortions in international trade, intellectual property right
regimes that are adverse to the poor, barriers to access to appropriate technology by
developing countries, barriers to labor movement across national borders, and
import barriers by industrialized countries to goods and services that generate
income among the poor in developing countries and for which these countries are
or could become competitive.
At the national level, countries should consider six sets of policy action,
described here.
Policies to Improve the Human Resource
It is generally recognized that good health and nutrition are important indicators
of well-being and should be pursued in their own right. But the important role of
health and nutrition as inputs in the development process is still poorly understood.
Sick and undernourished people will not escape poverty and associated human mis-
ery. Thus good health and nutrition are means to eradicating poverty and achiev-
ing broad-based development, as well as the ends.
Policy action to improve health and nutrition must deal with diseases affect-
ing the poor such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria as well as access to clean
drinking water and safe food. Poor nutrition can be a vicious circle in which under-
weight babies, born of poor and malnourished mothers, grow up in an environment
with unclean drinking water and insufficient and unsafe food to become under-
weight poor parents giving birth to underweight babies. Policies should be designed
and implemented to intervene in this cycle. The most cost-effective intervention
point will vary across population groups and over time.
In addition to the nutrition problems caused by food shortage, policy action is
needed to alleviate widespread micronutrient deficiencies through better-balanced
diets, plant breeding, fortification, and supplementation. Previously thought of as
rich people’s diseases, obesity and related chronic diseases are rapidly becoming a
serious health problem among the poor in many developing countries. Preventive
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policy action such as nutrition education and food price interventions is needed
along with curative measures. The dietary transition accelerating in many develop-
ing countries is resulting in the coexistence of a double burden of undernutrition
and “overnutrition,” placing additional demands on the public sector and civil
society.
In addition to publicly funded health, water, and nutrition programs and
direct transfers of income in cash and kind to the poor, policy action should focus
on generating pro-poor economic growth. Primary education has shown to be par-
ticularly effective in helping people out of poverty, and emphasis should be placed
on policies promoting primary education, particularly among the poor. Food for
Education programs, including both school feeding and take-home food, have
shown great promise as a way of expanding school enrollment of poor children and
simultaneously improving the food security of participating families. Education of
girls from poor families has been neglected in many societies and should be
improved, not only for equity reasons but also because it improves the well-being
of families and contributes to poverty alleviation in general. Improving the status
of women within households and societies has also been shown to contribute not
only to equity but also to general improvements in food security and economic
growth. The design and implementation of policies to help the poor and food in-
secure should recognize the importance of social capital and build on it rather than
trying to replace it.
Access to Productive Resources and Employment
If pro-poor economic growth is to succeed, the poor must have access to produc-
tive resources and employment. Between 70 and 75 percent of the world’s poor peo-
ple live in rural areas of developing countries. Some have access to small plots of land,
most do not. Among those who have access to land, many live in areas with poor
soils, irregular rainfall, and very little appropriate infrastructure such as roads and
markets. While outmigration to urban or peri-urban areas may be the best solution
for some, these areas can absorb only a small fraction of the rural poor every year.
Thus, in the short to medium term, policy action to achieve the 2020 Vision must
focus on the environments where the majority of the poor are.
Secure access to land by poor families through individual or community own-
ership, long-term user rights, or some other means is of paramount importance.
Governments may need to intervene in existing land tenure arrangements either to
redistribute land or to assure secure long-term access by households or communi-
ties. Clear property rights or user rights to other natural resources, such as water and
forests, are also crucial for achieving the combined goals of poverty alleviation, sus-
tainable management of natural resources, and productivity increases in agriculture.
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National policies should be balanced with community action. In some cases, mar-
ket approaches may be appropriate. In others, delegating the necessary power to
communities and user associations may be the way forward.
Although the majority of the rural poor depend on agriculture, many of them
do so indirectly through employment in small-scale rural enterprises that provide
goods and services for farm families. Credit and savings institutions for small rural
enterprises as well as investment in rural infrastructure and competitive markets is
needed to further enhance employment and add value to primary agricultural pro-
duction on the basis of small-scale rural enterprises.
Although countries must focus on policies to deal with rural poverty and food
insecurity, they also need to accommodate the rapidly increasing urban population.
Such policies should focus on public and private investment in infrastructure,
employment, housing, education, and primary health care.
Markets, Infrastructure, and Institutions
Without fair, well-functioning markets and access to both production inputs and
consumption goods at reasonable prices, the poor cannot fully capture the benefits
from improved human resources and access to productive resources. Small farmers
must have access to efficient and effective competitive markets to buy the inputs they
need in the production process and to sell what they produce. They must also have
timely access to credit and savings institutions that offer reasonable interest rates and
other conditions. While microcredit and savings schemes have been successful in
many locations of the developing countries, these schemes are usually limited to very
small-scale enterprises and frequently exclude farming. Policies are urgently needed
to facilitate access to unsubsidized credit by small farmers producing primarily for
the market. Access by women and collective repayment responsibility are impor-
tant aspects to consider for equity and economic growth reasons.
Ongoing privatization of domestic agricultural input and output markets
should be completed, and the new role of government, such as regulation, specifi-
cation of standards for weight and measures, and enforcement of contracts, should
be identified and implemented.
Globalization and increasing climatic fluctuations are likely to introduce
new risks and uncertainties for the poor. Economies will be more interconnected,
resulting in new risk factors, and consumers, producers, and labor will be less pro-
tected as markets are liberalized and subsidies reduced. Institutions to facilitate
the management of risk among the poor, including credit and savings institutions
and social and food security networks, as well as predictive tools such as timely
weather and market forecasts, are currently weak in most countries and need
strengthening.
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Explicit and implicit capital subsidies as well as infrastructure investments in
developing countries tend to be biased against small farmers. This may also be the
case for access to input and output markets. Many rural regions consisting prima-
rily of poor people, including small farmers, are often the last regions to get invest-
ments in infrastructure, and partly for that reason markets are poorly developed.
There is a widespread erroneous view that small farmers are not competitive. While
the relation between efficiency and farm size depends on many factors, it is impor-
tant to remove the distortions currently embodied in capital subsidies, infrastruc-
ture investments, markets, and related policies to give the farm structure the
opportunity to adjust according to relative efficiency. This step is particularly impor-
tant to assure that the rural poor get their fair share of the benefits from globaliza-
tion and the associated changes in market competition. Rural poor, whether farmers
or not, will not benefit if they are excluded from participation or fair competition
in the mainstream market economy.
Knowledge and Technology
Sustainable productivity increases in small-scale agriculture are of critical importance
to achieve the 2020 Vision. In addition to access to inputs and other factors already
mentioned, productivity increases will depend on access to appropriate knowledge
and technology. While private sector research may produce some of the knowledge
and technology needed by small farmers, publicly funded research is essential. This
is so partly because poor farmers are not an attractive market for private sector
research agencies and partly because much of the knowledge and technology poor
farmers need is of a public goods nature.
Public sector agricultural research should embody all relevant approaches, such
as agroecological, conventional, and molecular biology research methods.
Opportunities for using modern information and communications technology in
agricultural production and distribution as well as nonagricultural rural enterpris-
es to help achieve the 2020 Vision should be pursued. The primary role of the gov-
ernment should be not to choose technologies for small farmers and others but
rather to make available a menu of technology options from which they can choose.
Because of past negligence of areas that are environmentally less favored, such a
menu of technology options is particularly critical for these areas. To ensure that
technologies are relevant to the ultimate users, research should involve the partici-
pation of these users.
Because of past labor surpluses in rural areas of many developing countries,
researchers have focused on developing labor-using technologies. The result has
often been low labor productivity. Situations of surplus labor are less common to-
day than they were 10 years ago, particularly in areas affected by HIV/AIDS.
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Seasonal labor scarcity is now very common in rural areas of developing countries.
Planning for research and technology must take this situation into consideration and
place a greater emphasis on increasing labor productivity.
Most developing countries must also strengthen their polices related to biotech-
nology, particularly in the areas of allocation of public resources for research, bio-
safety, intellectual property rights, health and ecological risks, antitrust legislation,
and trade.
Management of Natural Resources
Population and income growth along with dietary changes will require continued
increases in food production. Most of the increases will have to come from land cur-
rently under cultivation. Continuing to bring new land into agricultural produc-
tion will entail large environmental costs in terms of land degradation, deforestation,
and loss of biodiversity. Governments must take steps to ensure that continued
expansion of yields on existing agricultural lands is sustainable, such as undertak-
ing agricultural research and technology, enacting policies for water and land man-
agement, and establishing property rights to natural resources.
Policy action is needed in many of the least-developed countries to help farm-
ers solve the problem of declining soil fertility through better soil management and
cropping practices, effective use of organic matter, and access to reasonably priced
fertilizers. Required policies include support of agricultural research aimed at bet-
ter use of plant nutrients and the capture of nitrogen from the air, access to credit,
investments in roads and rural transportation systems, government support and reg-
ulation to create an effective and efficient market for plant nutrients, and extension
services. Policy action is also needed to mitigate negative effects of climate change
and to reduce agriculture’s contribution to global warming.
Macroeconomic Policies and Good Governance
An appropriate macroeconomic environment is critical for the achievement of the
2020 Vision. The impact of the policy measures discussed in this chapter will
depend on existing macroeconomic policies, such as those affecting money supply,
exchange rates, and trade.
The roles of the state, the market, civil society, and the for-profit private sec-
tor have changed markedly during the last 10 years in response to globalization,
structural adjustment, and related market reforms. The role of the public sector is
shrinking while civil society and the market are taking on additional responsibili-
ties. Although this shift may be appropriate, it is important to recognize the limi-
tations of the for-profit sector in providing public goods. Developing countries
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should maintain a strong and effective public sector to guide and support efforts to
achieve the 2020 Vision and to provide public goods needed by the poor. These
goods include primary health care; education; rural infrastructure in regions with
many poor people; research to help small farmers and to enable sustainable man-
agement of natural resources; development and enforcement of effective and fair
legal systems, including contract enforcement; and weight and measurement stan-
dards. Other public sector actions, such as poverty and nutrition programs, have
already been mentioned. Civil society may carry out part of these actions and may
play an increasingly important role in providing other public goods to the poor and
malnourished.
No More Business As Usual
Achieving the 2020 Vision will not be easy. It will not happen with business as usual.
A much higher level of dedication by those with the power to move the world clos-
er to the 2020 Vision will be needed. A small sacrifice by the nonpoor may be called
for in the short run, but in the long run we will all gain. Apart from the tremen-
dous human misery they create, widespread poverty, food insecurity, and malnu-
trition constitute a huge economic waste that, if eliminated, would provide the
foundation for enhanced well-being for poor and nonpoor alike.
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